Operation "Wooden Leg" (, Mivtza Regel Etz) was an attack by Israel on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Hammam Chott, near Tunis, Tunisia, on October 1, 1985. With a target 1,280 miles (2,060 km) from the operation's starting point, this was the most distant publicly known action undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces since Operation Entebbe in 1976. It has been condemned by the United Nations Security Council. Background After being driven out of Lebanon in the 1982 Lebanon War, the PLO moved its headquarters to Tunisia. In April 1985, a PLO plan for a major seaborne attack on Israel was thwarted. Under the plan, PLO fighters would travel to the Israeli coast in a freighter and land in rubber dinghies, the hijack a bus or two and force the drivers to transport them to the Kirya, the Israeli military headquarters in Tel Aviv, where they would kill the sentries and storm the compound, killing as many people as they could and trying to target the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff. They would then take hostages and bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. Israeli military intelligence was aware of the plan and the Israeli Navy subsequently thwarted it. On April 20, the Atavarius, a ship carrying the PLO raiding force, was intercepted and sunk by two Israeli missile boats. Twenty PLO fighters were killed and eight captured. In a subsequent raid on April 24, four Israeli missile boats and Shayetet 13 commandos sank the Moonlight, another ship leased for the operation, at its dock in Algeria. In the aftermath of the incident, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin ordered plans drawn up for a retaliatory operation against the PLO's base in Tunisia. Under one proposal, Israel would launch a major seaborne commando raid, with about a hundred commandos from the Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, and Shaldag units landing on the Tunisian shore in rubber dinghies launched from navy vessels and raiding the PLO compound. Another proposal was a bombing run by Israeli fighter jets to destroy it. Training began for both plans pending cabinet apprival. There were tactical and strategic problems with both options. The sheer distance from Israel complicated the options for a combined-arms ground attack. It would be difficult to extract the commandos if the operation went poorly and the chances of casualties were high. On the other hand, Israel had