With respect to s. 12, they argued that the punishment for possession was grossly disproportionate. On s. 15, they argued that singling out marihuana possession infringed the equality guarantee of the Charter. The Supreme Court dismissed their appeals. On the issue of the criminal law power, the Court unanimously concluded that the federal criminal law power included the power to criminalize marihuana. The Court split, 6–3, on the Charter issues. Speaking for the majority, Justices Gonthier and Binnie found no infringement of any of the Charter provisions. On s. 7, the majority found that the proposed "harm principle" did not qualify as a principle of fundamental justice, and in any event the government had provided sufficient evidence of harm to justify its actions. Nor was the law arbitrary. On the issue of punishment, the fact that there was no minimum sentence for the offences indicated that the law was not grossly disproportionate. On the equality issue, the lifestyle goals of the accused did not rise to the level of inherent personal characteristics to trigger s. 15 of the Charter. The three dissenting judges each wrote their own reasons. All three agreed that the federal criminal law power included the power to criminalize marihuana. Justice Arbour accepted the appellants' argument that the principles of fundamental justice included a "harm principle". She concluded that the criminalization of marihuana failed to meet that requirement, and so was unconstitutional. Justices Le Bel and Deschamps did not accept the "harm principle" as a principle of fundamental justice, but they both concluded that the law was arbitrary and therefore infringed the principles of fundamental justice. 2007: R. v. Long (Ontario Court of Justice) The Ontario Court of Justice held in R. v. Long that the prohibition in the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act against the possession of cannabis were unconstitutional in the absence of an accompanying constitutionally acceptable exemption for medical cannabis. The current exemption depended on the government supplying cannabis, which it was only doing as a result of the policy. However, the policy did not impose a legal obligation upon the government to supply cannabis to those who needed it for medical purposes. The court held that without such an obligation, the exemption was constitutionally unacceptable, as access to marijuana depended on the implementation of a policy rather than the application of a law. If the government wanted to control the supply of cannabis,