way to Stanleyville in the Orientale province of the Congo. He made frequent stops to help rally people to his cause (and this allowed his captors to catch up to him quickly). Lumumba never made it, he was captured by Mobutu's forces. He was savagely beaten, and he was executed on January 17, 1961. After the death of Lumumba, the CIA's relationship with Mobutu continued to develop. Frustrated with the assent to power of Antione Gizenga, the CIA continued to support Mobutu. Mobutu worked behind the scenes of then-president Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Ministers Moise Tshombe and Cyril Adoula, helping to secure the nation's new regime with the help of the CIA. This included subsidizing and advising (bribing and buying) tribal and political leaders, fortifying relationships with labor unions and student associations, paying off parliament members and military officers, and increasing efforts to convince UN delegates of the legitimacy of the Congo's government. This support continued to grow after Mobutu visited President John F. Kennedy in the Rose Garden in 1963. This led to Mobutu receiving American financial and military support that allowed him to be in a position to assume total control of the Congo. After his 1963 visit to the White House, Mobutu was regarded as a CIA asset, and a relationship that lasted over thirty years was solidified. The chief of AF wrote in 1967 that Mobutu had become accustomed and to some degree dependent on the informal channel to the US Government thus provided... and would interpret the termination of this relationship- particularly if termination were more or less coincident with Delvin's (second) departure - as evidence of a desire on the part of the U.S. Government to disengage from the close and friendly relations that have characterized dealings between the governments for most of the period since 1960. Although U.S. policymakers wanted to move "away from slush funds and towards genuine development aid", when Mobutu asked for more funds in late 1968, he got it with few strings attached, because, according to the State Department, Mobutu was the ultimate source of power in Congo. They also stated how vital ready access was in order for the State Department to continue their long-standing policy of helping the Congo with unity, stability, and economic progress, as their hopes were to see a stable, western-oriented government in the heart of Africa. They did not want to risk the