anti-Communist efforts in the region. On 20 June 1950, the CIA published a report, based primarily on human assets, concluding that the DPRK had the capability to invade the South at any time. President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Johnson all received copies of this report. On 25 June of that same year, the Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (it would not be renamed the "Korean People's Army" until later) invaded across the 38th parallel. This was a surprise to US intelligence. Covert operations During the 1950s, the CIA parachuted into North Korea some of its Korean agents it had trained, until sometime in the 1970s. During the 1950s, hundreds of agents were sent on a mission to establish resistance networks in North Korea. 1996 Intelligence analysis A report obtained from a "secret" Russian foreign ministry meeting states that North Korea's Nodong-1 is "not useful as a military weapon", based on its poor performance in all areas during a test-firing in the Sea of Japan in 1993. The report quoted Yu Min in the Seoul Sinmun, 5 January 1996, p. 2. On 2 February, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch tells a United States Senate Select Committee that North Korea is developing long-range missiles. The United States, according to Deutch, should focus on stopping North Korea from acquiring guidance-and-control technology that could make its long-range missiles more accurate and lethal. In a 9 May article in Aerospace Daily, pp. 233–234, a National Security Council director, Robert G. Bell, says that a United States National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that no new strategic missile system will threaten the continental United States reflects a consensus within the United States intelligence community. Bell admits, however, that the intelligence community's knowledge of North Korea's Taepodong-2 program is incomplete. According to Bill Gertz of The Washington Times, CIA sources said North Korea delivered seven shiploads of Scud-C missiles to Egypt between March and April 1996. The missile shipments were part of a 1980s licensing agreement between Egypt and North Korea. On December 11, according to Barbara Starr of Jane's Defence Weekly (p. 10), former CIA Director Robert Gates told the United States Senate Intelligence Committee that North Korea is having problems developing its Taepodong class of ballistic missiles. He said that research and development were needed for a completely new propulsion system, plus improved guidance. Gates said that