certain UK court interpretation. Finally, Intent can be transferred and 'transferred malice' is recognised too within tort law, I.e. in Bici v ministry of Defence. How have the requirements changed? This tort has changed significantly from how it used to be. In past case-law such as Cole v Turner [1704], 'the least touching of another in anger' was what constituted a battery. Therefore, some form of anger used to be required, following cases such as this. Moreover, in the case of Wilson v Pringle [1704] the court said that contact to be tortious must be 'hostile'. However, these requirements were not helpful, as they would mean that an unwanted kiss is not a battery due to a lack of anger or hostility. Thus, thankfully these requirements were changed to follow Collins v WilcockDefenses The standard defenses to trespass to the person, namely necessity, consent, self-defense, and defense of others, apply to battery. As practical examples, under the defense of necessity, a physician may touch a person without that person's consent in order to render medical aid to him or her in an emergency. Consent Under the defence of consent, a person who has, either expressly or impliedly, consented to participation in a contact sport cannot claim in battery against other participants for a contact permitted by the rules of that sport, or expected to occur within the course of play. For example, a basketball player who commits a hard foul against an opposing player does not thereby commit a battery, because fouls are a regular part of the course of the game, even though they result in a penalty. However, a player who struck another player during a time-out would be liable for battery, because there is no game-related reason for such a contact to occur. I.e. in Condon v Basi you can consent in a sports context to a risk of harm but this does not extend to unreasonable contact, the contact must be reasonable. Medical consent Moreover, you can also consent to medical treatment: 'All common law persons have the right not to suffer bodily violation without their consent, as seen in F v West Berkshire. It is therefore, 'essential that clinicians involved in either treating or advising patients consider the issue of consent.' It is the consent of the patient which prevents the doctor who performs surgery from otherwise being liable in the tort of battery, the