we ended up losing 1–0. In the match in Kyiv, we chose a playing model based on squeezing the play and fighting for the ball in our opponents’ half of the pitch, trying to create a numerical advantage in various areas. Eventually we won 2–0.’ Lobanovskyi's preferable formation was the 4–1–3–2. All his teams utilized the talents of two strikers, in 1975 Oleh Blokhin and Volodymyr Onyshchenko, in 1986 Blokhin or Oleh Protasov and Ihor Belanov, and in 1999 Andriy Shevchenko and Serhiy Rebrov. Lobanovskyi's forwards were highly versatile, being equally capable of shifting to the flanks, organizing attacks as playmakers, joining midfield in defensive formations and even dropping back to help the full-backs during spells of opponent pressure. This versatility of the forwards was key in disorganizing opponents' defenses and creating space for players attacking from the back. Pressing was always a key element of Lobanovskyi's teams. The main goal of pressing was to create situations of numerical superiority for Dynamo players where the ball was, and deny opponents both space and time for the right decisions, thus forcing them to always play the game at Dynamo's pace. The trademark Dynamo counter-attacks would start with a player dispossessing his opponent in midfield, then immediately playing a quick long ball either to the forwards or the advancing full-backs, so as to catch the opposition unorganized. Lobanovskyi always stressed the importance of the first seconds of an attack after winning the ball, as it is in these seconds that the opposition is less ready to defend in an organized manner. Pressing was a collective effort, and whenever a player moved up the pitch, a teammate covered his position. In this way Dynamo minimized the threat of having to face a counter-attack by the opponent in case the ball was lost. Lobanovskyi put meticulous attention to set-pieces both in attack and in defense. In defense, Dynamo often used tactical fouling to prevent opponents from getting quality shots on goal, frequently conceding fouls just at the top of the penalty area. The logic behind this was that free kicks were much easier for the goalkeeper to defend that shots in open play. In addition, they also used tactical fouling to prevent counter attacks: by fouling around the halfway line Dynamo's midfield could get behind the ball to defend. In attack, Lobanovskyi's teams also were intelligent in their use of playing short from free