experience arose out of non-experiencing natural entities or how conscious experience can be described in physicalist terms. Griffin proposes instead that all genuine actual entities (i.e., not aggregates like rocks or chairs, etc.) are events that have some degree of experience that includes both physical (objective) and mental (subjective) elements. This is a version of panpsychism but one in which consciousness is not central, rather consciousness “emerges in degrees of complexity from a rudimentary sentience that pervades the whole of nature.” The better term, according to Griffin, is “panexperientialism.” Common sense beliefs The notion of a class of "privileged" common sense beliefs, what Griffin calls "hard-core common sense" beliefs, was important to Griffin's thought at least since the mid-1980's and was always part of his understanding of what he calls "constructive postmodernism." By the end of the 1990s, however, "it was the centerpiece of his argument." According to Griffin, unlike most ordinary (i.e., soft-core) common sense beliefs which in fact "are theory-laden products of prior conceptual and cultural systems", "certain common presumptions are universally presupposed in practice even when they are denied in theory." Put otherwise, such hard-core common sense beliefs "cannot be denied verbally without self-contradiction." Examples of such beliefs are:One assumes causality in the act of causing one's self or others to doubt causality; one uses one's freedom in the act of renouncing the idea of freedom; even professed solipsists assume an actual world when they drive a car or question the existence of others.While there have been historical precedents for Griffin's notion of hard-core common sense beliefs (e.g., Thomas Reid and Charles Peirce), the root of Griffin's position is Whitehead's declaration in Process and Reality "that all thinking must bow to the presuppositions that are necessary 'for the regulation of our lives' and that all 'such presumptions are imperative in experience.'" Accordingly, for Griffin, "[t]he ultimate test of any philosophical position is whether it does justice to the hard-core ideas that are inevitably presupposed in practice by all human beings." Despite their philosophical importance to Griffin, however, he believes that the "precise formulations of hard-core ideas are always fallible" and so must "function not as a foundation upon which all other beliefs are to be built but as a compass telling us when we have gotten off course." Parapsychology Griffin wrote two books dealing with parapsychology: Parapsychology, Philosophy and Spirituality: A Postmodern Exploration and James and Whitehead