line); in its pillboxes the reserve battalions of the front-line regiments were held back for counter-attacks. From the back to was a rearward battle zone () containing support and reserve assembly areas for the divisions. The failures at Verdun in December 1916 and at Arras in April 1917, had given more importance to these areas, since the had been overrun during both offensives and the garrisons lost. It was anticipated that the main defensive engagement would take place in the with the reserve regiments and divisions advancing against attackers who had been slowed and depleted by the forward garrisons. The leading regiment of an division was to advance into the zone of the front division (), with its other two regiments moving forward in close support. divisions were accommodated behind the front line and began their advance to assembly areas in the , ready to intervene in the with an instant-immediate counter-thrust (). Loßberg rejected elastic defence in Flanders, because there was little prospect of operational pauses between British attacks because the British had so much artillery and ammunition. A trench garrison which retired quickly became disorganised and could not counter-attack, losing the sector and leaving the flanks of neighbouring formations in the air. Loßberg ordered that the front line was be fought for at all costs, with immediate counter-attacks to recapture lost sectors. Front line troops were not expected to cling to shelters but leave them as soon as the battle began, moving forward and to the flanks to avoid artillery-fire and to counter-attack. German infantry equipment had recently been improved by the arrival of machine-guns (tactical equivalent of the British Lewis gun) per regiment. The of eight men was augmented by a crew of four men, to become a , the becoming a . The extra fire power gave German infantry more means for fire and manoeuvre tactics; of the front line garrison were formed into and the other were concentrated in , in the forward battle zone. The contained of the and in divisional reserve and the local division (composed of formations), was based in the rear positions. 1–9 August After II Corps reported at that it was close to the second objective, Gough ordered that II Corps was to attack again on 2 August. At the order was altered, to make certain that the second objective had been captured before the four corps further north attacked