actual Department of Justice antitrust policy," despite Wilson's assertion that the so-called No-No's are restraints "which in virtually all cases are going to lead to antitrust trouble because of their adverse effect upon competition." Two other former Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals from the Antitrust Division commented: In actuality, of the sixteen cases filed by the division's Intellectual Property Section between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, only half specifically addressed any of the nine practices. Moreover, almost all of these cases were litigated under a rule of reason rather than per se illegality. Although it therefore appears that the No-No's were never more than an informal antitrust prosecutors' check-list, and were not advanced much less pressed in litigation as a proposed rule of antitrust law, they were widely denounced. For example, during the Bush Administration, government officials distanced themselves from them. Thus, in 2003 the official then heading the Antitrust Division spoke out strongly against the No-No's as valid enforcement guidelines. He then spoke of how the "No-No" practices actually often benefited competition; for example: Tie-ins of unpatented supplies "could minimize the risks associated with the uncertainty that a patent owner may have regarding the value of his/her patented technology." "Compulsory payment of royalties in amounts not reasonably related to sales of the patented product . . . might be far more efficient, for example, to [use to] base royalties upon the total units produced by the licensee." "Licensee veto power over the licensor's grant of further licenses . . . may have a net procompetitive effect." Another commentator during this period said with approval, "The Agencies have come a long way since the days of the Nine No-Nos." In retrospect, the Nine No-No's controversy appears to have been overblown, and the aims of its proponents exaggerated. The Antitrust Division's retreat from it and emphasis on whether the restrictive No-No actually had any anticompetitive effects in the marketplace, may properly be considered in light of the Zenith and Kimble cases' distinctions between antitrust and patent misuse based on their different respective policies. Considered in that light, the No-No's may properly state patent misuse policy. But in large part they did not state a viable antitrust enforcement policy. That appears to be the conclusion drawn in recent papers by Professor Hovenkamp. Thus, the Nine No-No's controversy informs us more about patent misuse than it does about antitrust policy, for Wilson's