of action: was the threat that serious? Would one divisional reinforcement do, or would at least two be necessary? Nixon could not have known that almost all of Townshend's military communications were being intercepted by the enemy. Increasingly all sides of the British military establishment were operating with blinkers on. Nixon's apologists, that included the first historian of the Mesopotamian campaigns, Field Marshal Robertson, have pointed out that the War Office was undergoing extensive Imperial reorganization, amidst a critical time on the Western Front. The expedition had been authorized by the Viceroy of India in conjunction with the India Office. In future all military operations would be conducted by the joint commands of the War Office. The upheaval led to a change in the Imperial General Staff, and Cabinet war policy that had a delaying impact upon General Nixon's command. The issue of supplies for the defenders at Kut became critical. Once withdrawal became impossible, Major-General Townshend reported that he only had enough supplies for a month. In fact, his garrison held out for five months, though at reduced rations. The supply problem caused Nixon to rapidly gather his remaining divisions and launch a hasty effort to break the siege. The relief force, under the local command of Lieutenant-General Aylmer began its efforts in early January, 1916. They forced the Ottomans out of two fortified positions (Sheikh Sa'ad and Wadi) while suffering significant casualties. However, the Battle of Hanna was a complete failure. The British troops never even reached the Ottoman defensive positions at a loss of 2,700 casualties. Nixon had to take the blame for the looming disaster at Kut and the inability of his army to rectify the situation and so he was removed from command (officially it was due to ill-health). He was replaced by General Sir Percy Lake, who would also fail to rescue the garrison at Kut and be removed from command for his failure. The stress and fatigue became too great for Nixon himself. In the new year he had suffered a mental collapse, and in March 1916 asked to be retired from active duty. He returned to India. In 1917 an official commission reported on the failure at Kut. Nixon was found principally responsible for the failure of the Mesopotamian Expedition. This ended Nixon's military career and he died just four years later in 1921. Notes Further reading External links "The Indian Army