As a result, Indonesia began a policy of confronting the Dutch over control of Western New Guinea. Sukarno also embarked on a policy of "progressive mobilization" to prepare the nation to carry out his commands. While the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia sided with the Netherlands' claims to Western New Guinea and were opposed to Indonesian expansionism, they were unwilling to commit military support to the Dutch. The Netherlands was unable to find sufficient international support for its New Guinea policy. By contrast, Sukarno was able to muster the support of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, and the Non-Aligned Movement. In response to Indonesian claims, the Netherlands sped up the process of implementing West Papuan self-rule from 1959 onward. These measures included the establishment of a legislative New Guinea Council in 1960, establishing hospitals, completion of a shipyard in Manokwari, development of agricultural research sites and plantations; and the creation of the Papuan Volunteer Corps to defend the territory. Trikora On 19 December 1961, President Sukarno made a speech in Yogyakarta regarding the liberation of Papua, revolving around "The three principles of Trikora." The three principles of Trikora were: Prevent The Netherlands from forming a puppet state in West Papua. To fly the Indonesian bicolour (the "red and white") in West Papua. Prepare for mass mobilisation of the military and citizens in the case that the defence of Indonesian unity and independence was required Preparation Military Indonesia began seeking weapons from abroad in response to the conflict with the Netherlands. Having failed to secure anything from the United States (Dutch membership in NATO was the possible reason), General Nasution went to Moscow in December 1960 to negotiate what eventually turned out to be a US$2.5 billion arms package with the Soviet government. The subsequent deliveries that arose from this deal led the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) to boast that Indonesia had the strongest air force in the southern hemisphere. The United States did not support the surrender of West Papua to Indonesia, since the Bureau of European Affairs considered it an act of trading one occupying power for another. However, in April 1961, Robert Komer and McGeorge Bundy began to prepare plans for the United Nations to give the impression that surrender to Indonesia was legal. Although reluctantly, President John F. Kennedy finally supported these plans, fearing that, without U.S support, the Indonesians would