anticommons. Justice Abella indicates that her judgement contemplates the tragedy of the anticommons when at paragraph 71 she cites the "aftermath of the litigation in New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001)." In Tasini, the facts were very similar to those in Robertson and freelance authors got a judgement to prevent The New York Times from posting their articles online. The New York Times reacted to this judgement by simply deleting the articles because of the huge cost of locating and negotiating with each freelancer individually for the right to re-post the articles online. As a consequence, the public was no longer able to consult those articles. Furthermore, a non-comprehensive database is not as valuable as a comprehensive database. The corollary is that if the newspaper was to locate all of the owners of the copyright in the individual articles, there will be an incentive for each individual copyright holder to hold out because the last person to agree has far more bargaining power. So, the default rule in s. 13(1) works well looking forward, but it creates a huge amount of transaction costs when looking backwards. For this reason, the corollary of the Coase theorem that the initial allocation of rights is important when transaction costs are high might suggest that Justice Abella's conclusion in Robertson is far more efficient then would be a straightforward application of section 2.1(2) of the Copyright Act. Further reading References Canadian copyright law