of the submarine cables in the areas in which he fished. Peracomo Inc. was liable for Mr. Vallée’s actions, not only vicariously, but also personally. Vallée did not own or consult any of the maritime charts of Zone 17, as required under Canadian law. while the Marine Liability Act provided for liability to be capped at $500,000 for property damage caused by ships similar in size to the Realice, art. 4 of the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims provides that the cap does not apply where a loss resulted from a person’s intentional or reckless conduct. coverage of the loss through the appellants' insurance policy was excluded by the Marine Insurance Act, because cutting the cable fell within the statutory exclusion from marine liability insurance for "wilful misconduct". The Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling. In his ruling, Létourneau JA also held that, under existing precedent, employees, officers and directors will be held personally liable for tortious conduct causing property damage even when their actions are pursuant to their duties to the corporation. In addition, the Convention contemplates such scenarios. Vallée appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, and leave to appeal was granted in January 2013. At the Supreme Court In a 4-1 ruling, the appeal was allowed in part. In relation to the appellants’ limitation of liability, the appeal was allowed with costs but including only one-half of their costs of the leave application. The appellants’ joint and several liability is limited by the Convention. In relation to the claim against the insurer, the appeal was dismissed with costs including its costs of the leave application. In his ruling, Cromwell J held that: Corporate personality is not a relevant consideration in this case, since Vallée was personally negligent in cutting the cable. Therefore, the company was liable as a result of his acts, not the other way around. The courts below were correct in holding Vallée personally liable. The Federal Court of Appeal gave a narrow interpretation to the intent requirement under art. 4 of the Convention, effectively stating that all that was required to break the limit on liability is knowledge that one is interfering with property. Such an approach undermines the Convention’s purpose to establish a virtually unbreakable limit on liability and does not accord with its text. While the threshold to break liability under the Convention requires intention or recklessness with