public funds is a matter of public interest." Finding that Hutchinson was a public figure, the court moved on to the question of whether Proxmire had acted with actual malice. Finding that there was no "genuine issue of material fact" the court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Proxmire. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Proxmire's statements in the press release and newsletters were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Though they found that comments made on television and during telephone calls were not protected by that Clause, the Court held that they were still protected by the First Amendment because the petitioner was a "public figure" and had not made a sufficient showing of "actual malice." Opinion of the Court Having granted certiorari the Supreme Court considered three questions: the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause the First Amendment claims the appropriateness of summary judgment, under constitutional and state law The Supreme Court decided that statements made by Congressmen in press releases and newsletters are not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In the course of their analysis, they determined that, under the precedents of the court, a member of Congress may be held liable for republishing defamatory statements that were originally made during floor speeches. They also found that Hutchinson was not a public figure and that the "actual malice" standard established by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan for defamation claims brought by public figure did not apply to Hutchinson's case. Although Hutchinson did have access to the news media, the facts of the case do not indicate "that he was a public figure prior to the controversy" that resulted from the Golden Fleece award. The Court wrote: His access, such as it was, came after the alleged libel, and was limited to responding to the announcement of the award. Those charged with alleged defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure. Nor is the concern about public expenditures sufficient to make petitioner a public figure, petitioner at no time having assumed any role of public prominence in the broad question of such concern They reversed the lower court decision and remanded back to the appeals court for further proceedings. Subsequent proceedings Following the Supreme Court ruling, the case returned to the district court on remand.