for annexing most of Europe and Africa in World War I are seen by Wehler as the pinnacle of social imperialism. The British Marxist historian Geoff Eley contends that there are three flaws to Wehler's theory of social imperialism. The first is that Wehler credits leaders such as Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Prince Bernhard von Bülow with a greater degree of vision than what they in fact possessed. The second is that many of the pressure groups on the right who advocated an imperialist policy for Germany were not the creations of the government, and in fact often demanded far more aggressive policies than what the government was willing to undertake. The third was that many of these imperialist lobbying groups demanded a policy of political and social reform at home, in addition to imperialism abroad. Eley argued that what is required in thinking about social imperialism is a broader picture with an interaction from above and below, and a wider view of the relationship between imperialism abroad and domestic politics. One of the more notable uses of the social imperialism concept was by the British Marxist historian Timothy Mason who argued that World War II was caused by social imperialism. In Mason's opinion, German foreign policy was driven by domestic political considerations, and the launch of World War II in 1939 was best understood as a "barbaric variant of social imperialism". Mason argued that "Nazi Germany was always bent at some time upon a major war of expansion". However, Mason states that the timing of such a war was determined by domestic political pressures, especially as relating to a failing economy. According to Mason, by 1939, the "overheating" of the German economy caused by rearmament, the failure of various rearmament plans caused by the shortages of skilled workers, industrial unrest caused by the breakdown of German social policies, and a sharp drop in living standards for the German working class forced Hitler into going to war at a time and place not of his choosing. Mason contended that, when faced with the deep socio-economic crisis, the Nazi leadership had decided to embark upon a ruthless "smash and grab" foreign policy of seizing territory in Eastern Europe which could be pitilessly plundered to support living standards in Germany. Mason described German foreign policy as driven by an opportunistic "next victim" syndrome after the Anschluss, in which the "promiscuity of