rank of honorary major-general. The arrival of General Nixon from Simla was "shabby…jobbing" as the military build-up enclosing India's plan to capture Baghdad troubled the veteran political time-servers, morally responsible to humanity and to civilization. For want of a more bland administration, Cox complained to Viceroy Lord Curzon that Barrett, whom Nixon replaced, had not wanted to go to Amara in pursuit of a policy of annexation. In a surprise attack upriver on Qurna before midnight on 6 December 1914, Commander Nunn and a small fleet managed to link up with Brigadier Fry's units of the 45th to force the Turk to surrender; ultimately, by land and by sea, a typical pincer movement in combined operations enabled only 45 officers and 989 men to take a garrison of 4,000 men. At 1.30 pm on 9 December, Sir Percy and Fry took the formal handover from Head of Vilayet, Vali of Basra, Subhi Bey, ending the Battle of Qurna. Cox was not one for sentimentality: but the Turkic rulers had been guilty of several barbarisms: stoning women, and severing thieves' hands off; traitors and spies were buried up to their necks in sand. During 1915 he saw action with Major-general Charles Townshend's expeditionary force. Throughout the Great War Cox masterminded the Imperial relationship with Turkic Mesopotamia/Iraq. By December 1915, Townshend's division had been defeated at Battle of Ctesiphon and retreated to be besieged in Kut al-Amara. Cox left with Brigadier Leachman's cavalry brigade sent back to Basra. General Townshend came to hate "this accursed country"; fly-blown. Historians point to his brilliant defence of the fort at Chitral on the North-West Frontier in 1895, as evidence of suitability for appointment. Townshend, although promised a relief force from Nixon, knew that it was an unrealistic prospect. Although substantial redoubts were constructed during September to December 1915, the cross-river route remained vulnerable to attack. Townshend blamed Cox for the failure to evacuate civilians in time. Cox was firmly against exposing them to the winter cold. In this assessment he was supported by Arnold Wilson, who wrote that a general was not competent to judge what protection civilians needed. On reflection Cox suggested that the 500 departing unit should turn back; but Colonel Gerard Leachman told him the roads being drenched and muddy were impassable. These men had left on 6 December to be transported downriver to safety. 2,000 would-be fit cavalry men and officers