feasible in Vietnam. The representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Admiral Lloyd Mustin, was much more certain America could and should win a battle in North Vietnam. The two men's differing points of view were synthesized by John McNaughton, a personal representative of Robert McNamara in the working group, who called from "translating the facets of a problem [namely the Vietnam War] into statistical probabilities in order to facilitate precise, objective decisions." McNaughton came to the view that "progress inside SVN [South Vietnam was] important...[but] unlikely despite our best ideas and efforts..." and admitted that "Action against North Vietnam is to some extent a substitute for strengthening the government of South Vietnam." The Three Options The group came up with three basic options for the future of American involvement in Vietnam. Option A: No change from previous policies. Option B: Immediate escalation Option C: Gradual escalation McNaughton voted for option 3 because, in his words: If Option C is tried and fails, [it] would still leave behind a better odor than Option A: It would demonstrate that [the] US was a 'good doctor' willing to keep promises, be tough, take risks, get bloodied, and hurt the enemy badly." Notes Bibliography United States National Security Council Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson