be conceived", his counter-argument cannot generate the contradiction from which Anselm concludes that something than which a greater cannot be conceived is in reality. Philosophers often attempt to prove the ontological argument wrong by comparing Anselm's with Gaunilo's. The former runs: God is that being than which no greater can be conceived. It is greater to exist in reality than merely as an idea. If God does not exist, we can conceive of an even greater being, that is one that does exist. Therefore, God must indeed exist in reality. Gaunilo's parody runs along the same lines: The Lost Island is that island than which no greater can be conceived. It is greater to exist in reality than merely as an idea. If the Lost Island does not exist, one can conceive of an even greater island, that is one that does exist. Therefore, the Lost Island exists in reality. If one of these arguments is sound, it has been asserted, they must both be sound. By Gaunilo's reckoning, however, one (and, therefore, the other, too) is unsound. The Lost Island does not exist, so there is something wrong with the logic that proves that it does. Because the argument proves true in one case that which is patently false (the Lost Island), it is fair to ask whether it may fairly be regarded as proving true the other case. Criticisms Gaunilo's objection to the ontological argument has been criticised on several grounds. Anselm's own reply was essentially that Gaunilo had missed his point: any other being's existence is derived from God's, unnecessary in itself, and nonamenable to his ontological argument which can only ever properly apply to the single greatest being of all beings. Indeed, while we can try and conceive of a perfect island, that island is yet greater if it creates other beings, whereupon it would no longer be an island as we can understand it. Similarly, Alvin Plantinga tendered a reply to Gaunilo's remonstrance by arguing that the concept of "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is not applicable to an island, or any other object, in the special way that it is applicable to God. Plantinga defends Anselm's proof by averring that it applies exclusively to Him. A necessary being is both existent and the greatest conceivable and greatest possible being. Only God, as Anselm defines him, meets all of those criteria and