evaluation. No, or insufficient, regard was had to the relevant rights of Charlie and the parents under Articles 2, 5 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The parents and their legal team were placed at an unfair procedural disadvantage as a result of the late disclosure of documents. The court granted permission for the parents to appeal on ground 1, 2 and 4, and refused permission for ground 3 (no prospect of success), and ground 5 (no evidence). Having refused permission to appeal on ground three, the court went on to assess grounds 1, 2 and 4 on the basis that the judge at first instance had correctly evaluated Charlie's best interests and the lack of any identifiable benefit for him arising from nucleoside treatment. A letter dated 22 May from Hirano was submitted to the court as "fresh evidence". The court read the letter and noted its contents but stated "It is, however, plain that the letter does not purport to contain anything new". By grounds 1 and 2 the parents attempted to establish a "wholly new point of law" – all previously decided and reported medical treatment of children cases, save and except for that of Re King, should be regarded as "Category 1", whilst Re King established a "Category 2". In a "Category 1" case the parents who oppose the course of treatment for which the treating clinicians apply, and do not have a viable alternative therapeutic option to put before the court. The distinction that would lead a case to be allocated to "Category 2" is that a viable alternative treatment option is put forward by the parents and the court is, therefore, required to choose between the two. The court rejected this argument. The judge at first instance was required to evaluate Charlie's best interests and had done so. Lord Justice McFarlane said "On the facts of this case in my view, Mr Gordon's submission, unfortunately for the parents, does not even begin to have traction. The submission is based upon there being a viable alternative form of treatment available." Of the "wholly new point of law" Lord Justice McFarlane said "If, contrary to my primary reading, Mr Justice Baker did intend to state, where a parent puts forward a viable option for treatment, that the High Court only has jurisdiction to interfere with a parent's choice of that medical treatment if