and preoccupations of recent English-speaking philosophy and the concepts and concerns shared by Aquinas and his followers" (from the article on "analytical Thomism" in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by Ted Honderich). By "recent English-speaking philosophy" Haldane means the analytical tradition founded by thinkers like Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, which tends to dominate academic philosophy in the English-speaking world. Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) and her husband Peter Geach are sometimes considered the first "analytical Thomists," though (like most writers to whom this label has been applied) they did not describe themselves in these terms, and as Haldane's somewhat vague expression "mutual relationship" indicates, there does not seem to be any set of doctrines held in common by all analytical Thomists. What they do have in common seems to be that they are philosophers trained in the analytic tradition who happen to be interested in Aquinas in some way; and the character of their "analytical Thomism" is determined by whether it tends to stress the "analytical" side of analytical Thomism, or the "Thomism" side, or, alternatively, attempts to emphasize both sides equally. 24 Thomistic theses of Pius X With the decree Postquam sanctissimus of 27 July 1914, Pope Pius X stated that 24 theses formulated by "teachers from various institutions [...] clearly contain the principles and more important thoughts" of Aquinas. Ontology Potency and Act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either pure act, or of necessity it is composed of potency and act as primary and intrinsic principles. Since act is perfection, it is not limited except through a potency which itself is a capacity for perfection. Hence in any order in which an act is pure act, it will only exist, in that order, as a unique and unlimited act. But whenever it is finite and manifold, it has entered into a true composition with potency. Consequently, the one God, unique and simple, alone subsists in absolute being. All other things that participate in being have a nature whereby their being is restricted; they are constituted of essence and being, as really distinct principles. A thing is called a being because of "esse". God and creature are not called beings univocally, nor wholly equivocally, but analogically, by an analogy both of attribution and of proportionality. In every creature there is also a real composition of the subsisting subject and