The Stimson Doctrine is the policy of nonrecognition of states created as a result of a war of aggression. The policy was implemented by the United States government, enunciated in a note of January 7, 1932, to the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China, of non-recognition of international territorial changes imposed by force. The doctrine was an application of the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur. Since the entry into force of the UN Charter, international law scholars have argued that states are under a legal obligation not to recognize annexations as legitimate, but this view is controversial and not supported by consistent state practice. Overview Named after Henry L. Stimson, United States Secretary of State in the Hoover administration (1929–1933), the policy followed Japan's unilateral seizure of Manchuria in northeastern China following action by Japanese soldiers at Mukden (now Shenyang), on September 18, 1931. The doctrine was also invoked by US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles in the Welles Declaration on July 23, 1940, which announced non-recognition of the Soviet annexation and incorporation of the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This remained the official US position until the Baltic states regained independence in 1991. It was not the first time that the US had used nonrecognition as a political tool or symbolic statement. President Woodrow Wilson had refused to recognize the Mexican Revolutionary governments in 1913 and Japan's 21 Demands upon China in 1915. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in late 1931 placed Stimson in a difficult position. It was evident that appeals to the spirit of the Kellogg–Briand Pact had no impact on either the Chinese or the Japanese, and Stimson was further hampered by President Herbert Hoover's clear indication that he would not support economic sanctions as a means to bring peace in the Far East. On January 7, 1932, Stimson sent similar notes to China and Japan that incorporated a diplomatic approach that had been used by earlier secretaries facing crises in the Far East. Later known as the Stimson Doctrine or sometimes the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine the notes read in part as follows: [T]he American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those