Blitz, which lasted until May 1941. As a mobile unit, 60th HAA Rgt had an attached Signal Section (Royal Corps of Signals), Workshop (Royal Army Ordnance Corps) and Transport (Royal Army Service Corps), but while the regiment remained on home defence these sections were transferred to 89th (Cinque Ports) HAA Rgt which embarked for Egypt on 15 December 1940. By the end of the Blitz 194th HAA Bty had also left the regiment, joining the War Office (WO) Reserve as an independent battery for service in the field, and was replaced in June 1941 by 206th (Erith) HAA Bty from 58th (Kent) HAA Rgt. (194th HAA Battery later joined 80th (Berkshire) HAA Rgt and served with it in Operation Torch.) By September, 60th HAA Rgt had moved to 42nd AA Bde in 12th AA Division covering the Firth of Clyde in Scotland, and had been joined by 359th HAA Bty from 113th HAA Rgt. By the Spring of 1942 the regiment was still in 42nd AA Bde, but 359th HAA Bty was attached to 63 AA Bde in Western Scotland. Later, 359th HAA Bty left the regiment completely, and by the summer of 1942 was deployed in the Falkland Islands. Mobile unit In May 1942, 60th HAA Rgt briefly joined 57th AA Bde in 7th AA Division in North East England, but before the end of June had left again, as an unbrigaded regiment in AA Command. By early 1943 it had become a mobile unit once more as part of the field force under WO control with the following composition: RHQ 60 HAA Rgt 168 HAA Bty 169 HAA Bty 206 HAA Bty 60 HAA Rgt Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) Normandy The regiment was assigned to Second Army for the Allied invasion of Normandy (Operation Overlord). It formed part of 106th AA Bde, scheduled to land shortly after D-Day to defend the airfields that would be established for RAF Second Tactical Air Force. The brigade began landing on 10 June (D + 4), although the regiment at first only had two of its batteries, the third battery not arriving until after 25 June. The deployment was frustrating, because Luftwaffe attacks were lighter than anticipated and there were surplus HAA guns in the beachhead. In addition, RAF commanders refused permission to engage enemy aircraft unless the airfields themselves were being attacked. Airfield defence having become redundant, the