that violate their religious convictions as the owners of Hobby Lobby faced. FLI also dismissed the Third Circuit's claim that the effect on non-religious parties for enforcing RFRA had to be weighed in any decision invoking it. The Court had worried that finding for the religious objectors "would impose an undue burden on nonbeneficiaries—the female employees who will lose coverage for contraceptive care." FLI held that such thinking "advanced the dangerous and legally incorrect idea that third party 'harm' supersedes RFRA's protections for religious objectors—virtually nullifying RFRA. …RFRA would have no meaning if it only applied where no other interest competed with the religious objector's interest." Again it cited Burwell V. Hobby Lobby, according to which "[I]t could not reasonably be maintained that any burden on religious exercise…is permissible under RFRA so long as the relevant legal obligation requires the religious adherent to confer a benefit on third parties." FLI wrote, "the notion that third party harm vetoes any interest in religious toleration is a prevalent deception RFRA opponents advance, but RFRA is by nature a burden-shifting standard. …in structuring and passing RFRA, Congress accepted the consequence that religious tolerance may sometimes affect third parties. …the lower court flipped RFRA on its head by mandating that the government find a means of applying RFRA that is least restrictive on third parties, not least restrictive on religious objectors." Liberty Counsel also denied that there was any "compelling governmental interest" in the mandate that a person trying to apply RFRA would have to note. It cast the mandate's effects as "a newly minted 'right' of free employer-provided contraceptives, which in reality is nothing more than a convenience. …not necessary for public order or the common good". FLI argued that the government had failed to use "the least restrictive means" as demanded by RFRA as it had already "exempted many entities from providing contraception without any Accommodation process" including houses of worship, religious orders, and self-run insurance plans that were owned and operated by religious groups (referred to as "Church Plans"). Therefore, when it came to religious nonprofits, the government had no justification to force them "to comply with either the Contraceptives Mandate or the Accommodation against their sincere religious beliefs." FLI held that the mandate "manifests an aggressive effort to compel the religious objector to assimilate with popular secular beliefs", and the lower jurisdictions' ruling in its favor "converts the federal courts