approach that of his or her physician. He questions even the possibility of a patient reaching a state of "informed consent". He further believes that if individuals reach such a state of "informed consent", this does not mean individuals should consent, or fully understand the meaning of their consent. "For persons can misuse themselves even if they do so voluntarily and with full knowledge." Individuals consenting to experimentation through the justification of the human good turn themselves into objects for the use of the experimentation. The issue is further complicated for Hauerwas as to who should be considered for medical experimentation. The use of prisoners only proliferates social stereotypes and denigration. He believes that informed consent is necessary for human experimentation, but it does not provide justification for one's willingness to submit and participate in experimentation. Language of rights Hauerwas finds the language of "rights" to be disturbing as it assumes that people relate to others as strangers, and lends even the understanding of the family to that of a contractual society. He argues that being part of a family, however, is not a voluntary undertaking. As such, when one is part of a family, the kinds of responsibilities each member holds are in relation to each other. Hauerwas finds that as a parent, you have a duty to your children, not just because you brought them into existence, but because the role of parent is to ensure the children are brought up in a way that is conducive to the community's values. Thus, the issue with "rights" language is that it attempts to prevent maltreatment of individuals to the point of exclusion of familial and communal responsibility. Hauerwas's bottom line is that there can be no real society if its members only relate in terms of noninterference. The language of rights destroys society because we regard people as strangers instead of assuming the responsibility towards them as family and members of the community that we share. Views on death and dying well Hauerwas believes that there is a difference between the concept of death and the criteria for death. The concept of death "involves a philosophical judgment of a significant change that has happened in a person" and therefore "is a correlative of what one takes to be the necessary condition of human life, e.g., ... the potential for consciousness". The criteria of death, however, are "those empirical measurements