from classified sources, (2). if not derived from classified sources, itself counted as "secret" information under the "born secret" clause of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, and (3). dangerous and would encourage nuclear proliferation, Morland and his lawyers disagreed on all points, but the injunction was granted, as the judge in the case thought that it was safer to grant the injunction and allow Morland, et al., to appeal, which they did in United States v. The Progressive, et al. (1979). Through a variety of more complicated circumstances, the DOE case began to wane, as it became clear that some of the data it attempted to claim as "secret" had been published in a students' encyclopedia a few years earlier. After another hydrogen bomb speculator, Chuck Hansen, had his own ideas about the "secret" (quite different from Morland's) published in a Wisconsin newspaper, the DOE claimed The Progressive case was moot, dropped its suit, and allowed the magazine to publish, which it did in November 1979. Morland had by then, however, changed his opinion of how the bomb worked to suggesting that a foam medium (the polystyrene) rather than radiation pressure was used to compress the secondary and that in the secondary was a sparkplug of fissile material as well. He published the changes, based in part on the proceedings of the appeals trial, as a short erratum in The Progressive a month later. In 1981, Morland published a book, The secret that exploded, about his experience, describing in detail the train of thought which led him to his conclusions about the "secret." Because the DOE sought to censor Morland's work, one of the few times that it violated its usual approach of not acknowledging "secret" material that had been released, it is interpreted as being at least partially correct, but to what degree it lacks information or has incorrect information is not known with any great confidence. The difficulty which a number of nations had in developing the Teller–Ulam design (even when they understood the design, such as with the United Kingdom) makes it somewhat unlikely that the simple information alone is what provides the ability to manufacture thermonuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the ideas put forward by Morland in 1979 have been the basis for all current speculation on the Teller–Ulam design. See also Manhattan Project History of nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons design Nuclear weapon Nuclear fusion Notes References Further