which gave a good view of the target and an equally good view of the aircraft from the ground. With more experience, pilots used ground features for cover and made shorter approach runs. The German invasion demonstrated that RAF crews were not sufficiently equipped or trained for daylight tactical operations and army support; during the Battle of Arras (21 May) the BEF had received no air cover. The attacks on 14 May were catastrophic and the Air Staff claimed that the losses suffered by the AASF showed that tactical air support was not a feasible operation of war. The ministry claimed that the Battle was obsolete, rather than in need of more armour, self-sealing tanks, guns and fighter support. After the war, German officers said that day bombing caused them many delays and that they had not noticed the British night bombing offensive against the Ruhr. The AASF had made a start on becoming a flexible tactical air force; daylight operations by the Battles had more effect on the German offensive than Wellington bombers flying by night. Sending low-performance aircraft over the battlefield might seem suicidal but slow biplanes like Dutch Fokker C.X bombers, the German Henschel Hs 123 dive-bomber/close support aircraft and British Hawker Hector army co-operation aircraft had been used in 1940 for ground attacks at low altitude. Against the ragged forward edge of advanced forces, with ill-organised anti-aircraft defences, such slow, light and highly-manoeuvrable aircraft could hit targets and escape. Command By 19 May, the lack of centralised command made Allied problems much worse; in the north the BEF commanded the Air Component, in the south, the AASF flew in support of the army but the BAFF HQ had to move south to Coulommiers, separating it from the ZOAN HQ. The Air Ministry continued its strategic bombing campaign, Fighter Command was preoccupied by the air defence of Britain, 2 Group was commanded jointly by Bomber Command and BAFF and the French command structure was similarly fragmented. After Dunkirk, Barratt realised that the AASF, down to six Battle squadrons, needed more than its three Hurricane squadrons for day operations. Barratt offered the Air Ministry the choice of a better-balanced force or the withdrawal of the AASF to Britain. If more fighters were to be sent to France it was vital that they be dispatched promptly, not after the Allies had been forced into another retreat. The Cabinet discussed