it slid under the hopper. Ten seconds into the accident, the rear of the HST, led by coach F, collided with the now stationary coach G. The energy release of the still moving rear of the HST bent the structure of coach G into a distinct half-curve at its midpoint. Five people died in coach G, which was almost completely destroyed. The rear of the HST, led by coach F, collided with the stationary rear of the freight train. Coach F was left derailed. Seven passengers died; six at the scene and one in hospital. The HST driver said he was aware of the isolated AWS but admitted to a lack of focus, referring to putting items in his bag before the incident twice in his tape-recorded conversation with signallers at the nearest trackside telephone: If the AWS or the ATP equipment on the HST had been working, the chance of the accident occurring would have been highly unlikely. Functioning AWS would have given the HST driver an audible warning that he was running towards a signal at danger and needed to start braking. Failure to press the AWS cancelling button to acknowledge the warning would have caused the emergency brake to apply. The train was also fitted with fully operational Automatic Train Protection (ATP) equipment, both at trackside and in the London-end power car, but it was not switched on because neither drivers Harrison nor Tunnock were then qualified to drive with ATP. From 1996, 125mph HST trains were driven by one driver only, following the removal of a requirement for a second driver. Aftermath Following this accident and the Ladbroke Grove rail crash, First Great Western (as GWT had become) required all its trains to have ATP switched on. If the equipment is faulty, the train is taken out of service. It emerged after the incident that the reset switch of the warning system had contamination on its electrical contact surfaces which rendered its performance intermittent, hence its disabling at Oxford the day before the crash. The HST driver and operator were charged with manslaughter, but the charges were later dropped. GWT was fined £1.5 million for not having a system to ensure HSTs were not operated for long journeys with AWS inoperative. The action of the signaller in stopping a high-speed passenger train to allow a slow freight train to cross in front of it has been