IMF approaches its preferred mechanism — a bank tax tied to systemic risks — is astonishing for such a knowledgeable institution, unless it is in fact designed to let the financial sector off the hook." He argues that the FAT and FSC do not reduce the overall risk in the system, and may increase it if banks are encouraged to feel that the taxes provide a government guarantee of future bailouts. Nonetheless, a 2010 Tulane Law Review article lent lukewarm support to President Obama's Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee, which is a "bank tax" similar to the FSC. The Tulane article concluded that taxing financial transactions would be "foolish", and that a bank tax "could constitute shrewd regulatory reform if done properly." Who pays the bank tax? The issue of tax incidence is discussed since it is unclear who bears the burden of bank taxation. However, an increase in taxes will increase borrowing rates for businesses and creditors without reducing bank income if banks are able to pass their taxes on to their customers. This would be counter to policymakers' goals of taxing banks to recoup bailout costs linked to the crisis, as well as taxing banks' economic rents due to potential implicit bailout guarantees. See also Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee Bank Capital levy Currency transaction tax Financial transaction tax List of G-20 summits Robin Hood tax Spahn tax Tax Tobin tax Transfer tax References Banking Business taxes International taxation