proof demonstrators: Ford Aerospace (laser-beam riding), Hughes Aircraft Missile System Group (imaging infrared combined with a fiber-optic cable link) and Texas Instruments (imaging infrared). In late 1988, the POP phase ended and, in June 1989, the full-scale development contract was awarded to a joint venture of Texas Instruments and Martin Marietta (now Raytheon and Lockheed Martin). The AAWS-M received the designation of FGM-148. In April 1991, the first test-flight of the Javelin succeeded, and in March 1993, the first test-firing from the launcher succeeded. In 1994, low levels of production were authorized, and the first Javelins were deployed with US Army units in 1996. Test and evaluation Development test and evaluation is conducted to demonstrate the engineering design and development process is complete. It is used to reduce risk, validate, and qualify the design. It also ensures that the product is ready for government acceptance. The DT&E results are evaluated to ensure that design risks have been minimized and the system will meet specifications. Results are also used to estimate the system's military readiness when it is introduced into service. DT&E serves a critical purpose as it reduces the risks of hazards by testing selected high-risk components or subsystems. DT&E is the government developing agency tool used to confirm that the system performs as specified and that the system is ready for field testing. DT&E is an iterative process of designing, building, testing, identifying deficiencies, fixing, retesting, and repeating. It is performed in the factory, laboratory, and on the proving ground by the contractors and the government. Contractor and government testing is combined into one integrated test program and conducted to determine if the performance requirements have been met and to provide data to the decision authority. The General Accounting Office (GAO), since renamed Government Accountability Office, published a report questioning the adequacy of Javelin testing. The report, titled "Army Acquisition—Javelin Is Not Ready for Multiyear Procurement", opposed entering into full-rate production in 1997 and expressed the need for further operational testing due to the many redesigns undergone. In 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry had set forth five new operational test initiatives. These included: 1) getting operational testers involved early in development; 2) use of modeling and simulation; 3) integrating development and operational testing; 4) combining testing and training; and 5) applying concepts to demos and acquisitions. The late-phase development of the Javelin retroactively benefited from the then new