repeating prior operations was courting disaster. The U.S. Navy Task Group 31.2 (TG 31.2) of six destroyers—, , , , , and —commanded by Commander Frederick Moosbrugger, having been forewarned of the Japanese operation, was dispatched to intercept the Japanese force. The morale of Moosbrugger's crews was buoyed by the realization that at last they would be free of the combat doctrine that required them to stick close to the cruisers; on this night, they would be able to apply their own tactics. The US ships made radar contact with the Japanese force at 23:33. Moosbrugger's battle plan divided his forces into two divisions. Moosbrugger's own Destroyer Division 12 (Dunlap, Craven and Maury), whose ships retained their full pre-war torpedo batteries, was to launch a surprise torpedo attack out of the shadow of Kolombangara Island. Meanwhile, Commander Roger Simpson's Destroyer Division 15 (Lang, Sterett and Stack), whose ships had exchanged some of their torpedo tubes for extra 40 mm guns, was to cover Moosburger's division from an overwatch position, turning to cross the enemy's course. The idea was that any attempt by the Japanese to turn into the first division's torpedo attack would expose their broadsides to torpedo attack from the second division. The two divisions could then switch roles if a repeat torpedo attack proved necessary, or alternate roles if barges were encountered, which could be dealt with by the second division's extra guns if necessary. Having learned the harsh lessons of naval combat at night after the Battle of Kolombangara, the Battle of Kula Gulf, and a previous PT boat skirmish, and having finally addressed the technical problems that had plagued their Mark 15 torpedoes since the beginning of the war, the American destroyers did not give away their position with gunfire until their torpedoes started striking their targets. Dunlap, Craven and Maury fired a total of 24 torpedoes in the space of 63 seconds before turning to starboard and withdrawing at high speed, using the mountainous island to their east to help camouflage their movements. The Americans were operating on the assumption that the Japanese had nothing to match their new centimetric SG radar; they knew that their older meter band radars could not differentiate between the surface ships and the island and presumed Japanese radars were no better. In the event, none of the Japanese ships present actually had radar and the looming mass of the