that Iraq no longer possessed chemical agents or munitions dating to the Gulf War. The DND also could not find credible evidence that the Iraqi nuclear program had been restarted. In March 2003, in the weeks before the invasion of Iraq, the DND published a report called Iraq: No Smoke, No Gun, where it assessed the coalition forces would fail to find WMDs in Iraq. Given that it contradicted the intelligence assessment from the UK and US, as well as the claims made by the coalition, the report was not shared with Canada's allies to not endanger the country's relationship with its Five Eyes partners. IAS reports that also disagreed with the intelligence assessments of its Five Eyes partners were also marked as "Canadian-Eyes Only". From late August 2002, the IAC focused its efforts on reviewing incoming intelligence reports that would alter its assessment. However, the conclusion reached by the IAC was reinforced by Canadian defence intelligence analysts who maintained regular contact with their counterparts in the UK, and to a lesser extent, in the US; where on a one-on-one basis, allied analyst seemingly expressed reservations about the evidence being shared through the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement. The IAS had also received intelligence passed along from the informant referred to as Curveball; concluding that the information provided by the informant was only circumstantial, and provided no direct evidence that Iraq had an active WMD program, or that they had the necessary delivery capabilities. In early 2003, the US provided Canada with the classified version of a National Intelligence Estimate for Iraqi WMDs. Issues within the National Intelligence Estimate, including dissenting views taken from various US departments within the classified version of the document further reinforced IAS's assessment that Iraq didn't have WMDs. However, CSIS may have provided the impression to the Americans that the Canadian intelligence community had suspicions that Iraq possessed WMDs in early 2002, owing to a report from the organization which raised such concerns in February 2002. Although that report was later withdrawn after the IAS raised several concerns about it, it had already been forwarded to the US. On the United States The Canadian intelligence community's assessment of the situation was also influenced by their intelligence of the United States. Shortly after the September 11 attacks in 2001, Kergin, returned to Ottawa to brief government officials on the ramifications of the events within the American administration;