it occurs where a large number of customers cannot be accessed by the competitors, which in turn reduces the efficiency of these downstream firms.As a result of this the more dominant firm has the ability to reduce quantity or to increase the price of products at its disposal due to weakened competition from its competitors. This leaves customers vulnerable as there are forced to buy from the dominant supplier. It is typically a seller who imposes exclusivity in the literature on exclusive dealing.The reason for the restraint of a seller may be procompetitive, such as preventing rival suppliers from: freely riding on the investments of the seller in the sales efficiency of a retailer.Efficiency reasons for exclusive dealing are: Encouraging distributors to actively promote goods from a manufacturer Encourages suppliers to help distributors by proving more information Eliminating the free rider problem amongst suppliers Allowing the control of distribution quality by suppliers Exclusive dealing induced by the seller may also lead to anticompetitive behaviour. This is true if it leads to. a foreclosure that removes competitors from a large portion of the market for a prolonged time period.This is also true in the case of an entrant where the dominant incumbent can deter the entry of an efficient entrant though the practice of exclusive dealing. Inefficient results for exclusive dealing are: Price decrease and an overall decrease in market output Increase in the dominant's firm's market share as well as the amount of product distributed Less competitors in the market as they are forced to exist due to exclusive dealing Incumbents have increase market power as they are bale to deter entry of new entrants to the market Buyer Induced Exclusive Dealing Exclusive dealing is commonly known as a supplier induced act, however the buyer has the power to influence exclusive dealing through multiple methods. At the manufacturing point, there is more market influence downstream than upstream in certain distribution networks because "consumers are more likely to switch products inside the supermarket than switch brand stores". Dobson (2008) noted that "buyer-led constraints most frequently occur when the buyer has some negotiating advantage over suppliers that guarantees their compliance or consent. The consumer-welfare consequences of exclusive dealings caused by buyers are not apparent. If a dealer sticks to a single supplier of a marketed consumer product, exclusive dealing decreases the options of customers. Those customers who may not find their favourite