reflected French traditions. Most of the equipment was of U.S. origin, however, because early in the First Indochina War, the Americans had been supplying the French with matériel ranging from guns to aircraft. Between 1962 and 1971, the U.S. provided Laos with direct military assistance, but not including the cost of equipping and training irregular and paramilitary forces by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). By the time the PEO changed into the Requirements Office in September 1962, the PEO believed "...the Laotian army continued to distinguish itself primarily by its lassitude and incompetence." PEO also noted that CIA-trained Hmong guerrillas were the only troops fighting to preserve northeastern Laos. When the PEO brought in Operation White Star trainers, the instructors found that 19 out of 20 Laotian soldiers had fewer than three years of education. Organization 1959–1970 Laotian National Army strength in May 1959 peaked at 29,000 officers and enlisted men organized into twelve independent battalions – ten infantry () and two airborne ( – BP) – plus one armored regiment and an artillery group (). A Laotian regular infantry battalion was organized according to the French Army model into a battalion headquarters (HQ), three company HQs and three rifle companies. Long-standing major formations above battalion level, such as Regiments, Half-brigades (), Brigades or even Divisions, were virtually nonexistent at the time. Instead, from November 1960 infantry and Paratrooper battalions began to be brought together to form loosely organized "mobile groups" ( – GMs) or "Mobiles" for short, a tactical expedient inherited from the French who had employed it previously during the First Indochina War. Being essentially a regimental-sized combat task-force, a typical Laotian GM consisted of two or three battalions' assembled for specific operations. Originally raised on a temporary basis, the Mobile Groups were re-structured in April 1961 as permanent units, and by July 1962 the Laotian Army fielded nine such Groups, eight composed of regular units – GMs 12, 13, 14, 15 (Airborne), 16, 17, and 18 – and one of irregular guerrilla forces – GM B –, with two or more being allocated per each Military Region. By late 1966 the number of mobile groups had increased to twelve, with the addition of the airborne GMs 21 and 802, and the mixed GM 801. In practice, the Military Region's commanders used the GMs as their private armies to further their own interests, rarely dispatching them outside the