ratings of the remaining 3 voters would be: The sorted ratings would be as follows: Result: A has the median rating of "Fair" and B has the median rating of "Poor". Thus, A is elected majority judgment winner. Voters participating Now, consider the 2 unconfident voters decide to participate: The sorted ratings would be as follows: Result: A has the median rating of "Fair" and B has the median rating of "Good". Thus, B is the majority judgment winner. Conclusion By participating in the election the two voters preferring A would change A from winner to loser. Their "Excellent" rating for A was not sufficient to change A's median rating since no other voter rated A higher than "Fair". But, their "Good" rating for B turned B's median rating to "Good", since another voter agreed with this rating. Thus, majority judgment fails the participation criterion. Minimax This example shows that the minimax method violates the participation criterion. Assume four candidates A, B, C, D with 18 potential voters and the following preferences: Since all preferences are strict rankings (no equals are present), all three minimax methods (winning votes, margins and pairwise opposite) elect the same winners. The two voters (in blue) with preferences A > B > C > D are unconfident whether to participate in the election. Voters not participating Assume the two voters would not show up at the polling place. The preferences of the remaining 16 voters would be: The results would be tabulated as follows: [X] indicates voters who preferred the candidate listed in the column caption to the candidate listed in the row caption [Y] indicates voters who preferred the candidate listed in the row caption to the candidate listed in the column caption Result: B has the closest biggest defeat. Thus, B is elected minimax winner. Voters participating Now, consider the two unconfident voters decide to participate: The results would be tabulated as follows: Result: C has the closest biggest defeat. Thus, C is elected minimax winner. Conclusion By participating in the election the two voters changed the winner from B to C whilst strictly preferring B to C. Their preferences of B over C and D does not advance B's minimax value since B's biggest defeat was against A. Also, their preferences of A and B over C does not degrade C's minimax value since C's biggest defeat was against D. Therefore, only