was adopted by X. Hu and Lloyd Shapley in 2003 in studying authority distribution in organizations. Approval voting has been adopted by several societies: the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (1992), Mathematical Association of America (1986), the American Mathematical Society, the Institute of Management Sciences (1987) (now the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences), the American Statistical Association (1987), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (1987). The IEEE board in 2002 rescinded its decision to use approval voting. IEEE Executive Director Daniel J. Senese stated that approval voting was abandoned because "few of our members were using it and it was felt that it was no longer needed." Because none of these associations report results to their members and the public, it is difficult to evaluate Senese's claim and whether it is also true of other associations; Steven Brams' analysis of the 5-candidate 1987 Mathematical Association of America presidential election shows that 79% of voters cast a ballot for one candidate, 16% for 2 candidates, 5% for 3, and 1% for 4, with the winner earning the approval of 1,267 (32%) of 3,924 voters. Approval voting also can be used in social scenarios as a fairer, but still quick system compared to a First-Past-The-Post equivalent, being able to avoid a spoiler effect while being very quick to calculate. See also: Multiwinner approval voting. Strategic voting Overview Approval voting allows voters to select all the candidates whom they consider to be reasonable choices. Strategic approval voting differs from ranked voting (aka preferential voting) methods where voters might reverse the preference order of two options, which if done on a larger scale can cause an unpopular candidate to win. Strategic Approval voting, with more than two options, involves the voter changing their approval threshold. The voter decides which options to give the same rating, even if they were to have a preference order between them. This leaves a tactical concern any voter has for approving their second-favorite candidate, in the case that there are three or more candidates. Approving their second-favorite means the voter harms their favorite candidate's chance to win. Not approving their second-favorite means the voter helps the candidate they least desire to beat their second-favorite and perhaps win. Approval voting allows for bullet voting and compromising, while it is immune to push-over and burying. Bullet Voting occurs when a voter approves only candidate "a"