left flank, the 3rd Armoured Brigade was able to reach high ground near Cambron and Saigneville and the edge of St Valery-sur-Somme on the coast. There was no infantry to follow up and consolidate the ground and the tanks were ordered to retire when the French were found to be digging in behind them at Behen, Quesnoy and Brutelles. The 1st Armoured Division suffered losses, with some recovered and caused by lack of maintenance. Among the tanks put out of action were Tanks Mk VI and Minor repairs could be undertaken locally but more substantial work had to be done at the divisional workshops south-west of Rouen, where repairs were slowed by a lack of spares. 28 May The French divisions on the Bresle attacked again, captured some German outposts and reached the Somme on both sides of the German bridgehead but failed to capture Abbeville and St Valery. The 1st Armoured Division recovered from its attack and reorganised, the 9th Lancers going into reserve and the remnants of the Bays and 10th Hussars being formed into a Composite Regiment of the 2nd Armoured Brigade. Georges sent Instruction 1809, reminding French commanders that the 1st Armoured Division was analogous to a French (DLM, mechanised light division) and not suitable for attacks on prepared positions. It should be used with the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division on the left flank of IX Corps. The 4e DCr arrived, which although improvised, incomplete and having suffered many losses earlier in counter-attacks at the Battle of Montcornet (17 May), was much more powerful than the French cavalry divisions used hitherto and could field cars (32 Char B1s, 65 Renault R35s, 20 SOMUA S35s, 20 Hotchkiss H35 modèle 39s and 14 Panhard 178s). The 4e DCr attacked on 28 May, either side of the Blangy–Abbeville road but was held up by the anti-tank defences in woods and a ridge running north-west from Villers sur Mareuil. The German front line was held by two battalions of reinforced by two companies of the with an establishment of forty-eight The 4e DCr lacked heavy artillery and infantry for consolidation, having only four battalions of motorised infantry and about seventy-two which could inflict little damage on prepared positions. The French attack was preceded by an artillery bombardment, about shells being fired on Huppy, about 83 rounds per gun. At two battalions of Char B1s advanced towards the German positions and