Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139 (2010), was a United States Supreme Court decision on the applicability of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. It further examined issues of previous court decisions on jury instructions and the effectiveness of counsel. Background Frank Spisak Jr. (June 6, 1951 – February 17, 2011) was an American serial killer who was convicted of three murders and one attempted murder at Cleveland State University. In 1982, he decided that he wanted to be like Hitler. In February 1982, Spisak embarked on a racist, anti-Semitic shooting spree, calling it his first "seek and destroy mission" in which he was attempting to "clean up the city". On February 1, 1982, Spisak shot Reverend Horace Rickerson, a 57-year-old black man, seven times. On June 4, 1982, he shot John Hardaway, another black man, seven times. On August 9, 1982, Spisak shot at Coletta Dartt, a white woman who he claimed had "made some derisive remarks about us," referring to the Nazi Party. Spisak missed and Dartt managed to escape. On August 27, 1982, he shot Timothy Sheehan, a white man who he thought was Jewish, four times. On August 30, he shot Brian Warford, a 17-year-old black youth, once in the head. Spisak was found guilty of three counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. During his murder trial, he grew a Hitler mustache and carried a copy of Mein Kampf. Spisak had an accomplice, Ronald Reddish, who aided him before the shootings. Reddish was convicted of one count of attempted murder and sentenced to 7 to 25 years in prison. He was paroled in 1990. His claims were denied by the State of Ohio in direct appeal and to the Ohio Supreme Court stating that his claim was "not well-taken on the basis of our review of the record". Spisak filed for habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. First he argued that the jury instructions at the penalty phase of trial unconstitutionally required the jury to consider in mitigation only factors that the jury unanimously found mitigating (violating Mills v. Maryland, 1988). Second he argued that he had suffered significant harm because his original counsel had given an inadequate closing argument during sentencing (violating Strickland v. Washington, 1984). The District Court subsequently denied his petition. The petition was accepted on appeal to the Sixth Circuit