Young's translation was at fault, that "Young, Cornwallis and Storrs all appear to have been mistaken" and Friedman asserts that the Arabic document produced by Faisal was "not authentic", a "fabrication". In early January, Faisal was given a print, ordered by Young, of the "Summary of Historical Documents from...1914 to the out-break of Revolt of the Sherif of Mecca in June 1916," dated 29 November 1916. Young on 29 November 1920 had written a "Foreign Office Memorandum on possible negotiations with the Hedjaz," addressing the intended content of a treaty, interpreting the Arabic translation to be referring to the Vilayet of Damascus. This was the first time an argument was put forward that the correspondence was intended to exclude Palestine from the Arab area. On 7 January and into the early hours of 8 January, Cornwallis, acting informally with instructions from Curzon, sounded out Faisal on Iraq. While agreeing in principle to a mandate and not to intrigue against the French, Faisal was equivocal about his candidacy: "I will never put myself forward as a candidate"...Hussein wants "Abdullah to go to Mesopotamia" and "the people would believe I was working for myself and not for my nation." He would go "if HMG rejected Abdullah and asked me to undertake the task and if the people said they wanted me". Cornwallis thought that Faisal wanted to go to Mesopotamia but would not push himself or work against Abdullah. On 8 January, Faisal joined Lawrence, Cornwallis, The Hon. William Ormsby-Gore, MP and Walter Guinness MP at Edward Turnour, Earl Winterton's country house for the weekend. Allawi quotes Winterton's memoirs in support of the claim that Faisal agreed after many hours of discussions to become King of Iraq. Paris says that Winterton had been approached by Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, with a message that the prime minister "was prepared to offer the crown of Iraq to...Faisal if he will accept it. He will not offer it unless he is sure of the Emir's acceptance." Paris also says that the meeting and its results were kept secret. On 10 January, Faisal met with Lawrence, Ormsby Gore and Guinness. Allawi says that upcoming changes in the department responsible for British Middle Eastern policy were discussed along with the situation in the Hejaz. Faisal continued to demur as regards Iraq, preferring that Britain should put him forward. Lawrence later reported to Churchill on the