1965 The government of the United States continued to view the military opportunistically, understanding that it had a strong anti-Communist stance. In one 12-page report, an analyst noted that the military loathed the PKI and regarded "Communism as an ideology which is essentially evil, totalitarian, and alien to the 'Indonesian way of life.'" In 1965, after the "30th of September Slaughter", the American and British governments were increasingly interested in conducting another joint operation. On October 5, 1965, British diplomat Sir Andrew Gilchrist wrote that, "I have never concealed... my belief that a little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change". This was used as an incentive to provoke quick action against the PKI. American officials backed this sentiment, with one writing that "We are, as always, sympathetic to [the Indonesian] army's desires to eliminate communist influence". With Western governments supporting anti-PKI Indonesian military generals, mass killings of PKI supporters and members began. By the beginning of November several hundred had been executed. On November 25, 1965, British intelligence reported that, "PKI men and women are being executed in very large numbers. Some victims are given a knife and invited to kill themselves. Most refuse and are told to turn around and are shot in the back". An Indonesian executioner was quoted as considering the killings a "duty to exterminate" what he called "less than animals". The American consulate in Medan reported that "Something like a reign of terror against PKI is taking place". Unanticipated event An action proposal was approved in March of that year, with an intermediate intelligence memorandum in July, and a SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate), on the situation regarding Indonesia and Malaysia, in September. According to H. W. Brands, American officials were so unprepared for the crisis that at first they misidentified the anti-communist leader, General Suharto. The United States along with Britain and Australia wanted to overthrow the Sukarno administration, who had become Indonesia's first president in 1949. Sukarno's vision was to unify the different cultures, languages, religions and political ideologies that existed within Indonesia under one common government and culture. Three months after Sukarno visited the United States, he visited China and the Soviet Union. Since Sukarno welcomed the ideology of communism (though he himself was a nationalist) and the success of PKI in 1965, his recent visit to these communist nations forced the U.S. to question Sukarno's objectives