the actual agreement, which leads the authors to conclude that the agreement is as fair as it could be. For the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the author constructs the valuation functions based on a survey of expert opinions, and describes the agreement that would result from running the AW protocol with these valuations. For the Spratly Islands dispute, the authors construct a two-phase procedure for settling the dispute, and present its (hypothetic) outcome. Other use cases are the Panama Canal Treaties, the Jolis v. Jolis divorce case (1980), and more. Limitations AW is not a truthful mechanism the partners might gain from spying after their partners and modifying their reports in order to get a larger share. However, the authors claim that such manipulation can be difficult to carry out, so in practice, using this method would encourage honesty. AW always has an approximate Nash equilibrium. Under informed tie-breaking, it also has a pure Nash equilibrium. As patented, AW assumes that the partners have additive utility functions, so that the utility of a set of goods is the sum of utilities of the goods. It does not handle, for example, multiple identical assets with diminishing marginal utility. Three or more agents AW is designed for two agents only. When there are three or more agents, there may be no allocation that is simultaneously envy-free, equitable and Pareto-optimal. This is shown by the following example, constructed by J.H.Reijnierse. There are three goods and three agents with the following points: Alice: 40, 50, 10 Bob: 30, 40, 30 Carl: 30, 30, 40 It is possible to show that the only PO and equitable allocation is the one that gives good 1 to Alice, good 2 to Bob and good 3 to Carl. The equitable value in this case is 40. However, this allocation is not envy-free since Alice envies Bob. Each two of these three properties can be satisfied simultaneously. An EF+EQ allocation can be found by just giving each agent an equal amount of each good. PO+EF allocations can be found by several algorithms; see Pareto-efficient envy-free division and also Weller's theorem. PO+EQ allocations can be found by linear programming. Moreover, it is possible to find an allocation that, subject to being PO+EF (or PO+EQ), minimizes the number of objects that have to be shared between two or more agents, or the amount of sharing. This can be seen as a proper generalization