The Best and the Brightest (1972) is an account by journalist David Halberstam of the origins of the Vietnam War published by Random House. The focus of the book is on the foreign policy crafted by academics and intellectuals who were in President John F. Kennedy's administration, and the consequences of those policies in Vietnam. The title referred to Kennedy's "whiz kids"—leaders of industry and academia brought into the administration—whom Halberstam characterized as insisting on "brilliant policies that defied common sense" in Vietnam, often against the advice of career U.S. Department of State employees. Summary Halberstam's book offers details on how decisions were made in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations that led to the war, focusing on the period from 1960 to 1965 but also covering earlier and later years up until publication. Factors examined: The Democratic Party was haunted by claims that it had "lost" China to the Communists, and it did not want to be accused of also losing Vietnam. Thus, the decision to intervene in Vietnam militarily was based on political expediency, the need to win a second term, and not on rationality. The McCarthy era had rid the government of experts on Vietnam and surrounding countries. Early studies called for close to one million U.S. troops to defeat the Viet Cong, but it would have been impossible to convince Congress or the U.S. public to deploy so many soldiers. Declaration of war and excessive use of force, including bombing too close to China or too many U.S. troops, might have triggered the invasion of Chinese ground forces or greater Soviet involvement, which might repair the growing Sino-Soviet rift. The American military and generals were not prepared for protracted guerrilla warfare. Some war games implied that a gradual escalation by the United States could be matched by North Vietnam: every year, 200,000 North Vietnamese reached draft age and could be sent down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to replace losses against the U.S.: the U.S. would be "fighting the birthrate". Use of bombing or ground forces would signal the U.S. commitment to defending South Vietnam and subsequently cause U.S. shame if they withdrew. President Johnson believed that too much attention given to the war effort would jeopardize his Great Society domestic programs. The effects of strategic bombing: Most people believed that North Vietnam prized its industrial base so highly it would not risk its destruction by U.S.