began training Lao and Thai counterinsurgents in Thailand. This was because the previous Geneva agreements did not allow for training to take place in Laos. The hope was for these counterinsurgents to be able to fight back if and when Vietcong forces should move offensively through Laos. During 1964 the RLAF - Royal Laotian Air Force - were loaned a total of 33 T-28 bombers for use in the fighting. In May 1964, the U.S. Air Force began flying reconnaissance missions over the Laotian panhandle to obtain target information on men and equipment shuttled into South Vietnam over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The problem addressed by the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of May 25 was to determine if there was a set of actions that would cause the Democratic (i.e., North) Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to reduce activities in the Republic (i.e., South) of Vietnam (RVN), and to respect the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos. It assumed the air and naval action primarily without attacks on population centers or the use of nuclear weapons. The DRV, China, and USSR would be informed that U.S. intentions were limited. On June 24, 1964, the U.S. government formally endorsed Operation Triangle. This endorsement allowed for escorting fighters to strike enemy activity detected during such flights while opening the door to armed recon missions. The U.S. Army and Air Force personnel were allowed to serve as advisors to the Laotian troops. Towards the middle of the summer in 1964, the U.S. involvement in Laos had relieved many military issues. Many of the American-endorsed operations in Laos proved successful and, in turn, incentivized more involvement. Various proposals were put in motion requesting quicker mission approvals and more lenient rules of engagement. However, none of these proposals were approved, and involvement in Laos remained limited. The U.S. concluded that Laos' military situation was more stable, despite issues in South Vietnam becoming more apparent and serious. Estimates had the DRV waiting on military action while stirring diplomatic opinion against the U.S. In the absence of U.S forces in Laos, however, it was judged capable of taking control of the country. While the DRV could resist an RVN ground attack, its air defenses were primitive and would be unlikely to accept Chinese assistance other than perhaps antiaircraft guns but not fighters. The estimate did suggest that a campaign against the North would have to be quick