R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 was an important decision of the Supreme Court of Canada concerning the application of Aboriginal rights under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Court held that Aboriginal rights, such as fishing, that were in existence in 1982 are protected under the Constitution of Canada cannot be infringed without justification on account of the government's fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Background Ronald Edward Sparrow, a member of the Musqueam Band, was caught fishing with a drift net 45 fathoms (82 m) in length, 20 fathoms (37 m) longer than permitted by the band's fishing licence under the Fisheries Act of 1985. Sparrow admitted to all the facts in the charge but justified it on the ground that he was exercising his Aboriginal right to fish under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. At trial, the judge found that section 35 protected only existing treaty rights and that there was no inherent right to fish. An appeal to the County Court was dismissed, and a further appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to maintain the defence. The issue to the Supreme Court was whether the net length restriction violated s. 35(1). Reasons of the court The judgment of unanimous Court was given by Chief Justice Brian Dickson and Justice Gérard La Forest. They held that Sparrow was exercising an "inherent" Aboriginal right that existed before the provincial legislation and that was guaranteed and protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. They interpreted each of the words of section 35(1). The Sparrow test Is the practice, custom, or tradition an existing aboriginal right? If this right has been established, does the impugned limitation constitute a prima facie infringement on that right? If the limitation is a prima facie infringement on the aboriginal right, can the government justify it? The existence of the aboriginal right to fish was not at serious dispute in this appeal, so this case doesn't elaborate on how to determine whether a right is an aboriginal right. This case instead focused on whether that right was extinguished, whether that right was infringed, and whether that infringement was justified. "Existing" The word "existing" in section 35(1), the Court said, must be "interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time". As such, "existing" was interpreted