the deductible before Fire Exchange could retain any of the amount collected from the children's insurers. When Fire Exchange refused to forward the additional 5% to Birch, he initiated a class action in the district court on behalf of himself and other similarly situated policy holders. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fire Exchange and Birch appealed. Birch claimed that Utah Supreme Court precedent required that he be “made whole” before Fire Exchange could retain any of the amounts obtained through subrogation. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected Birch's argument, holding as a matter of first impression that he had been made whole. The Court of Appeals noted that Birch actually lost depreciated property worth $7346.26. Due to his insurance contract with Fire Exchange, Birch was entitled to more than the value of the property at the time it was destroyed in replacement value, minus his deductible. Fire Exchange paid Birch $7232.91 in replacement value and $475 to reimburse his deductible for a total of $7707.91. Because the total Birch received was $361.65 more than his actual losses of $7346.26, the Court of Appeals concluded that he had been made whole and affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Fire Exchange. Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50, 131 P.3d 280, affirmed, 2007 UT 74, 171 P.3d 411. State highway patrol trooper, Richard Fordham, brought an action against Ryan Oldroyd, a motorist whose negligence caused a traffic accident to which Fordham responded in an official capacity. While Trooper Fordham was retrieving flares from the trunk of his patrol car to mark the Oldroyd accident, an approaching driver lost control of her care and struck Fordham, inflicting substantial injuries. Trooper Fordham sued Oldroyd for the injuries he incurred when struck by the third party's vehicle, claiming that Oldroyd's negligence caused Fordham to be at the scene of the accident when the other vehicle lost control. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Oldroyd and Fordham appealed. The Court of Appeals noted that this case presented Utah's first opportunity to consider whether the professional-rescuer doctrine operates to bar a police officer's claim against the party whose negligence cause the officer to be present at the scene, but where the officer's injuries are actually inflicted by a third party. Under the doctrine, a professional-rescuer, such as a police officer, cannot recover for