as were determined efforts for the U.S. to avoid BoP imbalances. Part of the reason was displacement of the previous dominant economic paradigm – Keynesianism – by the Washington Consensus, with economists and economics writers such as Murray Rothbard and Milton Friedman arguing that there was no great need to be concerned about BoP issues. In the immediate aftermath of the Bretton Woods collapse, countries generally tried to retain some control over their exchange rate by independently managing it, or by intervening in the foreign exchange market as part of a regional bloc, such as the Snake which formed in 1971. The Snake was a group of European countries who tried to retain stable rates at least with each other; the group eventually evolved into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) by 1979. From the mid-1970s however, and especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, many other countries followed the US in liberalizing controls on both their capital and current accounts, in adopting a somewhat relaxed attitude to their balance of payments and in allowing the value of their currency to float relatively freely with exchange rates determined mostly by the market. Developing countries who chose to allow the market to determine their exchange rates would often develop sizable current account deficits, financed by capital account inflows such as loans and investments, though this often ended in crises when investors lost confidence. The frequency of crises was especially high for developing economies in this era – from 1973 to 1997 emerging economies suffered 57 BoP crises and 21 twin crises. Typically but not always the panic among foreign creditors and investors that preceded the crises in this period was usually triggered by concerns over excess borrowing by the private sector, rather than by a government deficit. For advanced economies, there were 30 BoP crises and 6 banking crises. A turning point was the 1997 Asian BoP Crisis, where unsympathetic responses by western powers caused policy makers in emerging economies to re-assess the wisdom of relying on the free market; by 1999 the developing world as a whole stopped running current account deficits while the U.S. current account deficit began to rise sharply. This new form of imbalance began to develop in part due to the increasing practice of emerging economies, principally China, in pegging their currency against the dollar, rather than allowing the value to freely float. The resulting state