Soviet tanks; and the resulting Japanese defeat prompted a series of complaints by the Imperial Army to incorporate improvements in future Japanese armour. This is the primary reason IJA tanks were not as successful while being used with IJA tactics. The tank forces of the U.S. Army consisted of the M2A4 and M3 Stuart light tanks up until 1941, although these vehicles were five years newer than the 1935 built Type 95's, the IJA and U.S. light tanks were comparable to each other, and seemingly performed well for their respective forces during jungle combat operations; during their phase of World War II. As with all armour, maintenance was a continuous challenge; especially in tropical environments. When IJA and SNLF (Imperial marines) tanks did clash with the enemy they were quickly destroyed by concealed anti-tank guns or overwhelming numbers of hostile tanks. Japan was a naval power, and concentrated its production on warships, thus placing a low priority on armoured vehicle development, its tanks becoming quickly obsolete during the later years of the war. A number of designs that were equal to heavier foreign types were on the drawing board at the beginning of the war, but would only be built in small numbers towards the end, being placed in reserve, to be deployed for the defence of Japan itself. China The Republic of China's National Revolutionary Army's 200th Division was the country's only mechanised division during the war. The 200th used pre-war tanks acquired from Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union. After 1945 Indo-Pakistani wars Arab–Israeli wars The conflict between Arab nations in the East Mediterranean region and Israel in particular would serve to become a testing ground for development in armoured warfare during the decades of the Cold War. Both sides in the Arab–Israeli series of conflicts made heavy use of tanks and other armoured vehicles due to the practicality of tanks in the desert environment these conflicts largely took place in. During the 1956 Suez War and Six-Day War (1967), Israeli armoured units typically had the advantage, mainly due to good tactics and unit cohesion. Conversely, the Yom Kippur War (1973) illustrated the problems that can arise if armoured and infantry units do not work closely together. Israeli tanks, operating independently in large numbers, were decimated by Egyptian anti-tank teams, well-distributed amongst regular infantry, and often equipped with new, first-generation portable anti-tank guided missiles. This is an extreme