from 12 December 1917, killed 27 August 1918 Lt-Col R.C. Reeves, 1 September 1918 to demobilisation 39th (Deptford) DAC Lt-Col A.E.S. Griffin, 26 August 1915 to 10 August 1916 Col A.H. Carter, CMG, 11 August 1916 to 11 October 1918 Col F.W. Boteler, 13 October 1918 to demobilisation DTMO Capt O.C.K. Corrie, North Somerset Yeomanry, 25 April 1916 to 1 June 1917 Capt T. Mulligan, from 1 June 1917 to disbandment 137th (Deptford) Heavy Battery, RGA 137th (Deptford) Heavy Battery and its ammunition column were raised at Deptford as part of 39th Divisional Artillery in August 1915. It was taken over by the military authorities on 17 January 1916. By the time 39th Division embarked for France, the policy was to remove heavy batteries from infantry divisions and concentrate them into heavy artillery groups (HAGs). 137th Heavy Bty, equipped with four 60-pounder guns, went out to the Western Front in April 1916, joined I ANZAC Corps Heavy Artillery on 27 April but transferred to III Corps HA the next day. It was assigned to 22nd HAG with Fourth Army on 3 May, then to 34th HAG with Second Army on 9 June, and therefore missed the Battle of the Somme. However, because Second Army held the Ypres Salient, low-level trench warfare was constant. Vimy Ridge 137th (Deptford) Hvy Bty was made up to six guns on 9 November 1916 when it was joined by a section from 173rd Heavy Bty, formed at Woolwich on 8 May 1916, which had just landed in France. The battery was sent to 21st HAG with Fourth Army on 17 March 1917, but transferred to 15th HAG with First Army four days later. This HAG was assigned to I Corps and situated behind Aix-Noulette as a counter-battery (CB) group for the Battle of Vimy Ridge. First Army's commander, Gen Henry Horne, was himself a gunner and took a personal interest in the artillery preparation. The dedicated CB groups were provided with observation aircraft (the BE 2's of No 2 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps with I Corps), flash-spotters and sound-rangers, as well as their own Forward Observation Officers (FOOs). After the battle it was established that 86 per cent of the 212 active German batteries had been accurately located, despite bad weather and the new period of German air superiority (known to the RFC as Bloody April). The CB batteries began their systematic fire programmes on