any single major loss would erode confidence and lead to disaster. On the other hand, whereas weaknesses in the insured institutions themselves were a factor in all three states' funds, Ohio and Maryland institutions were weakened primarily by fraud while Rhode Island was more affected by losses in real estate loans and investments, which occurred across New England between 1989 and 1992. Bank closures and aftermath By state law, banks and credit unions cannot legally operate without insurance. Hours after his January 1, 1991, inauguration, Sundlun held a press conference. Due to a "banking emergency," he ordered the indefinite closure of the 45 RISDIC-insured financial institutions, about three quarters of which were credit unions. Police were posted at all closed banks "to maintain public order," according to officials cited in the Providence Journal. RISDIC-insured institutions were ordered not to accept deposits, grant withdrawals, pay dividends, pay creditors, renew loans, liquidate assets, or incur new debts. They were, however, to pay their own employees as applicable, and to submit plans for continued operation to Maurice C. Paradis, the new business regulation director in the Sundlun administration. Bank customers were, however, expected to repay loans. It was the first banking emergency in Rhode Island since the bank holidays of the Great Depression in 1933. Over 300,000 people, about a third of the state's population, lost access to their money, totaling about $1.7 billion. Depositors were notified that although they could not make deposits or withdrawals, they would still need to repay loans to those institutions and their money would continue to accrue interests. The state created a central phone hotline through the Department of Business Regulation, which had difficulty keeping up with the high call volume. By the following day, January 2, all but two of the institutions had applied for federal insurance, and those that were approved reopened relatively quickly: seven reopened the following Monday. However, the FDIC and NCUA declined to provide insurance to some of the institutions that did not meet its standards, highlighting eleven that had been explicitly declined. The FDIC chairman stated that it would not burden itself by providing extra help for the crisis or by repaying depositors if their accounts are salvageable. The seven that quickly reopened accounted for only about ten percent of the total deposits, however, with most of the larger institutions still closed. But the events worried some in the federal government,