Cipher machine, while working with the team which included Dr Erich Hüttenhain, the chief cryptanalyst of OKW/Chi and Oberinspektor Fritz Menzer, the hand and machine cipher designer and inventor. Buggisch also studied the M40 device, designed by Fritz Menzer, finding it moderately secure but it was never actually used. The M40 device was the forerunner of the Cipher Machine 41 (), but the motion of the wheels was found to be not so irregular. During September 1940, Buggisch was transferred to a Soviet (Russian) specialist section, which consisted. They worked on a 4-figure code (Olowo) and 5-figure codes, creating practice messages. In October or November 1940, Buggisch transferred to an intercept station in France. 1941 In January 1941, he was transferred to the Balkans specialist section that was directed by Rudolf Bailovic. Buggisch worked on the Greek 5-figure transposition cipher. Two memoranda were issued concerning the JUGO – SLAV code. Around 1 February 1941, all cryptanlysts including Buggisch were transferred from the Intercept station to the Inspectorate 7 unit, later called the General der Nachrichtenaufklärung. In June 1941, Buggisch moved to the newly formed Signals Recce Abteilung (abbr. Signals), with all personnel who worked in In 7/VI being subordinated into that unit. The Russian cipher specialist section was again subordinated to the Intercept station, with the unit moving to Loetzen. Between July 1941 and November 1941, while at Loetzen, Buggisch worked on 5-figure material, specifically the OK40 code and the K37 machine. The OK40 was the official Russian designation for the Soviet (Russian) 5/F or 5-figure operational code. It contained 25,000 groups namely all the five-figure numbers and only these, in which the first three figures were all simultaneously odd or simultaneously even. For recyphering the add [subtractor] or 300 5/F groups were in general use by the Soviets. The code was used from about the end of June 1941 to September 1941, by the higher and highest Soviet Army command. Soon after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, several copies of the code were captured along with their recypher tables but with most of them out of date by that point, with the Soviets changing them frequently, but not yet daily. Owing to the already mentioned special characteristic of the first three elements of the code groups it was particularly easy to line them up. In this way, depth of 8–12 was often obtained, so that the recipher could easily