the first time that Central Intelligence Agency contract employees had a direct role in combat air attacks when they flew Laotian government aircraft on strike missions. Additionally, the Air Force actively considered nuclear weapons options during the 1959 Laos crisis. By December 1959, Vang Pao had to either fight the communists or leave the country. If the United States supplied the weapons, Vang Pao claimed that he would fight and raise an army of 10,000. This aforementioned activity in 1959 was caused by an inability to integrate the Pathet Lao communist military into the Royal Lao Armed forces, precipitating a civil war in which the CIA ordered the Air Force to deploy a squadron of B-47 bombers to the Clark Air Force Base. This deployment ensured that the bomber could be used to interfere or destroy Pathet Lao communications to the North Vietnamese. Laos 1960 From 1960 to 1961, the CIA initiated operations code-named Erawan in which U.S. Special Forces trained Laotian soldiers in methods of unconventional warfare used the enemy. The previous training of the Laotian military was underdeveloped and had "caused friction between the Americans and the French." After a request from Phoumi in February, Washington decided to extend training programs for the Laotian military. However, negotiations over the nature and structure of the training programs created divisions between the French, Washington, and Phoumi. The French wanted to retain complete control over the Laotian Army, but Phoumi objected. Phoumi asserted his desire to have the French completely removed from Laos. He also voiced sentiments advocating for the U.S. Special Forces to control the training operations. The French voiced objections to U.S. presence in Laos stating that such intervention violated the Geneva accords, a position supported by Souvanna Phouma. After a long series of negotiations combined with interventions from the Royal Thailand Government, U.S. Special Forces infiltrated the Lao countryside and began training Laotians in unconventional warfare and anti-guerilla tactics. Eventually, four CAT pilots were trained on U.S. Air Force H-19A helicopters in Japan and the Philippines. The CAT contingent did not reach Laos until March 1960. Due to the operating limitations of the H-19s, the underpowered helicopters could fly only at lower elevations in the country. "Generally, they were used to carry CIA case officers to meetings in outlying areas and to distribute leaflets during elections. By June 1960, it had become clear that helicopters would form a