basic game, for every player i, there is a Nash-equilibrium that is strictly better, for i, than his minmax payoff. This requirement is stronger than the requirement for discounted infinite games, which is in turn stronger than the requirement for undiscounted infinite games. This requirement is needed because of the last step. In the last step, the only stable outcome is a Nash-equilibrium in the basic game. Suppose a player i gains nothing from the Nash equilibrium (since it gives him only his minmax payoff). Then, there is no way to punish that player. On the other hand, if for every player there is a basic equilibrium which is strictly better than minmax, a repeated-game equilibrium can be constructed in two phases: In the first phase, the players alternate strategies in the required frequencies to approximate the desired payoff profile. In the last phase, the players play the preferred equilibrium of each of the players in turn. In the last phase, no player deviates since the actions are already a basic-game equilibrium. If an agent deviates in the first phase, he can be punished by minmaxing him in the last phase. If the game is sufficiently long, the effect of the last phase is negligible, so the equilibrium payoff approaches the desired profile. Applications Folk theorems can be applied to a diverse number of fields. For example: Anthropology: in a community where all behavior is well known, and where members of the community know that they will continue to have to deal with each other, then any pattern of behavior (traditions, taboos, etc.) may be sustained by social norms so long as the individuals of the community are better off remaining in the community than they would be leaving the community (the minimax condition). International politics: agreements between countries cannot be effectively enforced. They are kept, however, because relations between countries are long-term and countries can use "minimax strategies" against each other. This possibility often depends on the discount factor of the relevant countries. If a country is very impatient (pays little attention to future outcomes), then it may be difficult to punish it (or punish it in a credible way). On the other hand, MIT economist Franklin Fisher has noted that the folk theorem is not a positive theory. In considering, for instance, oligopoly behavior, the folk theorem does not tell the economist what firms will do, but rather