only if a new fact is predicted with it... The idea of growth and the concept of empirical character are soldered into one." See pages 34–35 of The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, 1978. Lakatos's own key examples of pseudoscience were Ptolemaic astronomy, Immanuel Velikovsky's planetary cosmogony, Freudian psychoanalysis, 20th-century Soviet Marxism, Lysenko's biology, Niels Bohr's quantum mechanics post-1924, astrology, psychiatry, and neoclassical economics. Darwin's theory In his 1973 Scientific Method Lecture 1 at the London School of Economics, he also claimed that "nobody to date has yet found a demarcation criterion according to which Darwin can be described as scientific". Almost 20 years after Lakatos's 1973 challenge to the scientificity of Darwin, in her 1991 The Ant and the Peacock, LSE lecturer and ex-colleague of Lakatos, Helena Cronin, attempted to establish that Darwinian theory was empirically scientific in respect of at least being supported by evidence of likeness in the diversity of life forms in the world, explained by descent with modification. She wrote that our usual idea of corroboration as requiring the successful prediction of novel facts... Darwinian theory was not strong on temporally novel predictions. ... however familiar the evidence and whatever role it played in the construction of the theory, it still confirms the theory. Rational reconstructions of the history of science In his 1970 article "History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions" Lakatos proposed a dialectical historiographical meta-method for evaluating different theories of scientific method, namely by means of their comparative success in explaining the actual history of science and scientific revolutions on the one hand, whilst on the other providing a historiographical framework for rationally reconstructing the history of science as anything more than merely inconsequential rambling. The article started with his now renowned dictum "Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind". However, neither Lakatos himself nor his collaborators ever completed the first part of this dictum by showing that in any scientific revolution the great majority of the relevant scientific community converted just when Lakatos's criterion – one programme successfully predicting some novel facts whilst its competitor degenerated – was satisfied. Indeed, for the historical case studies in his 1968 article "Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" he had openly admitted as much, commenting: "In this paper it is not my purpose to go on seriously to the second stage