all out for it, hard, and if he thinks a thing is wrong, ten million wild hordes won't make him do it." Eden returned the admiration, writing that Cadogan "carried out his thankless task with a rare blend of intelligence, sensibility, and patience." In 1933, with Adolf Hitler in power and the fate of the Disarmament Conference clear, Cadogan accepted a posting at the British legation in Peking. The family arrived in 1934, after the Nationalist government had evacuated Beijing because of troubles with Japan. He met with Chiang Kai-shek and attempted to persuade him of Britain's support. Despite the lack of a real Chinese government, Cadogan did his best but lacked support from the Foreign Office. In 1935, after his recommendation to extend a loan to the Republic of China was again denied, he wrote that "with all their protestations that they mean to 'stay in China', they do nothing. And 'staying' will cost them something in money or effort or risk. The Chinese are becoming sick of us. And there is no use my 'keeping in touch' with them if I never can give them an encouragement at all". In 1936, Cadogan received a request from the newly appointed Secretary of State, Anthony Eden, offering him the post of joint Deputy Under-Secretary. He regretted leaving China so suddenly but took up the offer and returned to London. Things there had grown much worse since his departure. Fascist Italy had attacked Abyssinia and Nazi Germany had reoccupied the Rhineland. Assessing the situation, Cadogan advised a revision of the more vindictive elements of the Treaty of Versailles, "which was really more in the nature of an armistice." However, this suggestion was not taken up by Sir Robert Vansittart or Eden. It was felt that modifying the Treaty would only increase Germany's ambitions. Cadogan disagreed and wrote in his diary: "I believe that, so long as she is allowed to nurse her resentment to her bosom, her claims increase with her armaments." He wanted to engage Germany in an effort to get German grievances set down on paper and was not as troubled by his colleagues about the possibility of German domination of Central Europe. Cadogan grew impatient with the lack of strategic direction in the Foreign Office. He complained, "It can't be said that our 'policy' so far has been successful. In fact we haven't got a policy; we merely