The remaining AASF Hurricanes began operations to cover evacuations from ports on the French Atlantic coast. Nantes, Brest and St Nazaire were defended by 1, 73 and 242 squadrons, St Malo and Cherbourg by 17 and 501 squadrons flying from Dinard in Brittany and later the Channel Islands. On 18 June, 1 and 73 squadrons, the first to France in 1939, were the last to leave, although many unserviceable Hurricanes and those without fuel were abandoned, not all of them being destroyed. AASF headquarters was disbanded on 26 June 1940. Aftermath Analysis Fighters Flying Officer Paul Richey of 1 Squadron told a staff officer from AASF HQ that and in 1999, Cull et al. wrote that Hurricane tactics in France were inept, the fighters being sent into action in threes or sixes against far larger formations. Fighter pilots had been trained to attack bombers over England, beyond the range of German single-engined fighter escorts and formation flying received more emphasis than observation, dog-fighting and gunnery. Experience gained during the Phoney War was not generally applied; some Hurricane pilots enjoyed great success but the Hurricane squadrons suffered needless casualties for lack of training and leadership. The use of tight formations meant that Hurricane pilots seldom saw the aircraft that shot them down. Few squadron commanders flew on operations and some were flagrantly incompetent. Flying from improvised and unprotected airstrips, rather than the airfields enjoyed by the Fighter Command squadrons in Britain, reduced the number of serviceable aircraft. Most Hurricane engagements took place against bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and the twin-engined Bf 110 heavy fighter, inferior in manoeuvrability but present in much greater numbers. The Hurricanes made bomber escorts necessary but suffered disproportionate losses when they met Bf 109s which used stalking tactics, attacking unseen out of the sun rather than dog-fighting. Bombers According to Greg Baughen (2016) on 10 May, the Fairey Battle had been a disaster as a tactical bomber; when flying high, they were shot down by fighters and when low, by anti-aircraft fire. With fuel for a range of in un-armoured and non-self-sealing tanks, carrying a navigator in a cabin with a poor view outside, the Battle was highly unsuitable for short-range, low altitude, tactical attacks. Extra armour and self-sealing fuel tanks had been delivered to France but not fitted. The crews lacked experience and at first may have taken too long to bomb, sometimes attacking over flat ground,