v. Jacksonville, , the Court held that a traditional vagrancy law was void for vagueness because its "broad scope and imprecise terms denied proper notice to potential offenders and permitted police officers to exercise unfettered discretion in the enforcement of the law." In Brown v. Texas, , the Court struck down the application of Texas's stop-and-identify statute against Brown. They held that the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual had committed, was committing, or was going to commit a crime before an individual can be required to identify himself, and that the presence of an individual in a known drug area cannot establish reasonable suspicion without more. And in Kolender v. Lawson, , the Court struck down a California stop-and-identify law that required a suspect to provide "credible and reliable identification" upon request. The words "credible and reliable" were vague because they "provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with [the law], resulting in virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation." "The present case begins where our prior cases left off. Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. Further, the petitioner has not alleged that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender. Here the Nevada statute is narrower and precise." The Nevada Supreme Court had held that the Nevada statute required only that the suspect divulge his name; presumably, he could do so without handing over any documents whatsoever. As long as the suspect tells the officer his name, he has satisfied the dictates of the Nevada stop-and-identify law. The narrow requirements of Nevada's stop-and-identify law meant that it did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. "In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment." Since Terry, it has been clear that a police officer who reasonably suspects that a person is involved in criminal activity may detain a person long enough to dispel that suspicion. Questions related to a person's identity are a "routine and accepted part of many Terry stops." Knowing a person's identity may, of course, help to clear a suspect and divert the attention of the police to another suspect. On the other hand, knowing the suspect's name may just as quickly confirm to the