violent overthrow of the government or a communist political philosophy). Clark assumed that the city would not implement the law in such a way as to punish those individuals who lacked scienter, and assumed that scienter was implicit in the ordinance. The decision of the District Court of Appeals was affirmed. Frankfurter's dissent Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part. Frankfurter noted in his dissent that the majority had repeatedly referred to public employment as a privilege, which to his mind invoked the "doctrine of privilege." Invoking this doctrine, he concluded "does not meet the problem." But Frankfurter was unable to agree that the Los Angeles ordinance implied scienter. He wrote: "To find scienter implied in a criminal statute is the obvious way of reading such a statute, for guilty knowledge is the normal ingredient of criminal responsibility. The ordinance before us exacts an oath as a condition of employment; it does not define a crime. It is certainly not open to this Court to rewrite the oath required by Los Angeles of its employees..." The lack of an explicit requirement for scienter in the law, he concluded, asked the employees "to swear to something they cannot be expected to know. Such a demand ... can no more be justified than the inquiry into belief which [was] invalid in American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)." Frankfurter would have remanded the case back to the state court with instructions that the petitioners be allowed to take the oath under the scienter requirement imposed by the Court. Burton's dissent Associate Justice Harold Hitz Burton dissented in part. Under the Court's decisions in United States v. Lovett, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867), and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867), Burton concluded, the oath as currently framed was an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder. However, Burton would have affirmed the lower court concerning the judgment regarding the two employees who had refused to sign the affidavit. The affidavit merely represented an assertion of true facts, Burton said, and as such could be required of the employees. Douglas' dissent Associate Justice William O. Douglas dissented, joined by Associate Justice Hugo Black. Douglas concluded that the entire case was governed by the decisions in Ex parte Garland and Cummings v. Missouri. A bill of attainder as defined in these cases inflicts punishment