Once given freedom of action, Manstein intended to utilise his forces to make a series of counterstrokes into the flanks of the Soviet armoured formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking Kharkov and Kursk. The II SS Panzer Corps had arrived from France in January 1943, refitted and up to near full strength. Armoured units from the 1st Panzer Army of Army Group A had pulled out of the Caucasus and further strengthened Manstein's forces. The operation was hastily prepared and did not receive a name. Later known as Third Battle of Kharkov, it commenced on 21 February, as 4th Panzer Army under General Hoth launched a counter-attack. The German forces cut off the Soviet mobile spearheads and continued the drive north, retaking Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod on 18 March. A Soviet offensive launched on 25 February by the Central Front against Army Group Centre had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow the attacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the south to counter the threat of the advancing German forces under Manstein. Exhaustion of both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, coupled with the loss of mobility due to the onset of the spring rasputitsa, resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March. The counteroffensive left a Soviet salient extending from north to south and from east to west into the German area of control, centred on the city of Kursk. German plans and preparation The heavy losses sustained by the army since the opening of Operation Barbarossa had resulted in a shortage in infantry and artillery. Units were in total 470,000 men understrength. For the Wehrmacht to undertake an offensive in 1943, the burden of the offensive, in both attacking the Soviet defences and holding ground on the flanks of the advance, would have to be carried primarily by the panzer divisions. On 10 March, Manstein presented a plan whereby the German forces would pinch off the Kursk salient with a rapid offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided. On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which authorised several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient. As the last Soviet resistance in Kharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuade Günther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Centre, to immediately attack the Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient. Kluge refused,