is intended to apply to all the substantive offences. Yet, rather than defining what dishonesty is, s2 describes what it is not, allowing a jury to take a flexible approach, thus: s2(1). A person's appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest: (a) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other's consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or (c) (except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if he appropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps. s2(2). A person's appropriation of property belonging to another may be dishonest notwithstanding that he is willing to pay for the property. The s2(1)(a) claim of right is a difficult concept in that it represents a statutory exception to the fundamental public policy principle ignorantia juris non excusat and allows a limited mistake of law defence. According to R v Turner (No2) [1971] 2 All ER 441, a case in which a man was charged with the s1 Theft of his own car, the test was one of honest belief in a right, not a mere permission, to act in the particular way. In this, the test is subjective and a matter of fact for the jury to decide. If the owner or some person able to give a valid consent, actually consented to the taking, the property would not belong to another and no actus reus would exist. This provision applies to the situation in which either the consent is void ab initio or is subsequently voided. If the existence or effect of the vitiating factor is not recognised by the defendant, then he would not be dishonest. For example, if a contract was affected by a common or mutual mistake. But if the defendant is initially innocent, he may become dishonest if he later realises the mistake and decides to keep the property (i.e. an omission). Similarly, if he has knowingly misrepresented a material fact and this has induced a consent that he knows or ought to know would not have been freely given,