exploits grievances to influence or overthrow a government believed repressive by the supporters of the UW force. US doctrine assumes there will usually be a government in exile with which the UW plan can be developed. UW leaders must never forget that they are extending politics with military means, and that, in a guerrilla situation, their military means are limited. Successful UW always recognizes that its essence is political, not simply military. No warfare should ignore Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the extension of politics with the addition of other means". Subversion, psychological operations and other nonviolent means may be as potent as an ambush, in advancing the political goals of the UW force. The U.S. doctrine for special operations emphasizes that commanders cannot dominate a politicomilitary environment in the same way in which a conventional force can exert "battlefield dominance." UW is conceptually at a strategic level, and its commanders must constantly remain aware of political goals such as "military successor defeat, a change in hostile strategy or tactics, or fluctuating levels of US support. They must know who the friendly and hostile decision makers are, what their objectives and strategies are, and how they interact. They must influence friendly decision makers to ensure they understand the implications of SO mission requirements and the consequences of not adequately supporting them." Relationships with U.S. National Command The ability to create or support resistance forces expands the range of options available to national leadership, filling a niche intermediate between diplomacy and all-out warfare. As the Cold War began, the focus was on Europe, but it began to expand. Faced the reality of wars of national liberation from the mid-fifties on, President John F. Kennedy gave the first public endorsement to Special Forces, as a means of countering Communist expansion in the third world, a very different problem than the original UW concept of leading resistance movements after a Soviet invasion of Europe. . Operational SF personnel assigned to a Unified Combatant Command (UCC) or USSOCOM reports to the National Command Authority (NCA) of the United States (i.e., the President of the United States and the United States Secretary of Defense). Other national-level organizations, such as the United States Department of State or the Director of National Intelligence, may have a role in establishing policy for the UW operation, which is under the direct command of a joint organization made