Director of Public Prosecutions is not normally understood to be a fiduciary one. Rather, the courts are using fiduciary duties as a method of punishing the defendant; Alastair Hudson writes that they are "as concerned to punish the wrongdoer as to protect rights in property". Whether or not someone is a fiduciary depends on their position. Trustees, company directors, agents and business partners are all fiduciaries, as in Yugraneft v Abramovich, but other positions may be recognised by the court if the misuse of powers in a particular circumstance renders them so, as in Reid. In Brink's Ltd v Abu-Saleh (No. 3), a security guard who was bribed to give information on a company's security systems, allowing a gang of armed robbers to burgle their warehouse, was found to be in a fiduciary position. While a security guard would not normally be a fiduciary due to not holding a senior enough role, in relation to security arrangements the guard would be found to be acting in a fiduciary capacity. Bribes may also be synonymous with "secret commissions", where somebody is given an undisclosed "kickback". Murder makes the killer a constructive trustee of whatever property they acquire as a result. This applies to murder, as in In the Estate of Crippen, inciting someone to murder, as in Evans v Evans, and causing death by reckless driving, as in R v Seymour (Edward). In Re K, it was confirmed that involuntary manslaughter does not require constructive trusts, and neither do situations where there is a successful plea of insanity, as in found in Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. Curiously, there is no requirement that the defendant be found guilty in criminal proceedings; in Re Sigsworth, it was decided that claims can be brought without criminal proceedings having taken place providing the defendant is held up to the criminal standards of guilt in the equity case. In cases of fraud, the same principle applies; the property is held by the fraudster on constructive trust for the original owner, unless the original owner was involved in the fraud, as in Lonrho plc v Fayed (No. 2). An exception to this principle is fraudulent misrepresentation, where the courts disagree over whether it immediately forms a constructive trust or requires action by the victim. In Collings v Lee, an estate agent transferred property to a non-existent purchaser (in reality an alias) and