10, an unknown vessel was spotted floating upside-down in about of water on the eastern coast of Michigan within sight of Huronia Beach and the mouth of the St. Clair River. Determining the identity of this "mystery ship" became a national interest, resulting in daily front-page newspaper articles. The ship eventually sank and was identified on November 15 as Charles S. Price. The front page of that day's Port Huron Times-Herald extra edition read: "BOAT IS PRICE —DIVER IS BAKER — SECRET KNOWN". Milton Smith, an assistant engineer who decided at the last moment not to join his crew on premonition of disaster, helped identify bodies from the wreck. Among the debris cast up by the storm was the wreckage of the fish tug Searchlight, which was lost in April 1907. The final tally of financial loss included US$2,332,000 for totally lost vessels, $830,900 for vessels that became constructive total losses, $620,000 for vessels stranded but returned to service, and approximately $1,000,000 in lost cargoes. This figure excludes financial losses in coastal cities. While the storm was the main cause of damage on the lakes, human factors, including measures that could have reduced the storm's effects but were not taken, also contributed. Post-storm conversations mostly focused on placing blame but served to highlight weaknesses. The U.S. Weather Bureau did not have the ability to predict the storm but hesitated to admit its limitations because it wanted to secure higher budgets. Instead, it focused on the terminology and nature of warnings. Another factor was the underpowering of large ships that affected their ability to travel, maneuver, and hold steady in severe storms. Even with both anchors dropped and steaming full power into the wind, several were unable to avoid being carried backward. For example, the Charles S. Price had a single 1,760 horsepower engine. Three years after the storm, the same shipyard built a freighter with only 1,800 horsepower. The geometry of the lakes and locks combined with operational economics dictated the use of slimmer, shallower ships than comparable ocean-going vessels, reducing stability and structural strength. The "straight deck" ship design was becoming prevalent, requiring more and larger hatch covers, which increased vulnerability to storms. Insufficient strength of the large hatches and their fastenings was also noted, as well as the shortness of the hatch coamings. The limited compartmentalization of cargo holds meant the flooding of one compartment was sufficient to