The liberal paradox, also Sen paradox or Sen's paradox, is a logical paradox proposed by Amartya Sen which shows that no means of aggregating individual preferences into a single, social choice, can simultaneously fulfill the following, seemingly mild conditions: The unrestrictedness condition, or U: every possible ranking of each individual's preferences and all outcomes of every possible voting rule will be considered equally, The Pareto condition, or P: if everybody individually likes some choice better at the same time, the society in its voting rule as a whole likes it better as well, and Liberalism, or L (from which the theorem derives its gist): all individuals in a society must have at least one possibility of choosing differently, so that the social choice under a given voting rule changes as well. That is, as an individual liberal, anyone can exert their freedom of choice at least in some decision with tangible results. Sen's result shows that this is impossible. The three, rather minimalistic, assumptions cannot all hold together. The paradox—more properly called a proof of contradiction, and a paradox only in the sense of informal logic—is contentious because it appears to contradict the classical liberal idea that markets are both Pareto-efficient and respect individual freedoms. Sen's proof, set in the context of social choice theory, is similar in many respects to Arrow's impossibility theorem and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem. As a mathematical construct, it also has much wider applicability: it is essentially about cyclical majorities between partially ordered sets, of which at least three must participate in order to give rise to the phenomenon. Since the idea is about pure mathematics and logic, similar arguments abound much further afield. They, for example, lead to the necessity of the fifth normal form in relational database design. The history of the argument also goes deeper, Condorcet's paradox perhaps being the first example of the finite sort. Pareto efficiency Definition A particular distribution of goods or outcome of any social process is regarded as Pareto-efficient if there is no way to improve one or more people's situations without harming another. Put another way, an outcome is not Pareto-efficient if there is a way to improve at least one person's situation without harming anyone else. For example, suppose a mother has ten dollars which she intends to give to her two children Carlos and Shannon. Suppose the children each want only money, and they do