two voters with preferences A > B > C > D are unconfident whether to participate in the election. Voters not participating Assume the two voters would not show up at the polling place. The preferences of the remaining 23 voters would be: The pairwise preferences would be tabulated as follows: Now, the strongest paths have to be identified, e.g. the path A > D > B is stronger than the direct path A > B (which is nullified, since it is a loss for A). Result: The full ranking is A > D > C > B. Thus, A is elected Schulze winner. Voters participating Now, consider the 2 unconfident voters decide to participate: The pairwise preferences would be tabulated as follows: Now, the strongest paths have to be identified, e.g. the path C > A > D is stronger than the direct path C > D. Result: The full ranking is B > A > D > C. Thus, B is elected Schulze winner. Conclusion By participating in the election the two voters supporting A changed the winner from A to B. In fact, the voters can turn the defeat in direct pairwise comparison of A against B into a victory. But in this example, the relation between A and B does not depend on the direct comparison, since the paths A > D > B and B > C > A are stronger. The additional voters diminish D > B, the weakest link of the A > D > B path, while giving a boost to B > C, the weakest link of the path B > C > A. Thus, the Schulze method fails the participation criterion. See also Consistency criterion Voting system References Further reading Woodall, Douglas R, "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules" Voting matters, Issue 6, 1996 Electoral system criteria Mechanism design