the Qarmatians, and reconquer the Tulunid domains. All this came at the cost of gearing the state towards war: according to the historian Hugh N. Kennedy, based on a treasury document from the time of al-Mu'tadid's accession, "out of the total expenditure of 7915 dinars per day, some 5121 are entirely military, 1943 in areas (like riding animals and stables) which served both military and non-military and only 851 in areas like the bureaucracy and the harem which can be described as truly civilian (though even in this case, the bureaucrats’ main purpose seems to have been to arrange the payment of the army). It seems reasonable to conclude that something over 80 per cent of recorded government expenditure was devoted to maintaining the army." Paying the army thus became the chief concern of the government, but it became an increasingly difficult proposition as the outlying provinces were lost. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that in the remaining provinces, semi-autonomous governors, grandees and members of the dynasty were able to establish virtual latifundia, aided by the system of muqāṭa'a, a form of tax farming in exchange for a fixed tribute, which they often failed to pay. Even the revenues of the Sawad, the rich agricultural lands of Iraq, are known to have declined considerably at the time. Nevertheless, through stringent economy, and despite near-constant warfare, both al-Mu'tadid and al-Muktafi were able to leave a full treasury behind. Thus the restored Caliphate at the time of al-Muktafi's death was less than half the size than in its heyday under Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), but it remained a powerful and viable state, with an army that, "though it was very expensive, was probably the most effective in the Muslim world", and an almost unchallenged legitimacy as the true successors of Muhammad. Accession and the revolt of Ibn al-Mu'tazz In 908, al-Muktafi fell ill, and was evidently nearing his end. The issue of succession had been left open, and with the Caliph incapacitated, the vizier al-Abbas ibn al-Hasan al-Jarjara'i took it upon himself to seek out a successor. Two different versions are told of the events: Miskawayh reports that the vizier sought the advice of the most important bureaucrats (kuttāb, sing. kātib), with Mahmud ibn Dawud ibn al-Jarrah suggesting the older and experienced Abdallah ibn al-Mu'tazz, but Ali ibn al-Furat—who is usually portrayed as a villain by Miskawayh—proposing instead the