published in 1919 and was highly critical of Cadorna, at that time a bitter man busy with writing his own memoirs. Cadorna claimed that he had no responsibility for the defeat, despite fleeing to Padua during the battle and abandoning the entire Italian Second Army to its fate. Nevertheless, he was made a Field Marshal (Maresciallo d'Italia) in 1924 after Benito Mussolini seized power. Cadorna died in Bordighera in 1928. Personal reputation Several historians record Cadorna as an unimaginative martinet who was ruthless with his troops and dismissive of his country's political authorities. David Stevenson, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics, describes him as earning "opprobrium as one of the most callous and incompetent of First World War commanders." In manner he appeared a reserved and aristocratic officer of the old-fashioned Piedmontese school. During the course of the war Cadorna dismissed 217 officers, and during the Battle of Caporetto, he ordered the summary execution of officers whose units retreated. Six percent of Italian soldiers under his leadership faced a disciplinary charge during the war and 61% of those charged were found guilty. About 750 were executed, the highest number in any army in World War I. Claims have been made that he also reintroduced the ancient Roman practice of decimation—the killing of every tenth man—for units which failed to perform in battle. However, the military historian John Keegan records that his "judicial savagery" took the form of the summary executions of individual stragglers rather than the formalized winnowing of entire detachments. Because of the multiple and consecutive failed attacks led by him, the large number of casualties incurred among his own men and his personal reputation as disproportionately bitter and ruthless, Cadorna is often considered one of the worst generals of World War I. Other historians have a more balanced view of Luigi Cadorna. They argue that, in terms of military tactics, he was a typical general of his generation. It is also claimed that Cadorna's outdated tactics contrasted with his more innovative and effective military logistics. Cadorna was held in regard by fellow allied commanders prior to his failure at the Battle of Caporetto. His reputation reached its height in 1916, after the victories at the battles of Asiago and Gorizia, but subsequent allegations of the introduction of ancient Roman decimation alienated him from his troops. It was argued that the quasi-absolute power he assumed