it was sufficient to establish possession. The trial court found in favor of Post. On appeal after the trial, the issue put to the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York was whether one could obtain property rights to a wild animal (Ferae naturae), in this case the fox, by pursuit. The Supreme Court case was heard by Chief Justice James Kent, then one of the nation's preeminent jurists, and associate justices Daniel Tompkins (who later became Vice President of the United States) and Henry Brockholst Livingston (who later served as a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court). Ruling Majority opinion Justice Tompkins wrote the majority opinion. The Court cited ancient precedent in deciding the case: If we have recourse to the ancient writers upon general principles of law, the judgment below is obviously erroneous. Justinian's Institutes, and Fleta, adopt the principle, that pursuit alone vests no property or right in the huntsman; and that even pursuit, accompanied with wounding, is equally ineffectual for that purpose, unless the animal be actually taken. The same principle is recognized by Bracton. Puffendorf defines occupancy of beasts feræ naturæ, to be the actual corporeal possession of them, and Bynkershoeck is cited as coinciding in this definition. It is indeed with hesitation that Puffendorf affirms that a wild beast mortally wounded, or greatly maimed, cannot be fairly intercepted by another, whilst the pursuit of the person inflicting the wound continues. The foregoing authorities are decisive to show that mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox, but that he became the property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him. [Citations omitted] The court reasoned that given the common law requirement to have control over one's possessions, merely giving chase was not sufficient. Something more was needed, otherwise law would create a slippery slope. If the first seeing, starting, or pursuing such animals, without having so wounded, circumvented or ensnared the animal, so as to deprive them of their natural liberty, and subject them to the control of their pursuer, should afford the basis of actions against others for intercepting and killing them, it would prove a fertile course of quarrels and litigation. The majority opinion found that though it may have been rude for Pierson to have killed the fox, there was no reason to object as only the person to mortally wound or seize the animal can acquire possession of it.