As a result of the collisions, 35 people died, and 69 were seriously injured. Another 415 sustained minor injuries. Emergency response The driver of the Basingstoke train was off his train and standing by the line-side telephone when his train was pushed forward several feet by the collision. He picked up the receiver and spoke to the signalman, informing him of the collision and asking him to call the emergency services. The signalman immediately switched all the signals he could to 'danger', and signalled to the adjacent signal boxes he had an obstruction on the line. He had no control over automatic signals, however, and was not able to stop the fourth train. He then called the Clapham Junction station manager and asked him to call the emergency services. The accident had tripped the high-voltage feed to the traction current. The operator in the nearby Raynes Park electrical control room suspected there had been a derailment and re-configured the supply so that the nearby Wimbledon line trains could still run. Pupils and teachers from the adjacent Emanuel School, who were first on the scene of the disaster, were later commended for their service by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Rescue was hampered because the railway was in a cutting, with a metal fence at the top and a wall at the bottom of a wooded slope. The last casualty was taken to hospital at 13:04 and the last body was removed at 15:45. Investigations An initial internal investigation showed that a wiring fault meant that the signal would not show a red danger aspect when the track circuit immediately in front of the signal was occupied. Work associated with the Waterloo Area Resignalling Scheme meant new wiring had been installed, but the old wiring had been left connected at one end, and loose and uninsulated at the other. An independent inquiry was chaired by Anthony Hidden, QC for the Department for Transport. His eventual report included 93 recommendations, for changes to the working practices of both British Rail and the emergency services. A 1978 British Rail Southern Region report had concluded that due to the age of the equipment the re-signalling was needed by 1986. However, approval was given in 1984 after a report of three wrong-side signal failures. The re-signalling project had been planned assuming more people were available, but employees felt that the programme was inflexible and that they