an achievement comparable to the initial German gains during the Ardennes Offensive on the Western Front in December 1944. The situation at the Soviet crossing points on the Danube bordered on panic. Subjected to constant Luftwaffe attacks, 40,000 Soviet troops and large quantities of war material were transferred to the east bank to avoid them falling into German hands. The 40,000-citizen Hungarian city and key supply transit point of Székesfehérvár was captured by the Axis on 22 January after a fight. On 19 and early 20 January there were no Soviet troops between IV SS Panzer Corps spearheads and the Axis garrison in Budapest. 3rd Ukrainian Front transferred the 5th Cavalry Corps with 100 tanks, 360 artillery pieces, three anti-tank gun regiments and six artillery regiments to block the gap. It did so in time on 20 January after a 60-kilometer march as the Germans had also suffered considerable human and material losses in destroying all the tanks of the 4th Guards Army, had critical levels of fuel and ammunition and did not yet control Székesfehérvár that day, lengthening the German supply lines. The Soviet 1st Mechanized Corps was also deployed to fight the SS, slowing down the German advance which was redirected north-east towards Lake Velence. 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf pushed into the Soviet defenses and was within 25 kilometers of the Budapest pocket by 26 January. The 1st Panzer Division penetrated the Soviet defensive lines near Vál and established radio contact with the defenders of Budapest. It was then ordered by 6th Army commander Hermann Balck to fall back, triggering outrage with Herbert Gille, the commander of IV SS Panzer Corps. The fundamental cause behind Balck's order was the lack of infantry in the corps, which meant long and vulnerable security lines. Aftermath Not involving the 2nd Panzer Army to the south in the initial offensive was a serious mistake on the part of the Army Group South commander Otto Wöhler. A simultaneous offensive by 2nd Panzer Army and Army Group F might have severed all of 3rd Ukrainian Front's supply lines. Adolf Hitler refused to authorize the operation, codenamed Icebreaker, as he was concerned with a potential Soviet offensive from the south-east that might quickly capture the Nagykanizsa oilfields. The Soviets to the south in fact had no independent offensive designs as they were concerned about the potential for a German attack in this sector. On