IPC, however, failed to discover oil in the Sultanate's region, which was limited to the coastal area of Oman, and informed the Sultan that oil is more likely to exist in the interior region of Oman. The Treaty of Seeb provided autonomous rule to the Omanis who resided in the interior region of Oman, which was called the Imamate of Oman, by stating that the Sultanate "should not interfere in their [Imamate] internal affairs". IPC offered financial support to the Sultan in order to raise a military force that would occupy the Imamate's region so that IPC would gain access to the possible oil reserves. The Sultanate, backed by the British government and the financial support received from IPC, attacked the interior of Oman on 25 October 1954 triggering Jebel Akhdar War. IPC was also interested in other ventures apart from oil, such as potash mining in Trans-Jordan, asphalt in Syria (for which it set up a company, Société Industrielle des Asphaltes et Pétroles de Lattique) and salt mining in the Aden Protectorates - although this latter venture was never developed. The company created air transport companies, the Iraq Petroleum Transport Company and Transports du Proche Orient, to operate aircraft and vessels to ferry people and equipment to the remoter parts of its concession areas. IPC-Government relations During the Hashemite Monarchy (1932–58), there were no serious issues between the IPC and the Iraqi government as the Hashemites were extremely pro-west. In fact, they had been installed by the British, and therefore tensions were minimized. They were dependent on the British militarily and had essentially pledged allegiance to them through the Baghdad Pact. The Hashemites' main disputes centered on increasing the amount of crude oil extracted, getting more Iraqis involved in the process of producing the oil and getting more royalties. In 1952, terms that were more generous to the Iraqi government were negotiated. These terms were largely based on the far more lucrative terms of the Saudi-Aramco "50/50" agreement of December 1950. One could argue that a determinant in these negotiations was the friendly atmosphere in which they were conducted. This atmosphere did not continue to the negotiations held between the IPC and revolutionary governments that followed the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958. Relations between the two can be examined on two major factors. First, oil was a vital part of the Iraqi economy. Because of this, the