conduct must be wrongful: that is to say, objectively unreasonable and without lawful justification. One must be at fault, and one's blameworthiness must take the form of dolus (intention) or culpa (negligence). One must, however, be accountable for one's conduct before one can be blameworthy. There must be causation both factual and legal. For the former, the conduct must have been a sine qua non of the loss; for the latter, the link must not be too tenuous. In Scots law, the aquilian action has developed more expansively and may be invoked as a remedy for both patrimonial and certain types of non-patrimonial loss, particularly with regard to personal injury. By way of a legal fiction, 'personal injury' is treated as (physical) 'damage done', with the net effect that 'the actio injuriarum root of Scots law infuses the [nominate] delict assault as much as any development of the lex Aquilia and wrongdoing that results in physical harm to a person may give rise to both an aquilian action and an actio iniuriarum. Additionally, the modern Scots law pertaining to reparation for negligent wrongdoing is based on the lex Aquilia and so affords reparation in instances of damnum injuria datum - literally loss wrongfully caused''' - with the wrongdoing in such instances generated by the defender's culpa (i.e., fault). In any instance in which a pursuer (A) has suffered loss at the hands of the wrongful conduct of the defender (B), B is under a legal obligation to make reparation. If B's wrongdoing were intentional in the circumstances, or so reckless that an 'intention' may be constructively inferred (on the basis that culpa lata dolo aequiparatur - 'gross fault is the same as intentional wrongdoing'), then it follows axiomatically that B will be liable to repair any damage done to A's property, person or economic interest: 'wherever a defender intentionally harms the pursuer - provided the interest harmed is regarded as reparable - the defender incurs delictual liability'. If the pursuer has suffered loss as the result of the defender's conduct, yet the defender did not intend to harm the pursuer, nor behave so recklessly that intent might be constructively inferred, the pursuer must demonstrate that the defender's conduct was negligent in order to win their case. Negligence can be established, by the pursuer, by demonstrating that the defender owed to them a 'duty of care' which they ultimately breached by