the Harsanyi–Shapley solution, the Snow–Shapley theorem for matrix games, and the Shapley–Folkman lemma & theorem bear his name. According to The Economist, Shapley "may have thought of himself as a mathematician, but he cannot avoid being remembered for his huge contributions to economics". The American Economic Association noted that Shapley was "one of the giants of game theory and economic theory". Besides, his early work with R. N. Snow and Samuel Karlin on matrix games was so complete that little has been added since. He has been instrumental in the development of utility theory, and it was he who laid much of the groundwork for the solution of the problem of the existence of Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets. His work with M. Maschler and B. Peleg on the kernel and the nucleolus, and his work with Robert Aumann on non-atomic games and on long-term competition have all appeared in economic theory. Shapley argued with his sons about whether he should accept the Nobel Prize at all. He opined that his father, the astronomer Harlow Shapley, deserved it more. His sons persuaded him to accept it and accompanied him to Stockholm. Awards and honors Bronze Star, U.S. Army Air Corps, 1944 Procter Fellow, Princeton University, 1951–52 Fellow, Econometric Society, 1967 Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1974 Member, National Academy of Sciences, 1978 John von Neumann Theory Prize, 1981 Honorary Ph.D., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1986 Fellow, INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences), 2002 Distinguished Fellow, American Economic Association, 2007 Fellow, American Mathematical Society, 2012 Sveriges Riksbank Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 2012 Golden Goose Award, 2013 Selected publications A Value for n-person Games [1953], In Contributions to the Theory of Games volume II, H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (eds.). Stochastic Games [1953], Proceedings of National Academy of Science Vol. 39, pp. 1095–1100. A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System [1954] (with Martin Shubik), American Political Science Review Vol. 48, pp. 787–792. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage [1962] (with David Gale), The American Mathematical Monthly Vol. 69, pp. 9–15. Simple Games : An Outline of the Descriptive Theory [1962], Behavioral Science Vol. 7, pp. 59–66. On Balanced Sets and Cores [1967], Naval Research Logistics Quarterly Vol. 14, pp. 453–460. On Market Games [1969] (with Martin Shubik), Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 1, pp. 9–25. Utility Comparison and