coast towards Batavia and the other driving southeast to Rangkasbitung and Djasinga and preparing to cross the Tjianten River at Leuwiliang to capture Buitenzorg. Initially Blackburn planned a counter-attack against the southern advance for 2 March with the Dutch to hold the Japanese at Djasinga, but this was cancelled when the Dutch withdrew to the Bandung area, east of Leuwiliang. As part of the withdrawal, the Dutch blew up the bridge over the Tjianten River at Leuwiliang early on 2 March, severely restricting Blackburn's freedom of manoeuvre against the southern force. He was then ordered by Schilling to move most of his force approximately east to counter-attack against the regimental-sized force that had landed at Eretanwetan and was advancing south towards Bandung. This order was withdrawn after Blackburn opposed it on the grounds that the Japanese position was not known, the attack would be ill-prepared, and his efforts would be better spent preparing a rearguard defence at Leuwiliang. Sitwell supported Blackburn. Now able to consolidate a position against the southern force, Blackburn disposed two companies of his strongest fighting unit, the 2/2nd Pioneers, in depth along the road just east of Leuwiliang, and kept the remainder of Blackforce in reserve, ready to conduct counter-encirclement operations. About 12:00 on 2 March, five Japanese light tanks arrived at the destroyed bridge and were promptly engaged by the pioneers. Two tanks were quickly disabled and the remainder withdrew. Blackburn, realising that the Japanese would begin to probe his defences and try to outflank them, ordered his reserves to fan out to the north and south of the main blocking position at Leuwiliang. The Japanese soon tried to cross the river about south of the bridge, but were met with a hail of fire and withdrew with heavy casualties. Over the next three days, the Japanese tried to outflank and encircle the Australian positions, mainly to the south, but Blackburn deployed his forces to the flanks to check them. On one occasion he withdrew one of his units slightly, drew a significant number of Japanese across the river into a killing ground and caused them serious casualties. Blackburn deployed his last reserves on the afternoon of 4 March, and was finally outflanked to the south that afternoon. He ordered his men to break contact and withdraw closer to Buitenzorg. For the loss of around 100 casualties, Blackforce had held up a divisional-sized Japanese force