called the attack a complete failure. J. P. Harris wrote in 2008 that although fresh divisions had been used and a strictly limited objective had been selected, the ground was too wet and lack of observation made British counter-battery fire ineffective. The British had suffered about for only a small advance. In 2014, Robert Perry wrote that the result of the attack on 10 August forced Gough to choose between pressing on or pausing the offensive to concentrate troops, who were not easily available. Delaying the Fifth Army attacks to gain artillery superiority was possible but the attempt begun in mid-July had failed. Since 31 July, it had become clear that the 4th Army could replace rapidly its damaged guns and it was not clear that the Fifth Army had the artillery necessary to defeat the firepower of . Waiting to attack might improve the readiness of the infantry but could benefit the Germans more by degenerating into an endless artillery duel. Gough chose to continue, after a 24-hour pause for tired troops to be relieved, with a general attack on 15 August but the weather forced another 24-hour postponement; of rain fell on 14 August and fell the next day, turning the battlefield back into a swamp. The attack on 16 August began what was possibly the worst period of the war endured by the BEF. Casualties The 25th Division had including killed, and missing. The 13th Battalion Cheshire Regiment on the right flank suffered the losses. The 74th Brigade casualties from were from a front line strength of From 31 July to 10 August, the 18th (Eastern) Division casualties were killed, wounded and were taken. The cost to the Germans of the defence of the Gheluvelt Plateau was such that on 16 August, Brigadier-General Clifford Coffin of the 25th Division reported that the German dead he saw in the Hanebeek Valley lay more thickly than on any previous battlefield. On 15 August, Rupprecht wrote that the defence of the Ypres Salient by the 4th Army was costly, particularly in the wet and cold weather, which was causing much sickness among the infantry. German casualties were counted in ten-day periods and for 1–10 August the total for the 4th Army was 16,000, some of which were suffered on the Gheluvelt Plateau on 10 August. Subsequent operations At on 10 August, Jacob ordered the front line to be consolidated and