of people putting on and taking off protective gear, and a research study. The study had people put on and take off gear and averaged how long it took, which was considered "representative evidence." Tyson Foods asked the judge to bifurcate proceedings so that the jury would first answer whether the FLSA covered time taken to put on and take off protective gear and how long the donning and doffing took, and the jury would then determine which employees would be eligible to recover. However, Tyson Foods did not question the representative evidence used, such as by moving for a Daubert hearing, and instead emphasized that there was too much individual variance for the issues to be resolved in a class. The representative evidence presented would have supported an award of $6.7 million. The jury found that donning and doffing was compensable under the FLSA but awarded only $2.9 million to the class. Tyson moved to set aside the jury verdict by alleging improper class certification. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed, affirmed the judgment, and held that the use of representative evidence was appropriate in this case. Decision The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit. The parties were in dispute over whether the class met the predominance inquiry required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which requires the district court to ask whether common questions predominate over individual ones. That examination is meant to ensure that it makes sense to adjudicate the claims as a class. The predominance inquiry is different from the commonality inquiry in class actions since it asks not only whether there are common questions but also whether the common, class-wide issues are more important or arise more frequently than the individual ones. Tyson Foods maintained that the common questions did not predominate because it was the questions of each individual's work time that predominated. The employees, by contrast, argued that the representative evidence could replace individual inquiries. The permissibility of the representative evidence, therefore, was central to the case. The Supreme Court looked to the practical need for representative evidence and recognized that in some cases, it is the only evidence available. Since Tyson Foods had failed to keep records on employee time, representative evidence was necessary. The key inquiry, according to the Supreme Court, was whether the employees would have similarly used the representative evidence in individual