a situation where their tactical flexibility and discipline could not be brought to bear." The size of Arminius's forces is a guessing game at best since no written records of the Germanic peoples survive. Estimates thus vary widely based on the starting assumptions. Historian Adrian Murdoch suggests a force of 25,000. Historian Peter Wells suggests that the army may have pulled from a large area, and gives a range of estimates between 17,000 and 100,000, but suggests that 18,000 were likely involved at the final stage of the battle when the Romans were routed. Historian McNally finds fault with Well's demographic calculation style, finding his upper estimate of 100,000 to be very unlikely. Historian Hans Delbrück suggested that each tribe involved probably had 6,000 to 8,000 fighting men, for a total in the 20,000 to 30,000 range. Delbrück notes that these troops were not just mere farmers, they were experienced soldiers in their own right, even if not outfitted by the state as the Romans were. But the Germanic army was generally more poorly outfitted than the Romans. Most had no armor and would have been limited to a simple shield and a hunting spear or axe. But there was a gradation in equipment quality according to the wealth and status of the fighter. Those fighters who would have held command roles, or been part of a chief's guard would have carried a heavy spear and a number of javelins, along with various other secondary weapons. Those fighters would also have had high quality shields. Still, armor was very rare and would had to have been acquired as spoils of war from defeated Romans, or perhaps from time serving as a Roman auxiliary. Battles Varus' forces included his three legions (Legio XVII, Legio XVIII and Legio XIX), six cohorts of auxiliary troops (non-citizens or allied troops) and three squadrons of cavalry (alae). Most of these lacked combat experience, both with regard to Germanic fighters and under the prevalent local conditions. The Roman forces were not marching in combat formation and were interspersed with large numbers of camp followers. As they entered the forest northeast of Osnabrück, they found the track narrow and muddy. According to Cassius Dio, a violent storm had also arisen. He also writes that Varus neglected to send out reconnaissance parties ahead of the main body of troops. The line of march was now stretched out perilously