convoys over attacking the battleship had hindered his operations and that the fleet should not have been sent into waters where large numbers of submarines were operating as it lacked enough destroyers to protect its capital ships. He was also frustrated by the Admiralty's attempts to closely manage his command during the battle. The Admiralty conceded the first two of Tovey's criticisms, agreeing that sinking Tirpitz would be the Home Fleet's main priority when it covered convoys in the future and that the fleet should not proceed beyond 14 degrees east if it lacked destroyers. His other criticism was thought to be unfair as the Admiralty had better access to Ultra intelligence than Tovey did while at sea. On 13 March Churchill asked the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, to provide "a report on the air attack on TIRPITZ, explaining how it was that 12 of our machines managed to get no hits as compared to the extraordinary efficiency of the Japanese attack on PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE". The reason was that Japanese had enough highly effective aircraft with well trained crews while the Fleet Air Arm did not. Pound attempted to explain this to Churchill, but the Prime Minister was not fully convinced and it contributed to him becoming sceptical about the value of the Fleet Air Arm. Nevertheless, the failure of the attack on 9 March led to a decision to accelerate improvements to the Royal Navy's aviation force. Operation Sportpalast also demonstrated the threat which the German warships in Norway posed to the Arctic convoys, and it was also decided that the Home Fleet would cover them all in the future. This prevented ships being transferred from the fleet to other theatres of the war. Pound was so concerned about the risk of Tirpitz attacking an Arctic convoy that he sought Churchill's agreement to not dispatch any of them during the period of summer in which there would be almost continuous daylight in the Arctic. The Prime Minister did not agree. In contrast, Tovey believed that the Germans would be cautious with how Tirpitz was used as a result of their experiences during Operation Sportpalast. He expected that they would not assign her to attack convoys while they were passing through the Barents Sea. The Germans were chastised by Operation Sportpalast. Both Ciliax and Raeder believed that good luck was the