generate additional fees per use. For example, a person may not use a swimming pool very regularly. Therefore, instead of having a private pool, you become member of a club pool. By charging membership fees, every club member pays for the pool, making it a common property resource, but still excludable, since only members are allowed to use it. Hence, the service is excludable, but it is nonetheless nonrival in consumption, at least until a certain level of congestion is reached. The idea is that individual consumption and payment is low, but aggregate consumption enables economies of scale and drives down unit production costs. In Israel Analyzing Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel, economist Eli Berman writes: Club theory James M. Buchanan developed club theory (the study of club goods in economics) in his 1965 paper, "An Economic Theory of Clubs". He found that in neo-classical economic theory and theoretical welfare economics is exclusively about private property and all goods and services are privately consumed or utilized. Just over the last two decades before his provision in 1965, scholars started to extend the theoretical framework and communal or collective ownership-consumption arrangements were considered as well. Paul A. Samuelson made an important provision in this regard, making a sharp conceptual distinction between goods that are purely private and goods that are purely public. While it extended the previously existing theoretical framework, Buchanan found that there was still a missing link that would cover the whole spectrum of ownership consumption possibilities. This gap contained goods that were excludable, shared by more people than typically share a private good, but fewer people than typically share a public good. The whole spectrum would cover purely private activities on one side and purely public or collectivized activities on the other side. Therefore, according to Buchanan, a theory of clubs needed to be added to the field. The goal of his theory was to address the question of determining the "size of the most desirable cost and consumption sharing arrangement".<ref>James M. Buchanan 1965. "An Economic Theory of Clubs," Economica, 32(125), N.S., pp. 1-14. Reprinted in James M. Buchanan (2001). Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory, The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 15, pp. 193-209 (Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund); and, Robert E. Kuenne, ed. (2000). Readings in Social Welfare, pp. 73-85.</ref> The model was based on the assumptions that individuals have similar preferences for both private and public