The Waterfall rail accident was a train accident that occurred on 31 January 2003 near Waterfall, New South Wales, Australia. The train derailed, killing seven people aboard, including the train driver. The accident is famously remembered by systems engineers due to the poorly designed safety systems. Incident On the day of the disaster, a Tangara interurban train service, set G7, which had come from Sydney Central station at 6:24 am, departed Sydney Waterfall railway station moving south towards Port Kembla station via Wollongong. At approximately 7:15 am, the driver suffered a sudden heart attack and lost control of the train. The train was thus travelling at as it approached a curve in the tracks through a small cutting. The curve is rated for speeds no greater than . The train derailed, overturned and collided with the rocky walls of the cutting in a remote area south of the station. It was reported that the rescuers had to carry heavy lifting equipment for more than to reach the site. Two of the carriages landed on their sides and another two were severely damaged in the accident. In addition to the seven fatalities, many more passengers were injured. The subsequent official inquiry discovered the deadman's brake had not been applied. The train guard's solicitor stated that the guard was in a microsleep for as much as 30 seconds, just prior to the accident. The experienced human-factors accident investigator determined the organisational culture had the driver firmly in charge, making it psychologically more difficult for the guard to act. Causes of the accident Tangara trains have a number of safety and vigilance devices installed, such as a deadman's brake, to address problems when the driver becomes incapacitated. If the driver releases pressure from this brake, the train will safely come to a halt. The train in question was a four-car Outer Suburban Tangara set, numbered G7 and fitted with a Mitsubishi Electric alternating current traction system for evaluation purposes. The driver was in the leading driving carriage and the guard was in the rear driving carriage, in between which were two non-driving motor cars. On this service, the guard, who could have applied the emergency brake, and the deadman's brake were the main safety mechanisms in place. The train was later found to be travelling in excess of as it approached the curve where the accident occurred. Neither the deadman's brake nor the