Adjusted Winner (AW) is a procedure for envy-free item allocation. Given two agents and some goods, it returns a partition of the goods between the two agents with the following properties: Envy-freeness: Each agent believes that his share of the goods is at least as good as the other share; Equitability: The "relative happiness levels" of both agents from their shares are equal; Pareto-optimality: no other allocation is better for one agent and at least as good for the other agent; At most one good has to be shared between the agents. For two agents, Adjusted Winner is the only Pareto optimal and equitable procedure that divides at most a single good. The procedure can be used in divorce settlements and partnership dissolutions, as well as international conflicts. The procedure was designed by Steven Brams and Alan D. Taylor. It was first published in their book on fair division and later in a stand-alone book. The algorithm has been commercialized through the FairOutcomes website. AW was patented in the United States but that patent has expired. Method Each partner is given the list of goods and an equal number of points (e.g. 100 points) to distribute among them. He or she assigns a value to each good and submits it sealed to an arbiter. The arbiter, or a computer program, assigns each item to the high bidder. If both partners have the same number of points, then we are done. Otherwise, call the partner who has more points "winner" and the other partner "loser". Order the goods in increasing order of the ratio value-for-winner / value-for-loser. Start moving goods in this order from the winner to the loser, until the point-totals become "almost" equal, i.e., moving one more good from the winner to the loser will make the winner have less points than the loser. At this point, divide the next good between the winner and the loser such that their totals are the same. Use cases While there is no account of AW actually being used to resolve disputes, there are several counterfactual studies checking what would have been the results of using this procedure to solve international disputes. For the Camp David Accords, the authors construct approximate numeric valuation functions for Israel and Egypt, based on the relative importance of each issue for each country. They then run the AW protocol. The theoretical results are very similar to