says that the world was set up so that the consequent would have been made true if the antecedent were true. One will accept that second statement to the extent that one thinks the world was set up in that way. (Conspiracy theorists who think there was a back-up shooter, for instance, may accept the second statement.) Because of these differences, epistemic possibility bears on the actual world in ways that subjunctive possibility does not. Suppose, for example, that one wants to know whether or not to take an umbrella before going outside. If one is told "It's possible that it is raining outside"—in the sense of epistemic possibility—then that would weigh on whether or not I take the umbrella. But if one is told that "It's possible for it to rain outside"—in the sense of metaphysical possibility—then one is no better off for this bit of modal enlightenment. Further reading Alan R. White, Modal Thinking (), chapter 1. White discusses subjunctive possibility as "the actuality of a possibility" and epistemic possibility as "the possibility of an actuality" Keith DeRose, "Epistemic Possibilities," The Philosophical Review 100 (1991): pp. 581–605. David Chalmers, The Components of Content and The Tyranny of the Subjunctive External links Epistemology Modal logic Possibility