The right to counsel in criminal trials was initially not accepted in some adversarial systems. It was believed that the facts should speak for themselves, and that lawyers would just blur the matters. As a consequence, it was only in 1836 that England gave suspects of felonies the formal right to have legal counsel (the Prisoners' Counsel Act 1836), although in practice, English courts routinely allowed defendants to be represented by counsel from the mid-18th century. During the second half of the 18th century, advocates like Sir William Garrow and Thomas Erskine, 1st Baron Erskine, helped usher in the adversarial court system used in most common law countries today. In the United States, however, personally retained counsel have had a right to appear in all federal criminal cases since the adoption of the United States Constitution, and in state cases at least since the end of the civil war, although nearly all provided this right in their state constitutions or laws much earlier. Appointment of counsel for indigent defendants was nearly universal in federal felony cases, though it varied considerably in state cases. It was not until 1963 that the U.S. Supreme Court declared that legal counsel must be provided at the expense of the state for indigent felony defendants, under the federal Sixth Amendment, in state courts. See Gideon v. Wainwright, . Criminal proceedings In criminal adversarial proceedings, an accused is not compelled to give evidence. Therefore, they may not be questioned by a prosecutor or judge unless they choose to be; however, should they decide to testify, they are subject to cross-examination and could be found guilty of perjury. As the election to maintain an accused person's right to silence prevents any examination or cross-examination of that person's position, it follows that the decision of counsel as to what evidence will be called is a crucial tactic in any case in the adversarial system and hence it might be said that it is a lawyer's manipulation of the truth. Certainly, it requires the skills of counsel on both sides to be fairly equally pitted and subjected to an impartial judge. In some adversarial legislative systems, the court is permitted to make inferences on an accused's failure to face cross-examination or to answer a particular question. This obviously limits the usefulness of silence as a tactic by the defense. In the United States, the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted