Spectre refers to one of the two original transient execution CPU vulnerabilities (the other being Meltdown), which involve microarchitectural timing side-channel attacks. These affect modern microprocessors that perform branch prediction and other forms of speculation. On most processors, the speculative execution resulting from a branch misprediction may leave observable side effects that may reveal private data to attackers. For example, if the pattern of memory accesses performed by such speculative execution depends on private data, the resulting state of the data cache constitutes a side channel through which an attacker may be able to extract information about the private data using a timing attack. Two Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures IDs related to Spectre, (bounds check bypass, Spectre-V1, Spectre 1.0) and (branch target injection, Spectre-V2), have been issued. JIT engines used for JavaScript were found to be vulnerable. A website can read data stored in the browser for another website, or the browser's memory itself. In early 2018, Intel reported that it would redesign its CPUs to help protect against the Spectre and related Meltdown vulnerabilities (especially, Spectre variant 2 and Meltdown, but not Spectre variant 1). On 8 October 2018, Intel was reported to have added hardware and firmware mitigations regarding Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities to its latest processors. History In 2002 and 2003, Yukiyasu Tsunoo and colleagues from NEC showed how to attack MISTY and DES symmetric key ciphers, respectively. In 2005, Daniel Bernstein from the University of Illinois, Chicago reported an extraction of an OpenSSL AES key via a cache timing attack, and Colin Percival had a working attack on the OpenSSL RSA key using the Intel processor's cache. In 2013 Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner from the University of Adelaide showed how measuring the access time to data lets a nefarious application determine if the information was read from the cache or not. If it was read from the cache the access time would be very short, meaning the data read could contain the private key of encryption algorithms. This technique was used to successfully attack GnuPG, AES and other cryptographic implementations. In January 2017, Anders Fogh gave a presentation at the Ruhr University Bochum about automatically finding covert channels, especially on processors with a pipeline used by more than one processor core. Spectre proper was discovered independently by Jann Horn from Google's Project Zero and Paul Kocher in collaboration with Daniel Genkin, Mike Hamburg, Moritz Lipp,