in a large-scale offense. Fuller had proposed Plan 1919 to use tanks to break through the lines and then to wreak havoc on the German lines of supply and communication. During the interwar period, the British developed ideas for fully-mechanized all-arms warfare with the Experimental Mechanized Force. The Germans reviewed their doctrine and revised their approach by expanding on infiltration tactics and amplifying them with motor transport. Heinz Guderian was a leading proponent of armored combat. The German military stressed several key elements: versatile tanks combined with mobile infantry and artillery, close air support, rapid movement and concentration of forces (Schwerpunkt), and aggressive independent local initiative. All was strictly coordinated by radio and contributed to new tactics during the Battle of France in 1940. Theories in Germany about armored warfare have some similarities with interwar theories of British officers J.F.C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart, which the British army failed to embrace and understand fully. There are similarities between blitzkrieg and the Soviet concept of "Deep Battle," which the Soviets used to great effect in 1944 and continued to use as a doctrine during the Cold War. Soviet Deep Battle In the Soviet Union during the 1920s and the 1930s, the concept of "Deep Battle" was developed and integrated into the Red Army field regulations doctrine by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. That led to the creation of cavalry mechanised groups during World War II and to operational maneuver groups during the Cold War. US Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver According to the US Marine Corps, one key concept of maneuver warfare is that maneuver is traditionally thought of as a spatial concept, the use of maneuver to gain positional advantage. The US Marine concept of maneuver, however, is a "warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope." The US Marine manual goes on to say: "This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, firepower is central to maneuver warfare. Nor do we mean to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes." The possibility of a massive Soviet offensive in Western Europe