was very tempting, and summoned a private meeting with senior family members to discuss the benefits and consequences of such an invasion. After several hours of debate, the majority of the Sardars came to the conclusion that they should upkeep their treaty with the British. As he was unwilling to see the consequences of sending the council's reply to Nasrullah Khan, Dost Mohammad stalled for time and did not inform the Bukharan ambassador, instead sending a message that implied neither direct consent nor disagreement to what was proposed. On 7 May, the Bukharan ambassador was given audience with Dost Mohammad once again, and he informed them of the treatment he received in Bukhara during the First Anglo-Afghan War when he was a fugitive on the run. According to Jonathan Lee, Dost Mohammad was quoted to have said: "How can I ... believe the word of the King of Bokhara and break so good a union as the one which I have made with the British. If I had known the King of Bokhara to be true, I would have never joined the British, and I well know that my own kingdom, and that of Bokhara, will one day be annexed to the British territories. I have therefore entered into an alliance ... with a view to keeping my country as long as possible." Henry Lawrence, the British resident in Lahore, having heard of the news of Dost Mohammad's decision, perceived it as a "god send" according to Jonathan Lee. According to Jonathan lee, Henry Lawrence remarked that: "It is clear that, if we had been on bad terms just now with Kabul, we should have lost, first Peshawar and then the Punjab and all India would have reeled under the blow." Numerous of the British officers who quelled the Sepoy uprising were from the Punjab and the Northwestern Frontier on Afghanistan, with many having experience as Junior officers in the First Anglo-Afghan War. Conquest of Qunduz and subjugation of Badakhshan (1858-1860) Despite being ordered by Dost Mohammad to conquer Qunduz in 1855 during his visit to Kabul, it was not until 1858 when Afzal Khan begin preparing for the campaign. In 1858, the opportunity to strike and seize Qunduz was advantageous, as Nasrullah Khan of Bukhara was unable to support the Mir Ataliq of Qunduz, and was dragged into a dispute with Kokand and further faced rebellions. In the spring