The board failed to review reports by examiners and outside auditors. According to Pulkkinen and Rosengren, "That RISDIC did not fail earlier was attributable to its political clout and its ability to mask severe financial difficulties within its underlying membership." She said the only reason the legislation to end RISDIC failed was because of problematic relationships between legislators and the banks. Failure The Heritage Loan and Investment collapse came months after Jefferson Loan and Investment Company, another RISDIC-insured bank, folded because of fraudulent leases. Jefferson used up a great deal of RISDIC's resources, leaving them in particularly bad shape when the even more costly Heritage collapse came about in November 1990. The $13-million bank run in November, after customers learned the condition of Heritage, used up a large part of RISDIC's $25-million reserve. At the same time, concerned depositors at other RISDIC-insured institutions began withdrawing their own funds at an increased rate. As a result of the draining of its assets, RISDIC was left insolvent, unable to meet deposit insurance claims. Several RISDIC-insured institutions began working to obtain federal insurance amid these events. Some were delayed, while many others reconsidered, opting to explore other options upon realizing the stricter controls federal insurance would place on the institutions. The outgoing DiPrete administration prepared a plan to switch RISDIC-insured institutions to federal insurance, but did not act on it because, according to the Providence Journal, "it would be presumptuous for him to do so in the waning days of his term." The incoming administration of Bruce Sundlun planned to act on it in the days or weeks following his inauguration, but action hastened after a letter was delivered from the RISDIC board of directors. On December 31, 1990, the day before Sundlun's inauguration, the RISDIC board voted unanimously to request conservatorship due to "extraordinary liquidity demands ... in recent days." A retrospective analysis by Walker F. Todd in Economic Commentary found similarities in the failures of the Ohio, Maryland, and Rhode Island systems. Among them were the insurers' influence in state legislatures, failure to act when notified of problems, political authorities downplaying the seriousness of the funds' insolvencies, and, most importantly, "their incapacity to exercise sufficient supervisory authority to limit risks or to impose effective risk-based deposit insurance premiums to make unwise risk-taking more costly for the insured institutions creating the largest risks." Effectively, without enough funds and with too much risk,