which are groups that can block policy change from inside an institutional veto player. In a coalition government the partisan veto players are typically the members of the governing coalition. According to Tsebelis' veto player theorem, policy change becomes harder the more veto players there are, the greater the ideological distance between them, and the greater their internal coherence. For example, Italy and the United States have stable policies because they have many veto players, while Greece and the United Kingdom have unstable policies because they have few veto players. While the veto player and veto point approaches complement one another, the veto players framework has become dominant in the study of policy change. Scholarship on rational choice theory has favored the veto player approach because the veto point framework does not address why political actors decide to use a veto point. In addition, because veto player analysis can apply to any political system, it provides a way of comparing very different political systems, such as presidential and parliamentary systems. Veto player analyses can also incorporate people and groups that have de facto power to prevent policy change, even if they do not have the legal power to do so. See also Royal assent Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, allowing a temporary legislative override of court decisions Vetocracy Works cited Constitutions cited Benin: Cameroon: Canada: Dominican Republic: Estonia: France: Georgia: Hungary: Indonesia: Iran: Japan: Korea, South: Latvia: Micronesia, Federated States of: Philippines: Poland: Portugal: South Africa: Spain: Tonga: Uganda: United States: Uzbekistan: Zambia: References Latin legal terminology Latin words and phrases