substantial effort to reinforce the island. A similar plan to the one conducted in October was put forward, with a larger convoy preceded by another bombardment by battleships to neutralize the airfield. The Japanese were prepared to employ sufficient forces to guarantee its success. On the night of November 12–13, a force of two battleships, and , one light cruiser and 11 destroyers departed for Guadalcanal to bombard the airfield. However, this attempt was thwarted by a smaller American force of five cruisers and eight destroyers, which intercepted the Japanese force and a vicious night action ensued at close range. Losses were heavy on both sides, but the critical bombardment of the airfield never occurred. Hiei was damaged and the following day was sunk by American aircraft, becoming the first Japanese battleship to be lost in the war. The Japanese then attempted another bombardment with a force centering on the battleship Kirishima, with support from two heavy cruisers and two destroyer squadrons. The Japanese had additional battleships that were available, but were not employed. On the night of November 14–15, this attempt was again met by the American force which included two battleships and . In another vicious night battle, the Japanese were again turned back, losing the battleship Kirishima during the first battleship duel of the Pacific War. These two battles which were fought at night, becoming known as the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal, were the decisive events of the campaign. While the Americans had delivered large numbers of additional troops to Guadalcanal, the Japanese only delivered 2,000 troops and an insignificant amount of supplies. Additionally, the large Japanese convoy had lost all ten transports, which had been sunk by American aircraft from the undamaged airfield. Naval losses were heavy for both sides; the Americans lost two cruisers and seven destroyers and many ships had been severely damaged. The Japanese lost two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and three destroyers. The Japanese had been defeated more by a failure to mass their forces rather than by being outfought. The attrition suffered by the Japanese during the battles for Guadalcanal was too great. On January 4, the Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters instructed Yamamoto to prepare the withdrawal of the remaining troops from Guadalcanal. The evacuation of Guadalcanal was codenamed Operation Ke. The Americans detected the preparations for the operation and believed they were actually for