social choice is made so that everyone is collectively as well off as possible, to the extent that every available tradeoff would make someone worse off. Minimal liberalism (individual freedom): More than one individual in the society is decisive on a pair of social outcomes. (An individual is decisive on a pair of social outcomes x and y if, whenever they prefer x over y, the social choice function prefers x over y regardless of what other members of the society prefer. And similarly whenever they prefer y over x, the social choice function prefers y over x.) Formally, a social choice function F respects minimal liberalism if there is more than one individual i∊N for which there exists a pair of outcomes xi, yi on which they are decisive—that is, for every configuration of preference relations p∊Rel(X)N, yi∊ F(p) only when xi≼iyi (and similarly, xi∊ F(p) only when yi≼ixi). As an example of decisiveness: in the Lewd/Prude case, Lewd was decisive on the pair of outcomes ⟨"Lewd reads", "No one reads"⟩ and Prude was decisive on the pair of outcomes ⟨"Prude reads", "No one reads"⟩. Intuitively, minimal liberalism captures an aspect of individual freedom: for some issues, if you prefer x over y (or vice versa), then society respects your preference for x over y even if everyone else is against you. Sen's example is your personal preference for sleeping on your back or your side: on at least one innocuous personal area like this, a liberal society ought to prioritize your individual preference even if everyone else in society would prefer you to sleep another way. The formal requirement is that at least two people are decisive in this way, to rule out the possibility of a single person who dictates society's preferences. In other words, the liberal paradox states that for every social choice function F, there is a configuration of preference relations p∊Rel(X)N for which F violates either Pareto optimality or Minimal liberalism (or both). In the examples of Sen and Gibbard noted above, the social choice function satisfies minimal liberalism at the expense of Pareto optimality. Ways out of the paradox Because the paradox relies on very few conditions, there are a limited number of ways to escape the paradox. Essentially one must either reject the universal domain assumption, the Pareto principle, or the minimal liberalism principle. Sen himself suggested two ways out, one a