Iraqi internal developments, as well as deception efforts by the Iraqi government. However, the frequency of intelligence reports on Iraq dropped after the 1998 bombing of Iraq. In early 2002, the International Assessments Staff (IAS), the intelligence assessment branch for the Canadian Privy Council Office and the foreign affairs department, held oral briefings with Canadian officials where they stressed that there was no credible evidence linking Iraq to the September 11th attacks; in response to claims made by the Bush administration. IAS analysts worked closely with members of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) who also shared the same view. In June 2002, the Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC), a committee that coordinated the analytical units of CSIS, IAS, and the Department of National Defence's (DND) Director General Intelligence, had also concluded that there was little evidence that regimes like Iraq were providing chemical weapons to terrorist organizations. On 30 August 2002, the IAC published another assessment to determine whether or not Iraq had any WMD stockpiles, and whether or not the country was attempting to reconstitute its WMD program after the 1998 bombings. In its assessment, it could not conclude with certainty that Iraq had destroyed its WMDs, although it did note that any chemical agents or ballistic missiles that Iraq may possess would be in very small quantities, and would most likely be out of service due to poor storage of the materials. The assessment also could find no real indications that Iraq was reconstituting a nuclear program. The IAC assessment was also sceptical of the evidence presented by the Americans and was specifically critical of how there was little evidence of the wide range of equipment and resources needed to start such a program; even when accounting for potential deception efforts by the Iraqis. The Interdepartmental Experts Groups, a group that supported the work of the IAC, also found no evidence of that the Iraqi chemical weapons program was reconstituted; although did make note that Iraqi ballistic missiles may have exceeded the , although only by a limited amount. The IAS also assessed that Iraq did not appear to have taken the technical steps required to weaponize a biological agent like smallpox, although DND analysts have also highlighted that Iraq may have the virus itself. However, scientific analysis from the DND largely corroborated with the IAC's assessment. The DND reported with high confidence, although not with absolute certainty,