reserve for defense against an enemy strike down or out of the Pukhan River valley. In the left portion of the X Corps' sector, the 1st Marine Division and the 2nd Division, less the bulk of the 23rd Infantry in Corps' reserve, covered the Chuncheon-Hongcheon axis. Though the concentration of strength in the western and central areas left the remainder of the front comparatively thin, Van Fleet believed that the six ROK divisions in the east-the 5th and 7th in the right portion of the X Corps' sector, the 9th and 3rd in the ROK III Corps' sector, and the Capital and 11th in the ROK I Corps' sector, could hold the line since opposing KPA forces were weak and the terrain barriers of the higher Taebaek Mountains favored defense. Along with his 30 April instructions for the defense of the No-Name Line, Van Fleet ordered intensive patrolling to locate and identify PVA/KPA formations as they continued to move out of contact. Patrols searching above the front during the first two days of May, however, encountered no major PVA/KPA force except at the I Corps' left where ROK 1st Division patrols found the KPA 8th Division deployed along Route 1. To deepen the search in the west and central areas, Van Fleet ordered patrol bases set up out along a line reaching east as far as Route 24 in the X Corps' sector. Each division fronted by this line was to establish a regimental combat team in a base position organized for perimeter defense. Patrols operating from the bases could work farther north with full fire support, and the forward positions would deepen the defense in the sectors where Van Fleet expected to be most heavily attacked. While the fortification of the No-Name Line continued, the front east of Route 24 was to be advanced to the Missouri Line, both to restore contact and to clear a stretch of Route 24 and a connecting secondary road angling east to the coast for use as a supply route by the ROK divisions defending the sector. Van Fleet also directed a foray to destroy KPA forces in the I Corps' west sector after the 8th Division stopped short the ROK 12th Regiment, 1st Division's attempt to establish a patrol base up Route 1 on 4 May. The six ROK divisions in the east opened the advance toward the Missouri Line on 7