court order requiring Comcast to disclose Doe's identity. Comcast notifies Doe of the Cahills' request to disclose identity, as required by federal law. January 4, 2005: Doe files an "Emergency Motion for a Protective Order" to block Comcast from disclosing his identity to the Cahills. June 14, 2005: Superior Court trial judge denies Doe's motion for a protective order, using a "good faith" standard for "determining when a defamation plaintiff could compel the disclosure of the identity of an anonymous plaintiff." June 28, 2005: Doe appeals the decision by Superior Court and the case is accepted by the Delaware Supreme Court. Adoption of standard As this was the first trial of its kind, the court took upon itself the task of establishing an acceptable standard for deciding a discovery request to reveal the identity of an anonymous defendant alleged to have posted defamatory material on the internet by a public figure plaintiff. The court began by reviewing the possible spectrum of applicable standards over which the court must choose as the standard for this and similar cases. In ascending order the possible standards are "good faith basis to assert a claim, ...pleading sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, [and] ...showing of prima facie evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgement." The Superior Court permitted discovery of Doe's identity under the good faith standard. This good faith standard was famously applied in In re Subpoena to AOL, where the court concluded that anonymous identities should be revealed only if: The court is satisfied with pleadings and evidence The party bringing suit or subpoena had legitimate, good faith basis for actions The identity information is central to the claim The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with this standard. The court rejected the good faith standard due to the danger of bringing suit simply to reveal identity without any intention of pursuing the defamation action to a final decision. This, the court concluded, would have a chilling effect on free speech on the internet in contradiction to the First Amendment. The Supreme Court then turned to Ramunno v. Cawley as an example of the motion to dismiss standard being applied to a similar case. The court used Ramunno as an example of a motion to dismiss standard failing to screen "silly or trivial defamation suits." Thus, the court concluded, that in order to provide sufficient protection of anonymous internet speech