between equally strong parties or power-asymmetry between a stronger and a weaker party. All elements from which the respective parties can draw power constitute structure. They may be of material nature, i.e., hard power (such as weapons), or of social nature, i.e., soft power (such as norms, contracts, or precedents). These instrumental elements of power, are either defined as parties’ relative position (resources position) or as their relative ability to make their options prevail. According to structural analysis, negotiations can be described with matrices, such as the Prisoner's dilemma, a concept taken from game theory. Another common game is the chicken dilemma. Structural analysis is easy to criticize, because it predicts that the strongest will always win. This, however, does not always hold true. Strategic analysis Strategic analysis starts with the assumption that both parties have a veto. Thus, in essence, negotiating parties can cooperate (C) or defect (D). Structural analysis then evaluates Á outcomes of negotiations (C, C; C, D; D, D; D, C), by assigning values to each of the possible outcomes. Often, cooperation of both sides yields the best outcome. The problem is that the parties can never be sure that the other is going to cooperate, mainly because of two reasons: first, decisions are made at the same time or, second, concessions of one side might not be returned. Therefore, the parties have contradicting incentives to cooperate or defect. If one party cooperates or makes a concession and the other does not, the defecting party might relatively gain more. Trust may be built only in repetitive games through the emergence of reliable patterns of behavior, such as tit-for-tat. This table illustrates the options and possible outcomes of the Negotiator's Dilemma. Process analysis Process analysis is the theory closest to haggling. Process Analysis focuses on the study of the dynamics of processes. E.g., both Zeuthen and Cross tried to find a formula in order to predict the behavior of the other party in finding a rate of concession, in order to predict the likely outcome. The process of negotiation, therefore, is considered to unfold between fixed points: starting point of discord, endpoint of convergence. The so-called security point, which is the result of optional withdrawal, is also taken into account. An important feature of negotiation processes is the idea of turning points (TPs). A considerable amount of research has been devoted to analyses of TPs in single