findings indicated that Waxtan had been hurriedly hired by Dana Air. The performance assessment also indicated that he had been hurriedly trained to immediately fly the MD-83, even though there were plenty of notes about Waxtan's unsatisfactory performance. Findings related to Captain Waxtan's recruitment eventually led to more discovery on the corporate culture within Dana Air. The Quality Department of Nigeria's Dana Air had never been involved in the recruitment process of foreign pilots. Interviews by former pilots further revealed issues regarding the maintenance culture within Dana Air. According to the interviews, there was a habit for Dana Air crew to not enter flight defects into the technical logbook. Several of these malpractices had been conducted by senior Dana Air pilots. Most of the interviewees were pilots who had either been kicked out of the company or had decided to quit due to the issues. The Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, the regulatory body for Nigerian aviation safety, was supposed to oversee the operation of every airliners in Nigeria. The fact that there were malpractices inside the aviation industry proved that there were ineffective oversight on airliners in the country. The AIB eventually asked the NCAA to intensify the safety oversight of the country's aviation sector. Final report On 13 March 2017, a 210-page final report by Nigeria's AIB into the crash was released and made public. The investigation identified the following Probable Causal Factors: 1. Engine number one lost power 17 minutes into the flight, and thereafter on final approach, engine number two lost power and failed to respond to throttle movement on demand for increased power to sustain the aircraft in its flight configuration. 2. The inappropriate omission of the use of the checklist, and the crew’s inability to appreciate the severity of the power-related problem, and their subsequent failure to land at the nearest suitable airfield 3. Lack of situational awareness, inappropriate decision making, and poor airmanship The AIB issued several recommendations to the involved parties, mainly to Dana Air. Nigeria's NCAA was ordered to intensify its oversight, particularly on Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO). The FAA was asked to ensure Pratt & Whitney to re-categorize the issuance of the service bulletin to mandatory and to re-design the shimming and installation of the manifold assembly to remain foolproof and to prevent incorrect installation. Aftermath On 3 June 2013, the government of Lagos unveiled a memorial cenotaph for the