an election in which 30% of the voters prefer candidate A to candidate B to candidate C and vote for A, 30% of the voters prefer C to A to B and vote for C, and 40% of the voters prefer B to A to C and vote for B. Candidate B would win (with 40% of the vote) even though A would be the Condorcet winner, beating B 60% to 40%, and C 70% to 30%. The assumption of no tactical voting is also used to evaluate other systems; however, the assumption may be far less plausible with plurality precisely because plurality accommodates no other way for subsidiary preferences to be taken into account. Approval voting Approval voting is a system in which the voter can approve of (or vote for) any number of candidates on a ballot. Depending on which strategies voters use, the Condorcet criterion may be violated. Consider an election in which 70% of the voters prefer candidate A to candidate B to candidate C, while 30% of the voters prefer C to B to A. If every voter votes for their top two favorites, Candidate B would win (with 100% approval) even though A would be the Condorcet winner. Note that this failure of Approval depends upon a particular generalization of the Condorcet criterion, which may not be accepted by all voting theorists. Other generalizations, such as a "votes-only" generalization that makes no reference to voter preferences, may result in a different analysis. Also, if all voters have perfect information about each other's motivations, and a single Condorcet winner exists, then that candidate will win under the Nash equilibrium. Range voting Range voting is a system in which the voter gives all candidates a score on a predetermined scale (e.g. from 0 to 9). The winner of the election is the candidate with the highest total score. Range voting doesn't satisfy the Condorcet criterion. Consider an election with three voters and three candidates with the following range votes: In pluralistic head-to-head elections, two voters prefer A to B, and all three prefer both A and B to C, making A the Condorcet winner. However, candidate B is the range winner with 12 points compared to 11 points for A. Range voting satisfies the Condorcet criterion as long as voters score candidates in the head-to-head elections as they do in the full election. For example, let's