Electric and Insulated Callender Cables to design and build the Roxburgh and other New Zealand power stations. The Ministry of Works had reservations about the lack of a guaranteed completion date, difficulties with divided responsibility if the consortium undertook both the design and construction, the potential for the cost to be higher than if competitive tenders were called and that it could give the consortium a monopoly over future projects of a similar nature. The State Hydro-Electric Department didn't want to be restricted to one electrical equipment manufacturer and also saw the offer as a threat to their transmission line construction staff. Taking these concerns into account and wishing to avoid using up precious overseas funds the offer was formally rejected in September 1949 by the Minister of Finance in the Labour government. Meanwhile, work continued on site on completing the construction village and creating the diversion channel. However progress was slow, with completion of the diversion not expected until 1953 instead of the planned 1951. Call for tenders to contract the dam In 1949 the newly elected national government, which ideologically favoured private enterprise, appointed Stan Goosman as both Minister of Works and Minister of the State Hydro-electric Department. By 1951 the projected project delays were serious enough to draw criticism from the Electrical Supply Authority. By now aware of the projected energy shortfalls and the shortage of government resources to complete six other hydroelectric projects that were underway as well as complete Roxburgh, Goosman's response was to announce on 25 September 1951 that tenders would be called from interested parties to undertake the civil aspects of the project. This required the rapid production of tender documents and specifications by a short staffed government design staff. Bidders had the choice of offering on either a bill of quantities basis or by nominating a 'target estimate' plus a 4% fee. In this type of contract the Government met all costs and the contractor received a fee of 4% of the total cost up to the target estimate. If the cost varied from the estimate, then 25% of the change was added to or subtracted from the fee. A 'no loss clause' meant that if the cost overruns where high enough the contractor could lose their entire fee but would not suffer any further loss, other than those for not meeting agree completion dates. Eight tenders were received. Three were fixed