'declarations'. 4. The null or empty direction of fit. There is no direct question of achieving success of fit between the propositional content and the world, because success of fit is presupposed by the utterance. E.g.: "I'm glad I married you" presupposes that the speaker is married to the listener. Searle used this notion of "direction of fit" to create a taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Although Elizabeth Anscombe never employed the term "the direction of fit", Searle has strongly argued that the following passage from her work Intention was, by far, "the best illustration" of the distinction between the tasks of "[getting] the words (more strictly their propositional content) to match the world… [and that of getting] the world to match the words": In philosophy of mind According to Velleman, when used in the domain of the philosophy of mind, the concept direction of fit represents the distinguishing feature between two types of intentional mental states: Facta (singular factum, states that currently exist) are states with a mind-to-world direction of fit. Examples include beliefs, perceptions, hypotheses, and fantasies. In the event of a mismatch between the mental state and the world, the mental state is in some sense false or wrong and should perhaps be changed. Facienda (singular faciendum, states that are yet to exist) are states with a world-to-mind direction of fit. Examples include intentions and desires. If there is a mismatch between the mental state and the world, the world is in some sense wrong and should perhaps be changed. In some forms of mind-body dualism, a matching factum and faciendum must be present in a person's mind in order for him to act intentionally. If a person has the belief that action (A) will lead to state (S), and has the desire that state (S) obtain, then he will perform action (A). The action is directly caused by simultaneous presence of the two mental states; no further explanation is needed. According to Velleman: The term "direction of fit" refers to the two ways in which attitudes can relate propositions to the world. In cognitive attitudes [such as belief], a proposition is grasped as patterned after the world; whereas in conative attitudes [such as desire], the proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow. The propositional object of desire is regarded not as fact -- not, that is, as factum, having been brought about --