about each others' intentions and conditions for peace. This led Wilson to crucially delay offers to initiate a peace conference, and eventually fumble the diplomatic procedures necessary to make such an offer. While it is unclear if these mistakes were caused simply by House's lack of diplomatic experience or were instead intentional misdirects intended to protect House's own social standing, Zelikow argues that this failure of diplomacy was a primary reason for Wilson's eventual break with House following the end of the war. House's perspective as reflected in his personal papers, differs. House traveled in Europe to explore the possibility of peace as Wilson's unofficial agent. House was dismayed by German militarism which he believed the main cause of the war, but also by the hardened self-interest of each of the warring nations which included territorial aspirations, and Britain's fear of Germany's challenge to their military power, in particular naval primacy. The belligerents in the grip of war fever considered even discussing a peace conference a show of weakness; rejected automatically any proposal their enemy favored. Wilson's hopeful call for a reasonable, practical "peace without victory" backfired; angered the French and English fighting for Germany's utter and decisive defeat. Soldiers started calling dud shells "Wilsons." The efforts to offer American mediation foundered not for lack of trying, but because the intransigent warring nations were not ready for peace -- this, according to House's contemporaneous correspondence. Then Germany's decision to resume unrestrained submarine attacks against vessels of neutral nations, together with the Zimmerman telegram offering a German-Mexican alliance on the understanding Mexico would be assisted to reconquer New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona -- precipitated Wilson's decision to ask Congress to declare that a state of war existed between Germany and the United States. But both Wilson and House viewed entering the war to end it not just as a necessity of national interest, but as a Progressive project for a better future. Mankind would reject militarism after the horrors of this war; out of it would come a League of Nations to team against any single nation that waged aggressive war. It was to be (they thought) the War to End All Wars. Paris conference House helped Wilson outline his Fourteen Points and worked with the president on the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations. House served on the League of Nations Commission