of the enemy, clothing, rations, evacuation of the wounded, care and use of weapons and equipment, signal communication, and winter mobility. The manual was designed to provide information at the officer level for indoctrination of troops via the non-commissioned officer ranks. The scope of the manual is to train troops in the following areas: Protection of personnel, vehicles and weapons against snow and cold Training personnel to be hardened against the conditions encountered and able to improvise shelter from found materials Mobility on skis, winter roads, ice crossings, and conversion of wheeled vehicles into tracked versions Construction of positions and obstacles in frozen terrain Combat in deep snow and severe cold Some highlights include addressing: Human factors – Providing the right level of clothing to maintain agility and avoid overheating. Maintaining a slow, steady marching pace to avoid chilling down in the wind. Boosting morale with up-to-date newspapers from home and nearby areas. Providing improvised shelters and bivouacs. Hygiene, emphasizing cleanliness. Mobility – Setting up and maintaining winter roads and trails. Warming up engines for reliable starting. Positions and fortifications – Using logs and snow as materials to provide trenches and gun emplacements. Care of equipment – Keeping equipment dry, when possible, and substituting low-temperature lubricants for oils and hydraulic fluids. Soviet experience The Soviet Army learned from its 1939–40 Winter War experiences and the 1941 German advance on Moscow. The high command realized that it must prepare entire divisions for winter warfare in 1942, beginning with warm uniforms, winter equipment (skis, etc.), and training for winter operations. Analysis of previous experiences resulted in a series of manuals that covered flight, engineer, and combat arms operations in winter. Issues covered included: Flight operations – Reduced daylight, snow drifting, cold temperatures impeded the added need for air transport. Engineer operations – Engineer troops build new roadways, airfields, water crossings, and encampments with water supply. They destroy obstacles, requiring engineering equipment. Regular troops entrench tanks, construct tank obstacles, and build simple shelters. Combat arms operations – Addressing the German methods of defense with automatic weapons strongholds, supplemented with mines, wires, and anti-tank obstacles. Against these, the Russians used coordinated massed fire. In his 1981 paper, Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies, Chew draws on experiences from the Allied-Soviet War in Northern Russia during the Winter of 1918–19, the destruction of the Soviet 44th Motorized Rifle Division, and Nazi–Soviet Warfare during