Act, finding no party in the case with standing to challenge it. However, he did find a party with standing to challenge the President's cancellation in the Balanced Budget Act, and concluded that it did not violate the Constitution, because the Congress has the power to delegate the discretionary authority to decline to spend appropriated sums of money, which he asserted was equivalent to cancellation. Critical response Michael B. Rappaport argued that the original meaning of the Constitution does not apply to certain parts of the nondelegation doctrine, relying on his interpretation of the Executive Power Vesting Clause. Under this view, "laws that authorize the withdrawal of money from the treasury and which have traditionally taken the form of authorizing a certain amount to be spent for particular programs ... are not subject to the nondelegation doctrine". He further criticized the majority opinion for failing to satisfactorily justify its application of a stricter standard to the delegation of cancellation authority than it had used in the past for other executive delegations. In Rappaport's opinion, "the Court’s approach to cancellation authority has no basis in text, structure and purpose, or precedent". J.Stephen Kennedy wrote that the majority of the Supreme Court was sufficiently concerned with the constitutional challenges to the line item veto presented to declare the act wholly unconstitutional, instead of relying on other traditional and less sweeping ways of correcting acts of Congress. In his view, "the Court’s decision sent a clear message of finality for any future use of the line item veto". Kennedy also noted that while the majority relied on a strict interpretation or literal textual reading of the Presentment Clause contained in Article I of the United States Constitution, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, "stray[ed] somewhat from his usual strict constructionist approach ... by stressing that the President's act of cancellation would only occur after satisfaction of the Presentment Clause". Steven F. Huefner wrote that "Although the Presentment Clause analysis of the Line Item Veto Act has superficial appeal, it ultimately does not withstand scrutiny", arguing that the Court should have relied on the nondelegation doctrine in order to invalidate the Act, as it provided a superior basis for such a decision. Huefner named two main implications of the Court's refusal to use the nondelegation doctrine. First, it suggests that the Court seems unready or unwilling to alter the existing interpretation of the nondelegation doctrine.