placed by the Nazis on their Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. [:Special Search List G.B.] of Britons to be arrested and liquidated. Bletchley Park A brilliant linguist with infantry and Intelligence Corps experience from 1914–18, proven anti-fascist credentials and a scepticism about the Soviet Union, Lucas was one of the first academics recruited by the Foreign Office – on 3 September 1939 – to Bletchley Park. He was one of the original four members of Hut 3, whose organisation he set up, and from March to July 1942, when the Hut was run by committee, acting head. He remained a central figure there, working throughout the war on the Enigma decodes as translator, intelligence-analyst and (from July 1942) head of the Research Section, 3G [:Hut 3 General Intelligence], on the busy 4 p.m. to 1 a.m. shift. His main activities in 3G were cracking Axis covernames and covernumbers in decodes, analysing German "proformas" (supplies and ammunition returns), and writing general intelligence papers. Among the intelligence-reports he produced was a study of Hitler's intentions in the east in May 1941, which contrasted with the Foreign Office view that the Germans were just "building up pressure [on the U.S.S.R.] to extract more raw materials". "It becomes harder than ever to doubt," Lucas wrote, "that the object of these large movements of the German Army and Air Force is Russia. From rail movements towards Moldavia in the south to ship movements towards Varanger fjord in the far north there is everywhere the same eastward trend. Either the purpose is blackmail or it is war. No doubt Hitler would prefer a bloodless surrender. But the quiet move, for instance, of a prisoner-of-war cage to Tarnow looks more like business than bluff." Other Lucas papers ranged from practical suggestions, such as the proposal that the Salonica-Athens railway be cut in the Oeta gorges viaducts (carried out in Operation Harling), to psychological overviews later in the war, like 'Hitler as seen by Source' [:through decodes] and 'German Morale as seen by Source' (his old special subject from 1918 Intelligence Corps days). He also wrote confidential Special Reports for the Bletchley Park Director-General, one on Second Front rumours in German signals, and another, with Peter Calvocoressi, in late 1944 on Ultra and the failure of Allied intelligence to foresee the German counter-offensive through the Ardennes in December 1944. Lucas and Calvocoressi concluded "the costly reverse might have been avoided if