usually manifests itself as an allocation of XDRs to IMF member countries. Distrust of the U.S. dollar is not the only stated reason allocations have been made, however. One of its first roles was to alleviate an expected shortfall of U.S. dollars . At this time, the United States had a conservative monetary policy and did not want to increase the total amount of U.S. dollars in existence. If the United States had continued down this path, the dollar would have become a less attractive foreign exchange reserve asset: it would not have had the necessary liquidity to serve this function. Soon after XDR allocations began, the United States reversed its former policy and provided sufficient liquidity. In the process a potential role for the XDR was removed. During this first round of allocations, 9.3 billion XDRs were distributed to IMF member countries. The XDR resurfaced in 1978 when many countries were wary of taking on more foreign exchange reserve assets denominated in U.S. dollars. This suspicion of the dollar precipitated an allocation of 12 billion XDRs over a period of four years. Concomitant with the financial crisis of 2007–08, the third round of XDR allocations occurred in the years 2009 and 2011. The IMF recognized the financial crisis as the cause for distributing the large majority of these third-round allotments, but some allocations were couched as distributing XDRs to countries that had never received any and others as a re-balancing of IMF quotas, which determine how many XDRs a country is allotted, to better represent the economic strength of emerging markets. During this time China, a country with large holdings of U.S. dollar foreign exchange reserves, voiced its displeasure at the current international monetary system, and promoted measures that would allow the XDR to "fully satisfy the member countries' demand for a reserve currency." These comments, made by a chairman of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, drew media attention, and the IMF showed some support for China's stance. It produced a paper exploring ways the substance and function of the XDR could be increased. China has also suggested the creation of a substitution account to allow exchange of U.S. dollars into XDRs. When substitution was proposed before, in 1978, the United States appeared reluctant to allow such a mechanism to become operational. Use by developing countries In 2001, the UN suggested allocating XDRs to developing countries for