(GIREDMET). In any event, Wirths and the chief engineer at Plant No. 12, Yuri N. Golovanov, worked out the technological applications of the uranium tetrafluoride process in the production of uranium, which was superior to the uranium oxide process. The first experiments with the tetrafluoride were conducted in 1946, and the technology was accepted for industrial application in 1947. A high-frequency vacuum oven was acquired for the melting and casting of uranium. For their work at Plant No. 12, in contribution to the Soviet atomic bomb project, Wirths and Thieme were awarded a Stalin Prize, second class, and the Order of the Red Banner of Soviet Labor, also known and the Order of the Red Flag. In preparation for release from the Soviet Union, it was standard practice to put personnel into quarantine for a few years if they worked on projects related to the Soviet atomic bomb project, as was the case for Wirths. Additionally, in 1954, the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, German Democratic Republic) and the Soviet Union prepared a list of scientists they wished to keep in the DDR, due to their having worked on projects related to the Soviet atomic bomb project; this list was known as the "A-list". On this A-list were the names of 18 scientists. Nine, possibly 10, of the names were associated with the Riehl group which worked at Plant No. 12 in Ehlektrostal'. Born, Catsch, Riehl, Wirths, and Zimmer were on the list. Return to Germany When Wirths was released from the Soviet Union, he fled to West Germany and took a job at Degussa as an authority in the production of reactor-grade uranium. Wirths spoke English as was featured in the 1988 NOVA television program Nazis and the Russian Bomb. In the program, Manfred von Ardenne was also featured; he was a German physicist who directed Institute A, in Sinop, a suburb of Sukhumi. In the documentary, Wirths told a story about the purity of Plant No. 12's production of uranium. Through espionage, the Soviets has procured a specimen of American uranium and compared it to that at Plant No. 12. The Soviet leaders praised the purity of Plant No. 12's uranium production. Wirths, indicated that the Americans probably determined had optimized production output by allowing the purity to be less stringent, and said Plant No. 12 was probably "over doing it," to which one of the Soviet leaders responded,