mentor Shelepin, who had been KGB Chairman since 1958. Appointed at the age of 37, he was the youngest Soviet security and intelligence chief of the Cold War. As KGB chief, he generally continued his predecessor's policies: support for national liberation movements worldwide, suppression of nationalism, separatism and the dissident movement within the Soviet Union, and recruitment of young university graduates to the KGB. He also put much emphasis on developing the security and intelligence services of the Soviet satellite states, and on assisting the communist forces in the Vietnam War. Semichastny was surprised when Khrushchev informed him of his appointment as KGB Chairman, commenting that he did not have any experience in intelligence and counterintelligence; Khrushchev, however, told him that the KGB needed, above all, a deft political hand. Semichastny's young age and his lack of professional experience in intelligence and counterintelligence led him to rely heavily on senior department heads within the KGB; he was always respectful towards intelligence veterans, but he was also determined to be in charge and leave his mark on the agency. Semichastny's first decision as KGB Chairman, on November 22, 1961, (after nine days in office) was to approve the creation of a "sabotage and terrorism" group (as the KGB itself called it) within the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua; the Sandinistas would eventually manage to seize power in that country in 1979. Despite Khrushchev's fondness and esteem, Semichastny never became part of the Soviet leader's inner circle. The two rarely had one-on-one meetings (although there were some instances where they would have breakfast together, or a walk in the Kremlin where Semichastny would brief him on important matters) and Khrushchev was adamant in his belief that the KGB was to be confined to intelligence, counterintelligence and state security, and was not expected to have any policy recommendations of its own ("executor, not formulator of policy"), especially in foreign affairs, where Semichastny usually deferred to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Undoubtedly, however, the KGB and its chairman retained their relevance and importance; every morning, a large grayish blue file containing intelligence reports and analyses, selected and reviewed by Semichastny, was placed on Khrushchev's personal desk by one of his secretaries, and Khrushchev always read them avidly. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Semichastny was responsible for coordinating all information received from abroad. His chosen crisis team oversaw intelligence from the Foreign Ministry, the GRU