candidates {A, B, C}: A > B > C: 35 C > B > A: 34 B > C > A: 31 In this case, B is preferred to A by 65 votes to 35, and B is preferred to C by 66 to 34, hence B is strongly preferred to both A and C. B must then win according to the Condorcet criterion. Using the rules of IRV, B is ranked first by the fewest voters and is eliminated, and then C wins with the transferred votes from B. Note that 65 voters, a majority, prefer either candidate B or C over A; since IRV passes the mutual majority criterion, it guarantees one of B and C must win. If candidate A, an irrelevant alternative under IRV, was not running, a majority of voters would consider B their 1st choice, and IRV's mutual majority compliance would thus ensure B wins; in this way, IRV's failure of the Condorcet criterion here also implies a spoiler effect. In cases where there is a Condorcet Winner, and where IRV does not choose that candidate, a simple majority would by definition prefer the Condorcet Winner over the IRV winner. This anomalous case was demonstrated in the 2009 mayoral election of Burlington Vermont. Majority judgment Majority judgment is a system in which the voter gives all candidates a rating out of a predetermined set (e.g. {"excellent", "fair", "poor"}). The winner of the election would be the candidate with the best median rating. Consider an election with three candidates A, B, C. 35 voters rate candidate A "excellent", B "fair", and C "poor", 34 voters rate candidate C "excellent", B "fair", and A "poor", and 31 voters rate candidate B "excellent", C "fair", and A "poor". B is preferred to A by 65 votes to 35, and B is preferred to C by 66 to 34. Hence, B is the Condorcet winner. But B only gets the median rating "fair", while C has the median rating "good" and hereby C is chosen winner by Majority Judgment. Plurality voting With plurality voting, the full set of voter preferences is not recorded on the ballot and so cannot be deduced therefrom (e.g. following a real election). Under the assumption that no tactical voting takes place, i.e. that all voters vote for their first preference, it is easy to construct an example which fails the Condorcet criterion. Consider