The CIA conducted secret operations in Cambodia and Laos for eight years as part of the conflict against Communist North Vietnam. 1954 The National Intelligence Estimate projected relatively little Communist activity in Cambodia as Viet Minh withdraw. With outside help, the Cambodians should be able to build a security apparatus. 1959 In December 1958 Ngo Dinh NhuNgo Dinh Diem's younger brother and chief adviserbroached the idea of orchestrating a coup to overthrow Cambodian leader Norodom Sihanouk. Nhu contacted Dap Chhuon, Sihanouk's Interior Minister, who was known for his pro-American sympathies, to prepare for the coup against his boss. Chhuon received covert financial and military assistance from Thailand, South Vietnam, and the CIA. In January 1959 Sihanouk learned of the coup plans through intermediaries who were in contact with Chhuon. The following month, Sihanouk sent the army to capture Chhuon, who was summarily executed as soon as he was captured, effectively ending the coup attempt. Sihanouk then accused South Vietnam and the U.S. of orchestrating the coup attempt. Six months later, on 31August 1959, a small packaged lacquer gift, which was fitted with a parcel bomb, was delivered to the royal palace. Norodom Vakrivan, the chief of protocol, was killed instantly when he opened the package. Sihanouk's parents, Suramarit and Kossamak, who were sitting in another room not far from Vakrivan, narrowly escaped unscathed. An investigation traced the origin of the parcel bomb to an American military base in Saigon. While Sihanouk publicly accused Ngo Dinh Nhu of masterminding the bomb attack, he secretly suspected that the U.S. was also involved. The incident deepened his distrust of the U.S. 1969 President Richard Nixon asked Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger to explore two potential CIA actions in Cambodia: Creating covert paramilitary harassing operations directed against North Vietnamese Regular Forces in the sanctuary areas just over the Cambodian border CIA capability for eliminating or reducing the arms traffic through Cambodia to communist forces in South Vietnam. After discussion in the 303 Committee, which was then the approval group for US covert actions, the committee endorsed the first, although the CIA recommended against it for two reasons. They believed it would take effort away from operations in South Vietnam, and also would have questionable effectiveness but high cost against the large North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia. As far as the second, CIA has identified a number of Cambodian