Lieutenant Edward Williams doing double duty as the only experienced counter-espionage officer, working with revolutionary political groups. Intelligence analysis Working with available data, the CIA produced a National Intelligence Estimate in August 1954. It began by stating that the Communist signing of the Geneva agreements had legitimized them, and they would need to immediately move to control the North while planning for long-term control of the country. This National Intelligence Estimate went on to suggest that while the Diem government was in official control of the South, it remained unpopular because of a disconnect of the government from the people. Certain pro-French elements may have been planning to overthrow it. CIA experts also noted that Diem would have political problems on top of already sinking popularity. Vietminh elements would remain in the South and create an underground resistance force, discredit the government, and undermine French-Vietnamese relations. On October 26, 1954, Lansdale lured two key personnel in a planned coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem out of the country. Lansdale invited Hinh and staff to visit the Philippines. U.S. personnel dealing with the Government of Vietnam had difficulties understanding Vietnamese politics. This can be attributed to the fact that the CIA did not make a concerted effort to gain a better understanding of the history and culture of Vietnam. The CIA instead focused on the military forces occupying the territory instead of the political and economic forces that motivated them. The diplomats were not getting clear information in 1954 and early 1955, but the CIA station "had ... no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on." In Thomas Ahern's monograph, he stops short of saying that the agency was an actor in the coup that overthrew Saigon leader Ngo Dinh Diem. Within the monograph it is noted that on the morning of the coup the U.S. Military Command in Vietnam (MACV) advised the CIA that Saigon was quiet, and that the CIA should stop reporting a coup was imminent or in progress. The CIA also reportedly recognized that Diem would have political problems as early as August 1954. It is reported that policy surrounding Diem was set with this in mind. Relations with Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, began as early