the rebels into the army. Opposition to the agreement also acquired strong overtones of anti-French sentiment: French neutrality during the early phases of Operation Licorne had already been viewed as suspect, and the Linas-Marcoussis Accord was interpreted, by its Ivorian critics, as providing confirmation that France was attempting to undermine Gbagbo's leadership. Gbagbo's supporters blamed France for coercing him to accept the agreement. Indeed, in "a clear move to distance himself" from the agreement – which he referred to as a "proposal" – Gbagbo had not signed it, but had sent another representative to sign on FPI's behalf. Immediately after the accord was signed, the Young Patriots organised violent anti-French protests, apparently with Gbagbo's backing. A demonstration in Abidjan on 2 February drew 100,000 protesters, who objected to "French occupation" and to the power-sharing deal. The demonstrations continued on a daily basis, and at one point involved an attempt to seize the airport to prevent Diarra from returning to Abidjan to head the new coalition government. Amid attacks on French nationals, businesses, and bases, France carried out another wave of evacuations of French nationals. These protests in early 2003 marked the beginning of a surge in activity by Ivory Coast's so-called "patriotic movement", which continued to depend on mobilisation by the Young Patriots and to receive encouragement from Gbagbo, himself a longstanding nationalist. In the increasingly popular patriotic analysis, the crisis in Ivory Coast was a "war of second independence" from France's neocolonial influence, and international intervention in the crisis consisted in an attack on Ivorian sovereignty, particularly insofar as the Linas-Marcoussis Accord was viewed as recognising the legitimacy of the New Forces rebellion and as imposing constitutional change on Ivory Coast. Gbagbo was portrayed as a nationalist pioneer, persecuting for upsetting the status quo of French hegemony. In the months after Linas-Marcoussis, this narrative was used by Gbagbo to deny the legitimacy of international decisions, in favour of reasserting presidential prerogatives, and to justify his reluctance to implement the peace agreement. Peace implementation stalled Accra II talks: 7–8 March 2003 In a pattern that would be maintained in subsequent years, the signature of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord was followed by significant delays in its implementation, requiring the reopening of peace talks – though the Linas-Marcoussis Accord remained the basic framework within which all such talks took place between 2003 and 2006. On 7–8 March 2003, the first implementation stalemate was