one escapes the paradox: Minimal liberalism Most commentators on Sen's paradox have argued that Sen's minimal liberalism condition does not adequately capture the notion of individual rights. Essentially what is excluded from Sen's characterization of individual rights is the ability to voluntarily form contracts that lay down one's claim to a right. For example, in the example of Lewd and Prude, although each has a right to refuse to read the book, Prude would voluntarily sign a contract with Lewd promising to read the book on condition that Lewd refrain from doing so. In such a circumstance there was no violation of Prude's or Lewd's rights because each entered the contract willingly. Similarly, Alice and Bob might sign a contract to each paint their houses their dispreferred color on condition that the other does the same. In this vein, Gibbard provides a weaker version of the minimal liberalism claim which he argues is consistent with the possibility of contracts and which is also consistent with the Pareto principle given any possible preferences of the individuals. Dynamism Alternatively, instead of both Lewd and Prude deciding what to do at the same time, they should do it one after the other. If Prude decides not to read, then Lewd will decide to read. This yields the same outcome. However, if Prude decides to read, Lewd won't. "Prude reads" is preferred by Prude (and also Lewd) to "Lewd reads", so he will decide to read (with no obligation, voluntarily) to get this Pareto efficient outcome. Marc Masat hints that this should be another way out of the paradox: References Philosophical paradoxes Social choice theory Economics theorems