particular, the tautologies of sentential logic, such as "Frank is bald or Frank is not bald", will turn out to be supertrue, since on any precisification of baldness, either "Frank is bald" or "Frank is not bald" will be true. Since the presence of borderline cases seems to threaten principles like this one (excluded middle), the fact that supervaluationism can "rescue" them is seen as a virtue. Subvaluationism Subvaluationism is the logical dual of supervaluationism, and has been defended by Dominic Hyde (2008) and Pablo Cobreros (2011). Whereas the supervaluationist characterises truth as 'supertruth', the subvaluationist characterises truth as 'subtruth', or "true on at least some precisifications". Subvaluationism proposes that borderline applications of vague terms are both true and false. It thus has "truth-value gluts". According to this theory, a vague statement is true if it is true on at least one precisification and false if it is false under at least one precisification. If a vague statement comes out true under one precisification and false under another, it is both true and false. Subvaluationism ultimately amounts to the claim that vagueness is a truly contradictory phenomenon. Of a borderline case of "bald man" it would be both true and false to say that he is bald, and both true and false to say that he is not bald. Epistemicist view A fourth approach, known as "the epistemicist view", has been defended by Timothy Williamson (1994), R. A. Sorensen (1988) and (2001), and Nicholas Rescher (2009). They maintain that vague predicates do, in fact, draw sharp boundaries, but that one cannot know where these boundaries lie. One's confusion about whether some vague word does or does not apply in a borderline case is due to one's ignorance. For example, in the epistemicist view, there is a fact of the matter, for every person, about whether that person is old or not old; some people are ignorant of this fact. As a property of objects One possibility is that one's words and concepts are perfectly precise, but that objects themselves are vague. Consider Peter Unger's example of a cloud (from his famous 1980 paper, "The Problem of the Many"): it is not clear where the boundary of a cloud lies; for any given bit of water vapor, one can ask whether it is part of the cloud or not, and for many such bits, one won't know how to answer. So