supported Roosevelt during the cancellation of the air mail contracts, offered a verdict on the scandal in its history of the union: "The small operators denounced the bidding session of 1930 as a 'spoils conference.' Actually, it was no such thing ... Admittedly, there was an element of ruthlessness in the way (Brown) proceeded, but it was not illegal. Brown succeeded in creating the genesis of a regulated, integrated airline system—a system that FDR would eventually copy. The union of airline pilots was in complete agreement with the policies of Hoover and Brown." Changes in the Air Corps At the time of the scandal, the Air Corps was in a new phase of its continuing struggle with the War Department's General Staff for a more independent role for air operations. Technological developments in aircraft design had recently brought about a superiority in all-metal multi-engine aircraft over single-engine fighters, giving weight to their arguments for becoming an autonomous military service equal to the Army and Navy. The Drum Board, chaired by Deputy Army Chief of Staff General Hugh A. Drum, had proposed a compromise in 1933, recommending activation of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, a centralized organization that had been part of Army mobilization planning since 1924. Subsequently, a pair of bills were proposed in Congress to increase Air Corps autonomy by expanding its size and authorizing it several administrative functions separate from the rest of the Army, both of which the General Staff adamantly opposed. The immediate results of the operation were disastrous for the image of the Air Corps. Speaker of the House Henry T. Rainey, echoing comments made by Gen. Billy Mitchell, criticized: "If we are unfortunate enough to be drawn into another war, the Air Corps wouldn't amount to much. If it is not equal to carrying the mail, I would like to know what it would do in carrying bombs." Despite the public humiliation, the Air Mail Fiasco resulted in a number of improvements for the Air Corps, bringing about changes that its previous publicity campaigns were unable to obtain. On April 17, 1934, well before AACMO ended, Secretary Dern convened the "War Department Special Committee on the Army Air Corps," better known as the "Baker Board." Chaired by former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, the board's announced mission was to examine closely the military air mail operation and the overall condition of the