The court looked at the language of section 32 and found that it does not limit to only positive acts. It is not only to protect against encroachment on rights or the excessive exercise of authority, as McClung suggested, rather it is a tool for citizens to challenge the law in all its forms. The legislature's silence on an issue does not constitute neutrality with first assessing the application of section 15. Neutrality cannot be assumed. To do so would remove the omission from the scope of judicial scrutiny under the Charter. The appellants have challenged the law on the ground that it violates the Constitution of Canada, and the courts must hear and consider the challenge. The court then looked at the application of the Charter to private activities. Although the [Act] targets private activities and as a result has an 'effect' on those activities it does not follow that this indirect effect should remove the [Act] from the purview of the Charter. It would lead to an unacceptable result if any legislation that regulated private activity would for that reason alone be immune from Charter scrutiny. The respondents' submission has failed to distinguish between "private activity" and "laws that regulate private activity". The former is not subject to the Charter, while the latter obviously is. Section 1 The court followed this with a section 1 analysis to which they decided was not applicable. In concluding, the court ruled that to remedy the situation "sexual orientation" must be read into the impugned provision of the Act. Firstly, the respondents failed to show a "pressing and substantial objective". The Court dismissed the respondents' submission, that the predicament would be rare, as only an "explanation" and not an objective, as it lacked any description of goal or purpose. Secondly, the respondents failed to show a "rational connection". The Court was especially harsh on this point, stating:Far from being rationally connected to the objective of the impugned provisions, the exclusion of sexual orientation from the Act is antithetical to that goal. Indeed, it would be nonsensical to say that the goal of protecting persons from discrimination is rationally connected to, or advanced by, denying such protection to a group which this Court has recognized as historically disadvantaged. (para. 119) The respondents attempted to justify the rational connection as part of an incrementalist approach similar to one used by Gagan Egan v Canada,