opposition to the house of Habsburg and by a desire to win for Prussia the support of England, a policy supported by him in important memoirs of the years 1786 and 1787. His diplomacy was directed also against Austria's old ally, France. Hence it was chiefly owing to Hertzberg that in 1787, in spite of the king's unwillingness at first, Prussia intervened in the Netherlands in support of the stadtholder William V against the democratic French party. The success of this intervention, which was the practical realisation of a plan very characteristic of Hertzberg, marks the culminating point in his career. But the opposition between him and the new king, which had already appeared at the time of the conclusion of the triple alliance between the Netherlands, England and Prussia, became more marked in the following years, when Hertzberg, relying upon this alliance, and in conscious imitation of Frederick II's policy at the time of the first partition of Poland, sought to take advantage of the entanglement of Austria with Russia in the war with Turkey to secure for Prussia an extension of territory by diplomatic intervention. According to his plan, Prussia was to offer her mediation at the proper moment, and in the territorial readjustments that the peace would bring, was to receive Danzig and Thorn as her portion. Beyond this he aimed at preventing the restoration of the hegemony of Austria in the Empire, and secretly cherished the hope of restoring Frederick the Great's Russian alliance. With a curious obstinacy he continued to pursue these aims even when, owing to military and diplomatic events, they were already partly out of date. His personal position became increasingly difficult, as deep-rooted differences between him and the king were revealed during these diplomatic campaigns: Hertzberg wished to effect everything by peaceful means, while Frederick William II was for a time determined on war with Austria. As regards Polish policy, too, their ideas came into conflict, Hertzberg having always been openly opposed to the total annihilation of the Polish kingdom. The same is true of the attitude of king and minister towards Great Britain. At the conferences at Reichenbach in the summer of 1790, this opposition became more and more acute, and Hertzberg was only with difficulty persuaded to come to an agreement merely on the basis of the status quo, as demanded by Pitt. The king's renunciation of any extension of