members. Financing FARC received most of its funding—which was estimated to average some US$300 million per year—from taxation of the illegal drug trade and other activities, ransom kidnappings, bank robberies, and extortion of large landholders, multinational corporations, and agribusiness. From taxation of illegal drugs and other economic activity, FARC was estimated to receive US$60–100 million per year. Means of financing The guerillas's main means of financing was through the drug trade which includes both direct and indirect participation; taxation, administration or control of areas of production and trafficking. A large but often difficult to estimate portion of funding comes from the taxation of businesses and even local farmers, often lumped in with or defined by its opponents as extortion. Drug trade FARC was not initially involved in direct drug cultivation, trafficking, or trans-shipment prior to or during the 1980s. Instead, it maintained a system of taxation on the production that took place in the territories that they controlled, in exchange for protecting the growers and establishing law and order in these regions by implementing its own rules and regulations. During the 1990s, FARC expanded its operations, in some areas, to include trafficking and production, which had provided a significant portion of its funding. Right-wing paramilitary groups also receive a large portion of their income from drug trafficking and production operations. A 1992 Central Intelligence Agency report "acknowledged that the FARC had become increasingly involved in drugs through their "taxing" of the trade in areas under their geographical control and that in some cases the insurgents protected trafficking infrastructure to further fund their insurgency", but also described the relationship between the FARC and the drug traffickers as one "characterized by both cooperation and friction" and concluded that "we do not believe that the drug industry [in Colombia] would be substantially disrupted in the short term by attacks against guerrillas. Indeed, many traffickers would probably welcome, and even assist, increased operations against insurgents." In 1994, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) came to three similar conclusions. First, that any connections between drug trafficking organizations and Colombian insurgents were "ad hoc 'alliances of convenience'". Second, that "the independent involvement of insurgents in Colombia's domestic drug productions, transportation, and distribution is limited ... there is no evidence that the national leadership of either the FARC or the ELN has directed, as a matter of policy, that their respective organizations directly engage in independent illicit drug