(sunk south of Java March 3, 1942), (lost May 2, 1942), (scuttled May 6, 1942 but salvaged by the Japanese), (sunk May 5, 1942), and (scuttled May 5, 1942). In December 1941, the naval forces were augmented by the schooner . The U.S. 4th Marine Regiment, stationed in Shanghai, China, since the late 1920s, had anticipated a withdrawal from China during the summer of 1941. As personnel were routinely transferred back to the United States or separated from the service, the regimental commander, Col. Samuel L. Howard, arranged unofficially for all replacements to be placed in the 1st Special Defense Battalion, based at Cavite. When the 4th Marines arrived in the Philippines on November 30, 1941, it incorporated the Marines at Cavite and Olongapo Naval Stations into its understrength ranks. An initial plan to divide the 4th into two regiments, mixing each with a battalion of Philippine Constabulary, was discarded after Howard showed reluctance, and the 4th was stationed on Corregidor to augment the defenses there, with details detached to Bataan to protect USAFFE headquarters. Additionally the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, a paramilitary survey force, operated in Manila with the ship USC&GSS Research. Far East Air Force controversy News reached the Philippines that an attack on Pearl Harbor was in progress at 2:20 am local time on December 8, 1941.The attack on Pearl Harbor had occurred on December 7 by local, Hawaiian time. This was December 8 in the Philippines, which is on the other side of the International Date Line. Clock time in the Philippines was 18 hours 30 minutes ahead of Hawaiian time (see zoneinfo database). FEAF interceptors had already conducted an air search for incoming aircraft reported shortly after midnight, but these had been Japanese scout planes reporting weather conditions. At 3:30 am, Brigadier General Richard Sutherland, chief of staff to General Douglas MacArthur, heard about the attack from a commercial radio broadcast. At 5:00 am FEAF commander Gen. Brereton reported to USAFFE headquarters where he attempted to see MacArthur without success. He recommended to MacArthur's chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard Sutherland, that FEAF launch bombing missions against Formosa in accordance with Rainbow 5 war plan directives from which an attack was likely to come. Brereton was further made aware of an attack against the at Davao Bay. Authorization was withheld, but shortly afterward, in response to a telegram from General George C. Marshall instructing