bombs soon detonated in succession. Several minutes after those detonations, a bomb rack exploded with three Mark 82 bombs. This blast tore a hole into the flight deck about in diameter and ruptured a fuel tank mounted on a KA-3B tanker aircraft; the ensuing fireball spread the fire farther. A total of 18 explosions occurred, blowing eight holes into the flight deck and beyond. The nuclear-powered cruiser and destroyer came to the stricken carrier's aid. It took the combined crews of the three ships about four hours to extinguish the fires. Aftermath Bainbridge escorted Enterprise to Pearl Harbor that afternoon. After 51 days of repairs, Enterprise continued its regularly scheduled deployment. The carrier returned to Alameda on July 2, 1969. This was the last of three major fires to befall U.S. aircraft carriers in the 1960s. It followed a fire aboard USS Oriskany on October 26, 1966, that killed 44 sailors and injured 156 more; and a fire aboard USS Forrestal on July 29, 1967, that killed 134 sailors and injured 161. The Forrestal fire was also started by a Zuni rocket which was accidentally launched into parked aircraft by a power surge, igniting a fuel fire that began to "cook off" bombs. Procedural improvements after the Forrestal fire helped reduce damage and casualties in the Enterprise fire. Investigation A JAG Manual investigation began immediately after the fire, in accordance with Navy policy. The investigation determined that the initial explosion was caused by the huffer exhaust overheating the Zuni rocket. Investigators also determined that an airman had observed the exhaust and had raised concerns about the placement of the huffer, but personnel were involved in other tasks and may not have completely understood what was being said due to the ambient noise on the flight deck. However, the investigators also noted that moving the unit might not have prevented the initial explosion due to the estimated temperature of the rocket by that time. The investigation also revealed that flight deck personnel did not have an understanding of ordnance cook-off times or an appreciation of the hazards posed by live ordnance on the flight deck. The Forrestal investigation revealed that only half of the ship's crew and none of the air wing had attended firefighting school. When the Enterprise fire erupted, 96 percent of the ship's crew had attended firefighting training, along with 86 percent of the air wing. Lack of