operation was considered a success, with the rebels being pushed out of the town and the majority of hostages being rescued. Afterwards, authorities counted 35 dead and 80 wounded. While there were hostage casualties, the operation was considered successful because of the torture and poor treatment the hostages were experiencing, due to the anti-Western sentiments held by the rebels. Large amounts of negotiations took months for the eventual release of the hostages. Following the fall of Stanleyville, the insurgents killed approximately 300 Americans and Europeans who were taken hostage. In addition to providing air support for Mobutu, the CIA engaged in covert maritime activities. Rebels were smuggling Chinese-supplied weapons across Lake Tanganyika, which has an incredibly long coastline but is not overly wide, making it a difficult lake to monitor. At first, the impact was largely psychological, but later, once the CIA fleet was beefed up, the covert navy began having a serious impact. In conjunction with the air support, the covert operations managed to severely weaken the rebels. Early CIA perceptions of Joseph Mobutu When Congo became independent in 1960 the country was, to a large extent, an anarchist's paradise. Between 1960 and 1965, Congo had zero political institutes, null national leaders, and a very scant amount of competent individuals in its economy. Congo's independence, in 1960, was followed by a surge of military and political insurgency. Ethnic groups were butting heads with each other at that time and various uprisings took place that left behind a coagulated trail of curdled blood. However, by 1965 most of the chaos had been hampered and order subsequently managed to wiggle its way back into the state. In November 1965, then Lieutenant General Joseph Mobutu seized power and declared himself president after throwing Kasavubu out of office. Mobutu was able to rule for 32 years primarily due to several "sham elections as well as through brutal force". Several released CIA documents shed light on how the CIA perceived Mobutu during his rise to power and in the early years of his time in power. From these documents, it can be seen that many in the CIA were unsure of the long-term capability of Mobutu, viewing him in an "optimistically pessimistic manner". This is demonstrated in a 1966 intelligence memorandum, opening with a quote from the Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, stating that "The Coup was the best thing that could possibly have happened;