physicists expect that the outcome of ongoing experiments – the search for new particles at the large particle accelerators and for dark matter – are needed in order to provide further input for a theory of everything. Arguments against In parallel to the intense search for a theory of everything, various scholars have seriously debated the possibility of its discovery. Gödel's incompleteness theorem A number of scholars claim that Gödel's incompleteness theorem suggests that any attempt to construct a theory of everything is bound to fail. Gödel's theorem, informally stated, asserts that any formal theory sufficient to express elementary arithmetical facts and strong enough for them to be proved is either inconsistent (both a statement and its denial can be derived from its axioms) or incomplete, in the sense that there is a true statement that can't be derived in the formal theory. Stanley Jaki, in his 1966 book The Relevance of Physics, pointed out that, because any "theory of everything" will certainly be a consistent non-trivial mathematical theory, it must be incomplete. He claims that this dooms searches for a deterministic theory of everything. Freeman Dyson has stated that "Gödel's theorem implies that pure mathematics is inexhaustible. No matter how many problems we solve, there will always be other problems that cannot be solved within the existing rules. […] Because of Gödel's theorem, physics is inexhaustible too. The laws of physics are a finite set of rules, and include the rules for doing mathematics, so that Gödel's theorem applies to them." Stephen Hawking was originally a believer in the Theory of Everything, but after considering Gödel's Theorem, he concluded that one was not obtainable. "Some people will be very disappointed if there is not an ultimate theory that can be formulated as a finite number of principles. I used to belong to that camp, but I have changed my mind." Jürgen Schmidhuber (1997) has argued against this view; he asserts that Gödel's theorems are irrelevant for computable physics. In 2000, Schmidhuber explicitly constructed limit-computable, deterministic universes whose pseudo-randomness based on undecidable, Gödel-like halting problems is extremely hard to detect but does not at all prevent formal theories of everything describable by very few bits of information. Related critique was offered by Solomon Feferman and others. Douglas S. Robertson offers Conway's game of life as an example: The underlying rules are simple and complete, but there are formally undecidable questions