entails that the belief is at least likely to be true. The truth-conductive conception of justification corresponds to epistemic externalism. Theories of justification There are several different views as to what entails justification, mostly focusing on the question "How sure do we need to be that our beliefs correspond to the actual world?" Different theories of justification require different conditions before a belief can be considered justified. Theories of justification generally include other aspects of epistemology, such as knowledge. Notable theories of justification include: Foundationalism – Basic beliefs justify other, non-basic beliefs. Epistemic coherentism – Beliefs are justified if they cohere with other beliefs a person holds, each belief is justified if it coheres with the overall system of beliefs. Infinitism – Beliefs are justified by infinite chains of reasons. Foundherentism – A combination of foundationalism and epistemic coherentism, proposed by Susan Haack Internalism – The believer must be able to justify a belief through internal knowledge. Externalism – Outside sources of knowledge can be used to justify a belief. Reformed epistemology – Beliefs are warranted by proper cognitive function, proposed by Alvin Plantinga. Epistemic skepticism – A variety of viewpoints questioning the possibility of knowledge Evidentialism – Beliefs depend solely on the evidence for them. Reliabilism - A belief is justified if it is the result of a reliable process. Criticism of theories of justification Robert Fogelin claims to detect a suspicious resemblance between the theories of justification and Agrippa's five modes leading to the suspension of belief. He concludes that the modern proponents have made no significant progress in responding to the ancient modes of Pyrrhonian skepticism. William P. Alston criticizes the very idea of a theory of justification. He claims: "There isn't any unique, epistemically crucial property of beliefs picked out by 'justified'. Epistemologists who suppose the contrary have been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. What has really been happening is this. Different epistemologists have been emphasizing, concentrating on, "pushing" different epistemic desiderata, different features of belief that are positively valuable from the standpoint of the aims of cognition." See also Dream argument Münchhausen trilemma References External links Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Epistemology, 2. What is Justification? Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification Internet