Lijphart identifies four key characteristics of consociational democracies: Consociational policies often have these characteristics: Coalition cabinets, where executive power is shared between parties, not concentrated in one. Many of these cabinets are oversized, meaning they include parties not necessary for a parliamentary majority; Balance of power between executive and legislative; Decentralized and federal government, where (regional) minorities have considerable independence; Incongruent bicameralism, where it is very difficult for one party to gain a majority in both houses. Normally one chamber represents regional interests and the other national interests; Proportional representation, to allow (small) minorities to gain representation too; Organized and corporatist interest groups, which represent minorities; A rigid constitution, which prevents government from changing the constitution without consent of minorities; Judicial review, which allows minorities to go to the courts to seek redress against laws that they see as unjust; Elements of direct democracy, which allow minorities to enact or prevent legislation; Proportional employment in the public sector; A neutral head of state, either a monarch with only ceremonial duties, or an indirectly elected president, who gives up his or her party affiliation after being elected; Referendums are only used to allow minorities to block legislation: this means that they must be a citizen's initiative and that there is no compulsory voting. Equality between ministers in cabinet, the prime minister is only primus inter pares; An independent central bank, where experts and not politicians set out monetary policies. Favourable conditions Lijphart also identifies a number of "favourable conditions" under which consociationalism is likely to be successful. He has changed the specification of these conditions somewhat over time. Michael Kerr summarises Lijphart's most prominent favourable factors as: Segmental isolation of ethnic communities A multiple balance of power The presence of external threats common to all communities Overarching loyalties to the state A tradition of elite accommodation Socioeconomic equality A small population size, reducing the policy load A moderate multi-party system with segmental parties Lijphart stresses that these conditions are neither indispensable nor sufficient to account for the success of consociationalism. This has led Rinus van Schendelen to conclude that "the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all". John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary argue that three conditions are key to the establishment of democratic consociational power-sharing: elites have to be motivated to engage in conflict regulation; elites must lead deferential segments; and