would argue the case before the Supreme Court. At oral arguments on April 20, 1976, Becker pointed out that Public Law 280 gave the state jurisdiction over criminal matters and civil "causes of actions" – a legal term for lawsuits. Since Congress had also passed other Indian laws at the same time, such as the various Indian Termination Acts, which specifically authorized states to collect taxes from Indians, its silence in this area meant Congress did not intend to do so with Public Law 280. Becker brought up the leading article on Public Law 280, by UCLA law professor Carole Goldberg, that argued that the law was established to address the problem of crime on reservations. He also noted that tribes which had adequate law-and-order processes, such as the Red Lake Band of Chippewa, were excluded from state jurisdiction in Minnesota. Arguing for the State of Minnesota was C. H. Luther of the State Attorney General's office. Luther argued four points for the tax being valid: a) the language of the statute; b) the legislative history of Public Law 280; c) prior judicial opinions; and d) public policy. Luther conceded that if the trailer was a fixed house or real property, it would be exempt from taxation. Luther also stated that other taxes – such as gasoline, sales, income and other taxes of general applicability – would apply to Indians. Unanimous opinion Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the court on June 14, 1976. Brennan stated that Public Law 280 was not designed to eliminate all restrictions on the states as they dealt with Indian tribes. Brennan noted that under the Supreme Court's prior decisions of Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, , states had no authority to tax Indians "absent Congressional consent." Since Itasca County was claiming Public Law 280 granted that consent, Brennan evaluated the statute in regards to the taxation of Indians. Brennan noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had found that the statute did grant the right to tax personal property as an inherent power, even though the law did not specifically mention the power to tax. He rejected this argument, noting that the primary purpose of the law was to provide for "state criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians on the reservations." Nothing in the legislative history of the law provided support