who sought to approve rabbinically-questionable marriages to a kohen. Understanding Isaac ben Sheshet's response Leading Rabbinic authorities, such as Joseph Trani and Samuel Ashkenazi, disputed reliance on the Isaac ben Sheshet's response for purpose of questioning the authenticity of the kohen. They, as part of various proofs, cited reasoning from a latter response from Isaac ben Sheshet himself (Tshuvat HaRivash res. 348) where he is stringent that a kohen who married a divorcee is obligated to cease his marriage, thus proving the Isaac ben Sheshet's fundamental stance of upholding the legitimacy of the presumptive kohen. Rabbi Samuel de Medina's permission Rabbi Samuel de Medina, in a response concerning a woman who was held captive as a young girl, ruled that a kohen is permitted to marry her. The logic, he explained, is one of a double uncertainty. One uncertainty being that we are unsure the woman was exposed to forced intimacy, which would disqualify the woman from marrying a kohen, and even where she have been the kohen is prohibited from wedding her only according to rabbinical decision. In addition, the Samuel de Medina wrote that he is unsure as to the authenticity of the modern kohen based on the response of the Isaac ben Sheshet. This responsum of Samuel de Medina was met with a fiery reply from Ezekiel Katzenellenbogen; Rabbinic authorities such as Joseph Trani have come to the defense of Samuel de Medina by stating that the case brought before his court was one of Rabbinic degree, and never would Samuel de Medina have permitted a marriage prohibited in the Hebrew Bible marriage to presumptive kohen. They cite, as proof, additional responsa of Samuel where he is stringent on a presumptive kohen from continued marriage to his wife due to only the possible but not certain receipt of a bill of divorce. Opinion of Solomon Luria The opinion of Solomon Luria is somewhat obscure. On the one hand Luria opines with the advice to give the "devoted things", both land and goods, as one of the ten priestly gifts applicable outside of Israel, to a presumptive kohen, provided the estate owner of the devoted property explicitly states to give it to a kohen. Luria also encouraged the giving of shoulder, cheeks and maw to a presumptive kohen. However, Luria writes of the basic questioning of the kohen as legitimate due to upheaval of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, writing