The China shock (or China trade shock) is the impact of rising Chinese exports on manufacturing employment in the United States and Europe after China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Studies have estimated that the China trade shock reduced U.S. manufacturing employment by 0.55 million (explaining about 16% of the total decline in manufacturing employment in the U.S. between 2000 and 2007), 1.8-2.0 million, and 2.0-2.4 million. Losses in manufacturing employment have also been observed in Norway, Spain, and Germany. Studies have shown that there was "higher unemployment, lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets" in U.S. regions that have industries that competed with Chinese industries. Studies have shown that while some markets in the United States suffered adverse welfare and labor impacts, American trade led to net gains in employment and welfare over the period 1991-2011. These claims have been disputed by Economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson, who state that "at the national level, employment has fallen in the US industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize." A 2017 study found that Germany gained on net from trade. Experts have argued that the China trade shock in relation to consumer goods largely ended by 2006 while indicating that for capital goods the effects of Chinese imports to the United States continued up until 2012 and are ongoing in specific product categories. Economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon H. Hanson, who have extensively studied U.S. labor markets adjustments to trade competition shocks caused by China, supported the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Autor, Dorn and Hanson argue the adoption of the TPP "would promote trade in knowledge-intensive services in which U.S. companies exert a strong comparative advantage" and pressure China to raise regulatory rules and standards to those of TPP members, while "killing the TPP would do little" to bring manufacturing back to the United States. Background In 1991, China only accounted for 1% of total imports to the United States. Innovations in communications and transportation technology in the 1990s made it easier for firms to offshore production to low-wage countries such as China. China's accession to the WTO meant that it had to liberalize its economy, and reduce state interference, which boosted the efficiency of Chinese exporters. As China already had "most-favored nation" (MFN) status since the 1980s in