bridge into Abbeville. To stop the rout, the German commanders ordered the 5th Company and other unreliable units out of the bridgehead, so that troops holding firm, such as the 2nd and 6th companies, would not be affected. Erich von Manstein, the XXXVIII Corps commander, was warned and rallied the personnel in Abbeville. Günther von Kluge, the 4th Army commander, informed by Manstein that a "rather serious crisis" had developed, consented to an evacuation of the pocket, should this become unavoidable. The 2nd Motorised Infantry Division at Rue was alerted and sent out advance parties to reconnoitre. The orderly withdrawals over the bridge were seen by the French and at noon, De Gaulle issued an order announcing the German abandonment of the bridgehead and that the 4e DCr should immediately exploit this by advancing towards the river. The French advance came to a halt and at the Char B1 battalions asked for an artillery bombardment of the German defences on Mont de Caubert, to destroy the but this did not begin until Allied attacks at the west flank of the pocket at Cambron were stopped by close-range fire from The R35 battalion did not advance and the German commanders sent the rallied troops back over the river to raise their morale by conducting counter-attacks. The German advance southwards from Mont de Caubert was repulsed by -fire from the Char B1s but the tanks were forced to expose themselves to the German guns and lost another four vehicles; by late afternoon only seven Char B1s were operational. German counter-attacks around Cambron became so threatening, despite the deployment of a battalion of the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, that French cavalry tanks were moved from the east to the west side of the bridgehead to repulse them; a lull fell in the evening. The failure of the French, completely to reduce the bridgehead, was caused by the German defenders, fatigue of the troops, tank losses and a false impression given in the order by De Gaulle, that the battle had already been won. The French had overrun about half of the bridgehead, inflicted severe casualties on German officers and NCOs, taken about and routed more than two infantry battalions of the 57th Infantry Division (Lieutenant-General Oskar Blümm). After three hours, the German infantry had rallied and reoccupied their positions unopposed; the offensive ended on 30 May, the French having lost in three days.