case in general, in that the facts of the case did not create a stereotypical Quistclose trust; this causes problems with applying Millett's analysis. Express trust The second possibility is that Quistclose trusts are express trusts. If the contract included a provision that the money was to only be used for certain purposes, it could be interpreted that this money is held on trust until it is used for those purposes. The borrower would be a trustee; using the money for any other purpose would be in violation of the trustee's duties, and so void. This trust would be created as soon as the contract is agreed, with the normal requirement for it to be validly created. Two problems with this are that it has not been upheld by the English courts, and that the courts would require those explicit terms to be part of the contract; Hudson considers it the most advantageous however, because it would offer the simplest protection of the money by not requiring the contract to be breached for the trust to come into existence. In Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd, the courts considered a situation similar to Quistclose, in that a loan agreement was made where the borrowers explicitly agreed to follow guidelines on the use of the money, something they failed to do. The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords refused to constitute any kind of trust or return the money however, applying Lord Wrenbury's judgment in Palmer v Carey, when he said that "such a stipulation will not amount to an equitable assignment". Constructive trust The third main theory is that Quistclose trusts could be constructive trusts, which are created when the future trustee uses the money in an "unconscionable" manner. In Quistclose situations, the requirement of "unconscionableness" could be met by the borrower using the money for a purpose other than the one for which it was lent, allowing the lender to claim an equitable interest in it. In Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd, the Quistclose trust principle was said by Peter Gibson J. to be that "equity fastens on the conscience of the person who receives from another property transferred for a specific purpose only and not therefore for the recipient's own purposes, so that such person will not be permitted to treat the property as his own or to use it for other