but lose the war. The Westerners argued that the real heart of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, still lay hundreds of miles from an advance to Damascus or even Aleppo and if the Ottoman Empire saw at the same time Germany overrunning France, it would not be enough to force the Ottoman Empire from the war. With Russia out of the war the Dardanelles were no longer an objective for the British Empire as access to the Russian fleet was no longer of any importance. The Easterners accepted that it was essential to maintain the forces in France and Belgium on the Western Front, but that they were already sufficient to keep the front intact. They argued that 'to surrender the initiative everywhere and to concentrate on a policy of purely passive defence along the whole battle line was a counsel of despair.' Germany would have a brief window of opportunity thanks to the armistice between Russia and Germany, to attack the Allied forces on the Western Front before the United States, which had already entered the war could bring sufficient numbers to end Germany's war. But the Easterners asserted that during two years of war the Allies had superiority in numbers and material greater than the numbers the Germans could bring from the Russian front and they had failed to break the German lines. They argued that the Palestine theatre might be wasteful of shipping but the Western Front was wasteful of lives; that it would be folly to take seasoned troops from Palestine where a decisive victory could be won to die in the stalemate. On 13 December 1917 the War Cabinet instructed the General Staff to consider two policies; the conquest of Palestine involving an advance of about or an advance to Aleppo to cut the Ottoman communications with Mesopotamia. On 14 December Allenby reported that the rainy season would prevent any further attacks for at least two months. Qualified approval from the Supreme War Council for a decisive offensive to annihilate Ottoman armies and crush resistance was contained in Joint Note No. 12. It was claimed that the destruction of the Ottoman Empire 'would have far-reaching results upon the general military situation.' Early in February 1918 General Jan Christiaan Smuts (a member of the Imperial War Cabinet) was sent to confer with Allenby regarding the implementation of the Joint Note. The French imposed an important qualification on