the concept of France (whatever that might be).” Smith's alternative to concepts as units is based on a realist orientation, when scientists make successful claims about the types of entities that exist in reality, they are referring to objectively existing entities which realist philosophers call universals or natural kinds. Smith's main argument - with which many followers of the concept theory agree - seems to be that classes cannot be determined by introspective methods, but must be based on scientific and scholarly research. Whether units are called concepts or universals, the problem is to decide when a thing (say a "blackbird") should be considered a natural class. In the case of blackbirds, for example, recent DNA analysis have reconsidered the concept (or universal) "blackbird" and found that what was formerly considered one species (with subspecies) are in reality many different species, which just have chosen similar characteristics to adopt to their ecological niches (Fjeldså 2013, 141). An important argument for considering concepts the basis of classification is that concepts are subject to change and that they changes when scientific revolutions occur. Our concepts of many birds, for example, have changed with recent development in DNA analysis and the influence of the cladistic paradigm - and have demanded new classifications. Smith's example of France demands an explanation. First, France is not a general concept, but an individual concept. Next, the legal definition of France is determined by the conventions that France has made with other countries. It is still a concept, however, as Leclercq (1978) demonstrates with the corresponding concept Europe. Hull (1998) continued: "Two fundamentally different sorts of classification are those that reflect structural organization and those that are systematically related to historical development." What is referred to is that in biological classification the anatomical traits of organisms is one kind of classification, the classification in relation to the evolution of species is another (in the section below, we expand these two fundamental sorts of classification to four). Hull adds that in biological classification, evolution supplies the theoretical orientation. Methods of classification Ereshefsky (2000) presented and discussed three general philosophical schools of classification: "essentialism, cluster analysis, and historical classification. Essentialism sorts entities according to causal relations rather than their intrinsic qualitative features." These three categories may, however, be considered parts of broader philosophies. Four main approaches to classification may be distinguished: (1) logical and rationalist approaches including "essentialism"; (2) empiricist