law he had to teach. Eventually he found that the history of the philosophy of law showed him the way in its development, and that Schelling's thinking was confirmed and strengthened. However, Stahl did not see himself as a disciple of Schelling. A second figure he could draw on was Savigny, the father of the historical school of law. He recognized the right thing intuitively, but others needed a legal philosophy as a theoretical basis. This had been neglected, and Stahl wanted to set himself the task of justifying the views of the historical school of law theoretically, namely in terms of ethics, without following the natural law doctrine of the Enlightenment. Rather, he wanted to base himself on the traditional Christian views - and above all with his work to give "rationalism an eternal monument (i.e. gravestone)." Stahl begins the introduction to his main work with the succinct definition: "Legal philosophy is the science of the just." Since previous attempts cannot go unnoticed, the first volume of the genesis of legal philosophy is dedicated. "The historical course, the real nature of people is the judgment on the motives of all philosophy, and thus on philosophy itself. Science, like the saint in the legend (Christophorus), must seek the strongest lord...With every system, the question is not so much which institutions it declares to be just, what is just for it and where it gets its knowledge from." Beginning with the Greeks, through the Middle Ages and the theory of natural law, Stahl finally reaches the pragmatic (Machiavelli and Montesquieu) and speculative (Hegel and Schelling) to the "writers of the counter-revolution" and to historical legal philosophy. The second volume of the "Philosophy of Law" was published in 1833, i.e. after the July Revolution of 1830. The experience of the revolution was formative for Stahl. He absolutely rejected the revolution and was convinced that everything could be done to prevent it, to prevent it. The revolution for Stahl already begins with rationalism, with the fact that man is no longer satisfied with knowing God about himself, but wants to set standards himself, using his reason. And if you let rationalism run its course, Stahl believed, it would inevitably lead to permanent revolution, because since God is supposed to have been overthrown, you are not satisfied with a constitution, nor with the overthrow of the monarch and the establishment of a republic. Rather,