Deck's case. Dissent In the dissent, delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas and joined by Justice Scalia, it was stated that shackling Deck was not excessive as he had already been convicted, and since the jury knew of Deck's conviction, his shackling would not have shocked the members of the jury. With regard to the shackles biasing the jury, Thomas stated, “shackles may undermine the factfinding process only if seeing a convicted murderer in them is prejudicial.” Thomas writes, "[t]o presume that such a defendant suffers prejudice by appearing in handcuffs at sentencing does not comport with reality." He pointed out that the majority had put forth no evidence to support the claim that the shackles prevented Deck from participating in his defense, including taking the stand, or "that the shackles caused him pain." The dissent stated that, since Deck was convicted of capital crimes, his behavior may not have been predictable. The dissenting justices believed "he could turn that ire on his own counsel, who has failed in defending his innocence." The dissenting justices also suggested there was a possibility that Deck could have tried to harm a witness or a reporter. Thomas argued that the opinion of the majority went against common sense and that the decision paid little attention to courtroom security issues. Later in his opinion, Thomas stated "there was no consensus that supports elevating the rule against shackling to a federal constitutional command." He argued "there is no tradition barring the use of shackles or other restraints at sentencing." He referenced then-recent court rulings which had articulated that the "rule against visible shackled does not apply to sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 350 (Utah 1993); Duckett v. State, 104 Nev. 6, 11, 752 P.2d 752, 755 (1988) (per curiam); State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St. 3d 1, 18—19, 776 N. E. 2d 26, 46—47 (2002)" He discussed the three decisions which the majority had cited in their opinion. Thomas stated, "in recent years, more of a consensus regarding the use of shackling has developed, with many courts concluding that shackling is inherently prejudicial. But rather than being firmly grounded in deeply rooted principles, that consensus stems from a series of ill-considered dicta…the current consensus that the court describes is one of its own making. It depends almost exclusively on the dicta in the Courts' opinions in Holbrook, Estelle and Allen." In Deck's