from London to obtain swift success, the British tried to do too much too quickly, unlike the French Sixth Army which made short advances with the support of massive amounts of artillery-fire. In 2009, William Philpott wrote that after the war the French Official History gave five pages to 1 July, with one paragraph on the British attack and that the German official history covered the day in The British Official History described the day in with one page on the French success. In Joffre's memoirs the French victory was ascribed to "the excellent work of the artillery" and German underestimation of French offensive potential remaining from the battle at Verdun, leading them to make their principal defensive effort in the north. Many British infantry had been attacked from behind, after failing to mop up captured German positions. This military explanation was insufficient for many British commentators, who blamed "anachronistic" "sword wavers" for leading volunteers to an unnecessary slaughter. The French success, based on the experience of 1915 was overlooked, as was the French expectation of more quick victories being disappointed, as the battle became a counterpart to the long attrition campaign at Verdun. Philpott also described the Germans being written out of the British narrative of useless sacrifice. The Anglo-French armies had gained an advantage on 1 July by forcing the German defences for either side of the Somme to collapse. In the early afternoon a broad breach existed north of the river but the "break in" was in an unexpected place and exploitation had to be improvised. Casualties Philpott wrote that the "gory scene" behind the British front showed that something had gone wrong. In the evening of 1 July, Haig wrote in his diary, VIII Corps had left their trenches and over became casualties. Edmonds wrote that for the loss of Britain and Ireland's "finest manhood" there was only a small gain of ground, although an advance of on a front and minor advances elsewhere, was the furthest achieved by the British since trench warfare began. Only prisoners had been taken and none of the captured ground north of the Albert–Bapaume road except at the Leipzig Redoubt had been held. Before the battle, Rawlinson had requested 18 ambulance trains but only three were provided and these departed part-filled, before many of the wounded had been brought to casualty clearing stations, which had capacity for only Casualties were