as early as late 1985, a claims could not arise until Burger King Corporation actually allowed the Marriott Corporation to open the new franchise itself, or at least until an agreement was entered by both Burger King and Marriott that indicated both had intention to open the new franchise at the contentious location. As the site selection for the new franchise was in question as late as February 1987, and a franchise agreement between Burger King Corporation and Marriott was not entered until June 30, 1987, any attempt by Scheck even to enjoin Burger King before May 1986 would have been dismissed as not yet ripe . Judge Hoeveler thus denied Burger King's motion for summary judgement under the release by prior agreement theory. Summary judgement through statute of frauds defense Burger King also raised the statute of frauds as defense and motion for summary judgement with respect to all of Scheck's claims, arguing that the claims are contingent on an exclusive territory agreement, which was found by the court to not meet statutory requirements, as it was unwritten and not susceptible of performance, nor intended to be performed, in less than one year The Court found that Scheck did not assert breach of an oral exclusive territory agreement, nor entitlement to an exclusive territory. Rather, as was previously settled, Scheck claimed a breach of duties that were implied in the Franchise Agreement. Thus, the court did not acknowledge the finding of an "independent contract" which would have governed territorial exclusivity, and denied summary judgment pertaining to a statute of frauds defense. Discussion Respecting count I: Implied non-competition agreement Scheck alleged that when his original Lee site was purchased from Burger King it came with an implied promise of general non-competition, and a specific promise not to establish a franchise at the Howard Johnson location. Florida law prohibits express or implied contracts that restrain trade, but allows an exception where the good will of a business the value of the business's reputation in the community is part of a sale. Burger King argued that summary judgment must be entered in its favor respecting Count I as there was no sale of a business or good will. Rather, the statute would only extend to the sale of the Lee real estate proper, "from which one may nt imply a covenant of non-competition". The court acknowledged the good faith of Burger King's