cover, except for nine Loire 130 seaplanes based at Ream, which provided reconnaissance. Additional scouting was done by three coastal survey crafts, and intelligence gleaned from local fishermen. Plan of attack Bérenger's squadron began training manoeuvres in Cam Ranh Bay shortly after assembling. On 13 January 1941, Admiral Decoux formally requested that Bérenger lead the squadron against the Thai Navy to support a land offensive planned for 16 January. The land action was meant to force back the Thai ground forces that had been advancing along the coast. Because of the disparate speeds of the French ships, Bérenger sent the slower sloops on ahead, while he remained in Saigon to complete the final elements of the plan. Several options were being prepared, the Admiralty in France having given its approval to use naval forces to support the army. The final planning meeting on 13 January saw an immediate delay in the execution for 24 hours. Once the plans were completed, Bérenger sailed in Lamotte-Picquet. The delay in starting the operation allowed him to refuel at Cape St. Jacques before his rendezvous with the slower ships at 16:00 on 15 January, north of Poulo Condore. Admiral Decoux's order were simple: "Attack the Siamese coastal cities from Rayong to the Cambodian frontier to force Siamese government to withdraw its forces from the Cambodian frontier". On the evening of 15 January, following a last conference on board the flagship, the squadron weighed anchor at 21:15 and closed the Thai coast at , the top speed of the sloops. The French ships remained undetected as they entered the Gulf of Siam, but their quarry was not as fortunate. The Loire 130s from Ream had completed a sweep of the coast from Trat to Sattahip. They had sighted one coastal defence ship and one torpedo boat at Ko Chang, and one gunboat, four torpedo boats, and two submarines at Sattahip. Their report was forwarded to Marine Headquarters in Saigon, who re-transmitted it to the Lamotte-Picquet. Bérenger considered his options and decided on a dawn attack against the Thai ships at Ko Chang. He ignored Sattahip because the sloops would not be able to reach it until later in the day, when the element of surprise would already have been lost. Also, the strength of Sattahip's harbour defences was unknown. The Thai Naval force at Ko Chang was weaker and thus offered a better chance of