is not precluded even by absolute chances: they of course change the course of the world too, but still: if one thing was set otherwise, everything would have to be otherwise. Several scholars have argued that Nietzsche was not a determinist in his views of the universe. In Zarathustra, absolute randomness (maybe not as the essence of reality, but as a part thereof) can be thought of, yes, perhaps it even exists: Issues of responsibility and morality Because causa sui is according to Nietzsche a nonsense, even to a chance could get a basis attributed (only "the whole" has no basis), and it would be "divine dice" (or "Divine Plan"): If ever I have played dice with the gods at the divine table of the earth, so that the earth quaked and ruptured, and snorted forth fire-streams: – – For a divine table is the earth, and trembling with new active dictums and dice-casts of the gods: (...) To Nietzsche no one is responsible either for the necessities (laws and powers) he represents, or for chances he encounters (which conquer him unwillingly – and which, as things totally independent from anything, only the "supreme being" could change); after all, no one is absolutely and completely resistant, there can always happen something which changes one deeply enough. From The Dawn of Day: In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche discusses fatalism and responsibility in these words: Free will as a psychological error Nietzsche's critique of free will has essentially two aspects: one is philosophical (fatalistic), and the other is psychological. Fatalism lets Nietzsche theoretically prove the error of moral doctrines, which – most generally speaking – would require that a sinner changed his destiny (for instance by changing the laws of nature, influencing chances which lie completely beyond the extent of his influence), which is by definition impossible. But such theory would not be convincing enough if at the same time the impression of control was not removed, as well as the ever renewed attempts at associating it with the "freedom of will" and building a philosophy out of that. Thus a psychological critique is needed. If one agrees that the "freedom of will" denotes the power of will which rules but is not itself ruled, then it would at bottom be enough to prove that it is not will what governs human behaviour in order to abolish the very term, to