us." Cybersecurity experts replied that "to withhold the technical details of its app doesn't do much to protect the system." Criticism Security by obscurity alone is discouraged and not recommended by standards bodies. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States sometimes recommends against this practice: "System security should not depend on the secrecy of the implementation or its components." The technique stands in contrast with security by design and open security, although many real-world projects include elements of all strategies. Obscurity in architecture vs. technique Knowledge of how the system is built differs from concealment and camouflage. The effectiveness of obscurity in operations security depends on whether the obscurity lives on top of other good security practices, or if it is being used alone. When used as an independent layer, obscurity is considered a valid security tool. In recent years, more advanced versions of "security through obscurity" have gained support as a methodology in cybersecurity through Moving Target Defense and cyber deception. NIST's cyber resiliency framework, 800-160 Volume 2, recommends the usage of security through obscurity as a complementary part of a resilient and secure computing environment. See also Steganography Code morphing Kerckhoffs' principle Need to know Obfuscated code Presumed security Secure by design AACS encryption key controversy Zero-day (computing) Code talker Obfuscation References External links Eric Raymond on Cisco's IOS source code 'release' v Open Source Computer Security Publications: Information Economics, Shifting Liability and the First Amendment by Ethan M. Preston and John Lofton by Jay Beale Secrecy, Security and Obscurity & The Non-Security of Secrecy by Bruce Schneier "Security through obsolescence", Robin Miller, linux.com, June 6, 2002 Computer security procedures Cryptography Secrecy