The Far East Command was a British military command which had 2 distinct periods. These were firstly, 18 November 1940 – 7 January 1942 succeeded by the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM), and secondly, 1963–1971 succeeded by Australia, New Zealand, and United Kingdom Force (ANZUK Force) 1940–1942 The British had two commands with responsibilities for possessions in the Far East. GHQ India under General Sir Archibald Wavell the Commander-in-Chief, India and the Far East Command under Air Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham and from 23 December 1941 by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Royds Pownall. The C-in-C Far East Command was responsible directly to the Chiefs of Staff for the operational control and general direction of training of all British land and air forces in Malaya, Burma, and Hong Kong, and for the co-ordination of plans for the defence of those territories. But the CinC exercised no command or control over any naval forces. It was intended that C-in-C should deal primarily with matters of major military policy and strategy, but it was not the intention that the C-in-C should assume any administrative or financial responsibilities or take over any of the day-to-day functions at that time exercised by the General (or Air) Officers Commanding (GOC) of the different areas. The degree of "operational control" of British land and air forces, which the Commander-in-Chief Far East should assume, was defined as meaning "the higher direction and control" as distinct from "detailed operational control". To complicate matters, the GOCs correspond with the War Office, Air Ministry, Colonial Office and Local Governor's Offices on all matters on which they had previously dealt with those departments. But the GOCs had to keep the C-in-C informed if he wished. To enable the Commander-in-Chief Far East to carry out his functions, he was allowed a small staff, initially consisting of seven officers drawn from all three Services with the necessary clerical and cipher staff. For intelligence purposes, he had at his disposal the Far East Combined Bureau, though it remained under Admiralty control. Although the establishment of his staff was later increased to fifteen it was never large enough. The Naval Base was a considerable distance across Singapore from the Malaya Army Headquarters which discouraged frequent meetings. On 5 December 1941 London gave permission for C-in-C Far East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated. The chief strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be invaded in