something in nature binding together the [generic] properties which we use to identify kinds. ... Unobservables [universal propositions] are then postulated to explain the constant conjunction of observable properties. We approach the world by presupposing that it contains natural kinds. Our inferences depend on this presupposition,... This presupposition thus gives us a built-in advantage in understanding what the world is like, and thereby makes inductive understanding of the world a real possibility. When a population [kind] is uniform with respect to some [generic] property, [inductive] inferences from small samples, and indeed, from a single case, are perfectly reliable. If I note that a [generic] sample of [universal] copper conducts electricity and straightaway conclude that all copper conducts electricity, then I will do just as well as someone ... checking a very large number of copper samples for their conductivity. Kornblith didn't explain how tedious modern induction accurately generalizes from a few generic traits to all of some universal kind. He attributed such success to individual sensitivity that a single case is representative of all of a kind. If we are sensitive to the situations in which a population is uniform with respect to some property, then making inferences on the basis of very small samples will be a reliable and efficient way to gain information about a population [natural kind].". He argued that even human infants are intuitively sensitive to natural classifications. : "From the beginning, children assume that the natural world is divided into kinds on the basis of underlying features which are responsible for their superficial similarities, and that these similarities are an uncertain guide to that real underlying structure." Accepting intuition as a legitimate ground for inductive inferences from small samples, Kornblith criticized popular arguments by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman that intuition is irrational. He continued to argue that traditional induction explains the success of modern science. Our [universal] conceptual and inferential tendencies jointly conspire, at least roughly, to carve nature at its [generic] joints and project the features of a kind which are essential to it. This preestablished harmony between the [generic] causal structure of the world and the [universal] conceptual and inferential structure of our minds produces reliable inductive inference. Hasok Chang and Rasmus Winther Hasok Chang and Rasmus Winther contributed essays to a collection entitled Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice, published in 2016. The editor of the collection, Catherine Kendig, argued