Deontic logic is the field of philosophical logic that is concerned with obligation, permission, and related concepts. Alternatively, a deontic logic is a formal system that attempts to capture the essential logical features of these concepts. It can be used to formalize imperative logic, or directive modality in natural languages. Typically, a deontic logic uses OA to mean it is obligatory that A (or it ought to be (the case) that A), and PA to mean it is permitted (or permissible) that A, which is defined as . Note that in natural language, the statement "You may go to the zoo OR the park" should be understood as instead of , as both options are permitted by the statement; See Hans Kamp's paradox of free choice for more details. When there are multiple agents involved in the domain of discourse, the deontic modal operator can be specified to each agent to express their individual obligations and permissions. For example, by using a subscript for agent , means that "It is an obligation for agent (to bring it about/make it happen) that ". Note that could be stated as an action by another agent; One example is "It is an obligation for Adam that Bob doesn't crash the car", which would be represented as , where B="Bob doesn't crash the car". Etymology The term deontic is derived from the (gen.: ), meaning "that which is binding or proper." Standard deontic logic In Georg Henrik von Wright's first system, obligatoriness and permissibility were treated as features of acts. Soon after this, it was found that a deontic logic of propositions could be given a simple and elegant Kripke-style semantics, and von Wright himself joined this movement. The deontic logic so specified came to be known as "standard deontic logic," often referred to as SDL, KD, or simply D. It can be axiomatized by adding the following axioms to a standard axiomatization of classical propositional logic: In English, these axioms say, respectively: If A is a tautology, then it ought to be that A (necessitation rule N). In other words, contradictions are not permitted. If it ought to be that A implies B, then if it ought to be that A, it ought to be that B (modal axiom K). If it ought to be that A, then it is permitted that A (modal axiom D). In other words, if it's not permitted