led to the creation of the US Army's AirLand battle doctrine. Though far from focusing on maneuver, it emphasized using combined arms to disrupt an enemy's plan by striking through their depth and was seen as moving toward maneuver warfare in comparison to the earlier Active Defense concept. The AirLand doctrine was seen by Martin van Creveld as "arguably a half way house between maneuver and attrition." British air manoeuvre doctrine The British Joint Forces are limited to consider air assault or airmobile operations in their 2016 publication "Joint Doctrine Note on Air Manoeuvre". Limitations of maneuver in a modern context A key requirement for success in maneuver warfare is up-to-date accurate intelligence on the disposition of key enemy command, support, and combat units. In operations whose intelligence is either inaccurate, unavailable, or unreliable, the successful implementation of strategies based on maneuver warfare can become problematic. When faced with a maneuverable opponent capable of redeploying key forces quickly and discreetly or when tempered, the capacity of maneuver warfare strategies to deliver victory becomes more challenging. The 2006 Lebanon War is an example of such shortcomings have being exposed. Despite overwhelming firepower and complete air superiority, Israeli forces were unable to deliver a decisive blow to the command structure of Hezbollah or to degrade its effective capacity to operate. Although inflicting heavy damage, Israel was unable to locate and destroy Hezbollah's diluted force dispositions or to neutralize key command centers. Therefore, it did not meet its war aims. The insurgency in Iraq also demonstrates that a military victory over an opponent's conventional forces does not automatically translate into a political victory. Some military theorists such as William Lind and Colonel Thomas X. Hammes propose to overcome the shortcomings of maneuver warfare with the concept of what they call fourth generation warfare. For example, Lieutenant-Colonel S.P. Myers writes that "maneuver is more a philosophical approach to campaign design and execution than an arrangement of tactical engagements". Myers goes on to write that maneuver warfare can evolve and that "maneuverist approach in campaign design and execution remains relevant and effective as a counter-insurgency strategy at the operational level in contemporary operations." See also Blitzkrieg Charge Combined arms Decision cycle Defeat in detail Flanking maneuver Historical examples of flanking maneuvers OODA loop Pincer movement Russian military deception References Sources Boyd, John. Patterns of Conflict. 1986. Simpkin, Richard E. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on