the criminal must be executed). In medieval philosophy According to Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 21, Article 2), there are two kinds of "truth" (veritas), both understood as correspondence between mind (intellectus) or words (oratio) and world ("things", res): In speech act theory Perhaps the first to speak of a "direction of fit" was the philosopher J. L. Austin. Austin did not use the distinction between different directions of fit to contrast commands or expressions of intention to assertions, or desires to beliefs. He rather distinguishes different ways of asserting that an item is of a certain type. In an extensive discussion of the issues involved with the differences between, say, (a) wrongly calling a triangle a square (something which, he said, was committing an act of violence to the language) and (b) wrongly describing a triangular object as being a square (something which, he said, was committing an act of violence to the facts), Austin distinguished between what he termed: "the onus of match": in the case of one wanting to match X and Y, the distinction between the matching of X to Y and the matching of Y to X; and "the direction of fit": in the case of naming something, the difference between the fitting of a name to an item, and the fitting of an item to a name. The concept of direction of fit can also apply to speech acts: e.g., statements, guesses and conjectures have word-to-world direction of fit, while commands and promises have a world-to-word direction of fit. John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken assert that there are only four possible "directions of fit" in language: 1. The word-to-world direction of fit. In achieving success of fit the propositional content of the utterance fits an independently existing state of affairs in the world. E.g.: "We are married". 2. The world-to-word direction of fit. To achieve success of fit the world must change to match the propositional content of the utterance. E.g.: "Will you marry me?", "I want to marry him", "You'd just better marry her, buddy!", etc. 3. The double direction of fit. To achieve success of fit the world is thereby altered to fit the propositional content by representing the world as being so altered, unlike sense 2. E.g.: "I declare you man and wife". The 'doubled' direction is therefore always world-to-word-to-world. For obvious reasons, Searle calls sentences of this type