The Summerland disaster occurred when a fire spread through the Summerland leisure centre in Douglas on the Isle of Man on the night of 2 August 1973. Fifty people were killed and 80 seriously injured. The scale of the fire has been compared to those seen during the Blitz. Background Summerland was opened on 25 May 1971. It was a climate-controlled building covering on Douglas's waterfront, consisting of of floor area constructed at a cost of £2 million. The building's exterior and the interior were designed by two different architects—they did not coordinate their planning with each other and thereby created a venue with significant fire risks that were to become apparent only later. Summerland was designed to accommodate up to 10,000 tourists and consisted of a dance hall, five floors of holiday games, a rollerskating rink, restaurants and public bars. It was an example of Modernist architecture incorporating advanced controlled internal climate, built with novel construction techniques using new plastic materials. The street frontage and part of the roof was clad in Oroglas, a transparent acrylic glass sheeting. Fire The fire started at around 7:30 p.m. on 2 August 1973 when approximately 3,000 people were inside, and was caused by three boys who were smoking in a small disused kiosk, on the centre's miniature golf course and who told police it was likely started by a carelessly discarded match or stub. The burning kiosk collapsed against the exterior of the building. This part of the building was clad in a material called Galbestos: profiled steel sheeting with asbestos felt on both sides coated with bitumen, with no fire-resistant qualities. The fire spread to the wall's interior soundproofing material, which was highly combustible, causing an intense fire that ignited the flammable acrylic sheeting that covered the rest of the building. The fire quickly spread across the sheeting on the leisure centre walls and roof, and through vents which were not properly fireproofed. The acrylic material melted, allowing more oxygen to enter, and dropping burning molten material, both starting other fires and injuring those trying to escape. The building's open-plan design included many unblocked internal spaces that acted as chimneys, adding to the conflagration. There was no attempt to evacuate the 3,000 people present until the visible evidence of the flames prompted a panic-stricken mass rush for the exits. The fire was contained in an internal space within the walls until