regulates their respective members and covers deposits to the same amount covered by KDIC. Taiwan Deposits in the Taiwan up to NT$3,000,000 is covered by the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation. It was raised from the previous insurance coverage of NT$1,500,000. (or equivalent in dollar or other foreign currency). Thailand The complete deposit protection system was introduced in Thailand by the establishment of the Deposit Protection Agency (DPA) on 11 August 2008, in accordance with the Deposit Protection Agency Act B.E. 2551. The objectives of the Agency as specified by law are providing protection to deposits in the financial institution system, administration of institutions subject to control under the Financial Institutions Businesses Act, and liquidation of financial institutions whose licenses have been revoked. Deposit in Thailand was fully guaranteed until 10 August 2011. From 11 August 2011 until 10 August 2012, the coverage dropped to 50 million baht per depositor per bank. Since then coverage has been limited to THB one million per depositor per bank. Criticisms Detractors of deposit insurance claim the schemes introduce a moral hazard issue, encouraging both depositors and banks to take on excessive risks. Without deposit insurance, banks would compete prudently for deposits because depositors would prefer safe banks over risky banks to guard their money. With deposit insurance, banks can take excessive risks because depositors do not fear for their deposits' safety and thus do not move their money to safer banks. The risks are shared by all banks, safe or risky. If deposit insurance is provided by another business or corporation, like other insurance agreements, there is a presumption that the insurance corporation would either charge higher rates or refuse to cover banks that engaged in extremely risky behavior, which not only solves the problem of moral hazard but also reduces the risk of a bank run. The Bibby plan, which avoids the problem of moral hazard but still prevents bank runs, would have the state provide deposit insurance, with the banks paying regular premiums to the state reflecting the extent of the deposit insurance. The level of the deposit insurance could be at the choice of the banks, and the inherent risk in that particular bank. The plan would allow some element of differentiation between banks in terms of investment risk and in the level of insurance offered. See also Moral hazard, from the finance system point of view Bank run Financial crisis