Engineering at Convair, wrote a memo to Convair management pointing out several problems with the door design. McDonnell Douglas had subcontracted design and construction of the DC-10 fuselage to Convair, and Applegate had overseen its development in ways that he felt were reducing the safety of the system. In particular, he noted that the actuator system had been switched from a hydraulic system to an electrical one, which he felt was less safe. He also noted that the floor would be prone to failure if the door was lost, and this would likely sever the control cables, leading to a loss of the aircraft. Finally, he pointed out that this precise failure had already occurred in ground testing in 1970, and he concluded that such an accident was almost certain to occur again in the future. In spite of these recommendations, on March 3, 1974, less than two years after the near-loss of Flight 96, Turkish Airlines Flight 981 crashed outside Paris, killing all 346 passengers and crew on board in an identical rear cargo door failure. Unlike Flight 96, where the crew still managed to keep enough flight controls to safely return to Detroit, the pilots of Flight 981 completely lost control of the tail surfaces and all hydraulics. Investigators discovered that the upgrades had never been carried out on this airframe, although the construction logs claimed they had been. One modification had been carried out, the installation of the inspection window, along with a placard beside the door controls printed in English and Turkish that informed the operators how to inspect the latches. The operator in Paris was Algerian and could not read either language and had been instructed that as long as the locking handle closed, the door was safe. He also noted that he did not have to force the handle, and investigators concluded that it had already been bent on a prior flight. In the aftermath of Flight 981, the Applegate memorandum was discovered and introduced into evidence during the massive civil lawsuit that followed. Many commentators subsequently blamed the aircraft manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas, and other aviation authorities, for failing to learn lessons from the Flight 96 accident. Although there had been some redesign of the DC-10 cargo door system, it had only been implemented voluntarily and haphazardly by various airlines. If the warning signs of Flight 96 had been heeded, it is likely that