employed their direct and indirect fire support to inflict heavy casualties. Nevertheless, the Japanese achieved a degree of tactical success, albeit briefly. On 18 October, a party of Japanese broke through to Siki Cove, where Australian anti-aircraft gunners and artillerymen were forced to fire over "open sights" and fight back with small arms, after coming under fire from troops that had gotten under the guns. That night, the Japanese cut the 2/17th Infantry Battalion's supply route, establishing a road block astride the Jivevaneng–Sattelberg road, and cutting off the Australians defending Jivevaneng. The 2/17th and a number of other Australian units, such as most of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion, as well as part of the 2/28th, became isolated behind Japanese lines. In order to keep them supplied, emergency air drops of ammunition were flown in by pilots of No. 4 Squadron RAAF. Presented with the ambiguity of the situation, the commander of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion withdrew one of his outposts, while Brigadier Bernard Evans, commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade, also contracted his position around the beachhead, and in doing so subsequently granted the Japanese the prime position of Katika. The Australian divisional commander, Wootten, was enraged by the decision and subsequently lambasted his commander via radio. In response, the 2/13th Infantry Battalion detached two companies from rear area security and sent them north, while the 2/28th Infantry Battalion launched a counterattack against the Japanese around Katika, which – supported by artillery – successfully regained the position. Nevertheless, largely the fighting went in favour of the Allies, and finally the Japanese assault ground to a halt. Despite forcing a contraction of the Australian forces defending the beachhead, on 21 October the Japanese withdrew from Siki Cove, although the fighting around Katika continued for four more days as the Japanese attempted to retake it. Fierce resistance from the 2/28th halted them and eventually the attack was called off on 24 October, with the Japanese having suffered heavily due to tactical deficiencies, poor co-ordination and operational security, and a lack of artillery. Meanwhile, the Allied response was hampered by poor working relationships at some of the highest levels between Australian and US commanders – particularly between I Corps commander Lieutenant General Edmund Herring and the VII Amphibious Force commander Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey – the lack of a unified command structure, over cautiousness amongst naval staff, and a poor appreciation of