of concentration of Blücher's army, and was already in front of the chosen position, before that concentration could be accomplished; he was also operating with another portion upon the high road to Brussels, and had come in contact with the left of Wellington's troops; he had also placed himself so far in advance upon this line that even a partial junction of the forces of the Coalition commanders was already rendered a hazardous operation, without first retreating back towards Brussels, and he thus had it in his power to bring the principal weight of his arms against the one, whilst, with the remainder of his force, he held the other at bay. This formed the grand object of his operations on the next day. William Siborne was also of the opinion that however excellent, or even perfect, this plan of operation may appear in theory, still there were other circumstances, which, if taken into consideration, put the outcome in jeopardy for the French. Napoleon's troops had been constantly under arms, marching and fighting, since 02:00 in the morning, (the hour at which they broke up from their position at Solre-sur-Sambre, Beaumont, and Philippeville, within the French frontier) so they required time for rest and refreshment. They lay widely scattered between their advanced posts and the Sambre. Ney's forces were in detached bodies from Frasnes as far as Marchienne au Pont, the halting place of d'Erlon's Corps; and although Vandamme's Corps was in the Fleurus Woods, Lobau's Corps and the Imperial Guards were halted at Charleroi, and Gisraed's Corps at Chatelet. Hence, instead of an imposing advance, with the first glimmering of the dawn on 16 June, the whole morning would necessarily be employed by the French in effecting a closer junction of their forces, and in making their preparatory dispositions for attack. This interval of time was to be invaluable to the Coalition's generals, for it allowed them time to concentrate sufficient force to hold Napoleon in check, and to frustrate his design of defeating them in detail. Given the inability of the Prussians to concentrate at Ligny before dawn on 16 June, if Napoleon had instilled more vigour in his corps commanders he could have destroyed the Prussian corps individually before they could concentrate or forced them to retreat away from Wellington's army, allowing him to turn on his other enemy. William Siborne compares the relative laxity of Napoleon's