diversity. At the end of his deanship in 1987, Ely continued teaching at Stanford as the university's Robert E. Paradise Professor of Law and developed an interest in subjects concerning congressional war powers. Prompted by his love of scuba diving, Ely visited the University of Miami School of Law in 1996. Upon discovering he liked the city and the faculty, he chose to stay and became the university's Richard A. Hausler Professor of Law—the law school's most distinguished chair. Scholarship The Wages of Crying Wolf In 1973, Ely's article entitled "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade" was published in the Yale Law Journal. The article was a vociferous criticism of the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade which had given a constitutional basis for a right to abortion. Despite his own personal views in support of the availability of abortions, Ely was critical of the Court's decision to utilize the doctrine of substantive due process, arguing that since the Court's ruling was untethered from the constitution's text, it had "no business imposing it." He further contended that justices of the Supreme Court had an obligation to establish constitutional rights "in some identifiable constitutional value" before barring states from imposing their own regulations on abortion:What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation's governmental structure. Nor is it explainable in terms of the unusual political impotence of the group judicially protected vis-à-vis the interest that legislatively prevailed over it. Ely agrees that a right of privacy can be inferred from various provisions in the Constitution and that the right was grounded in its history, text, and theory. However, he saw no reason why it would include a right to abortion, why that right would be fundamental, and why the countervailing interests of protecting the fetus did not count as part of a disenfranchised minority. Towards the end of his article, he wrote:It is, nevertheless, a very bad decision. Not because it will perceptibly weaken the Court—it won't; and not because it conflicts with either my idea of progress or what the evidence suggests is society's—it doesn't. It is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and