men had known each other for forty years, and Krueger had been chief of the War Plans Division when MacArthur was chief of staff, the two had never been close. The War Department approved Krueger's transfer to SWPA, but did not approve MacArthur's request for Third Army headquarters. There were only three American divisions in SWPA: the 32nd Infantry Division at Rockhampton, Queensland, the 41st Infantry Division in the Buna area in Papua, and the 1st Marine Division in Melbourne, Victoria. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division were scheduled to arrive in 1943, and other divisions would follow in 1944, but for the time being there were many fewer troops than an army would normally control. The War Department therefore saw no need for a full strength army headquarters. Instead, Krueger had to make do with a skeleton staff of a new Sixth Army, which was activated in January 1943, with less than half the establishment strength of an army headquarters. Krueger took with him several key members of the Third Army staff, including Brigadier General George Honnen as chief of staff, Colonel George H. Decker as deputy chief of staff, Colonel George S. Price as assistant chief of staff, G-1 (Personnel), Colonel Horton V. White as assistant chief of staff, G-2 (intelligence), Clyde Eddleman as assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations) and Colonel Kenneth Pierce as assistant chief of staff, G-4 (supply). Honnen had health problems, and spent much of April, May and June 1943 in hospital before being ordered home on 18 June. He was replaced by Brigadier General Edwin D. Patrick, who had served on the staff of Admiral William F. Halsey in the South Pacific Area. Patrick did not get along smoothly with Krueger or the rest of the Sixth Army staff, and in May 1944 Patrick was appointed to command the 158th Regimental Combat Team, and Decker became chief of staff. Command in the Southwest Pacific Area was complicated. Instead of operations being conducted by the Sixth Army, its headquarters was used for what became Alamo Force. As a task force, Alamo Force came directly under MacArthur, rather than under the Allied Land Forces. Krueger noted that "the inherent difficulties faced by my dual headquarters in planning and administration were aggravated by the command setup, which was a novel one to say the least." Because Alamo Force was a purely operational entity,