the world, Indonesian's relatively consistent economic security meant that their political beliefs were less influenced by their economic conditions. That being said, the CIA was fearful of the PKI's ability to recruit followers in the rural areas of Indonesia. Concerns about Indonesia's military build-up In the 1960s, there was rising concerns about Indonesia's military build-up and the possibility of the new nation to build nuclear weapons. The concerns began to unfold in the early 1960s. In November 1962, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director of the CIA, send a memorandum forwarding the US Air Force Department assessment about the Soviet Union military build-up in Indonesia. The assessment saw parallel on increasing Soviet military presence with the pattern in Cuba. The message warns that there is potential for the Soviet Union to use the Indonesian territory to station its medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) or intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM). There were some indicators showing the increasing Soviet military presence in the archipelago as can be seen from the visits of Soviet high-level officials, the presence of Soviet technicians, and the assignment of high military officer (a "maj gen") as an air attache in the Soviet Union embassy Jakarta. According to a memo released by the CIA on September 29, 1965, the Indonesian government started to develop an increased interest in the acquisition of materials to develop their own nuclear program. During the 1965 International Atomic Energy Association (IAKA) in Tokyo, Japan, an Indonesian official was quoted as saying that Indonesia was actively negotiating nuclear research with China and that by 1970 they would be able to develop their own nuclear reactors. Besides the desire to acquire materials to develop a reactor, Sukarno's administration was directly seeking nuclear weapons from China. Another memo released by the CIA noted that Indonesia had recently withdrawn from the United Nations and had announced that development of a nuclear weapon would be ready by October 1965. The memo also noted that the U.S. had provided a small nuclear reactor (100 kilowatts) to Indonesia in 1964 and that a Russian-made reactor was currently being built (similar in size to the U.S. reactor). In June 1965, the CIA determined that Indonesia was capable of launching surface-to-air missiles from approximately six locations. Later, in December 1965, The CIA outlined that it had been looking for another missile site near Djampang-Kulon. The search was conducted within 25 nautical miles of the area