mistakes. The plurality opinion "provides more questions than answers, subjecting public employers to intolerable legal uncertainty", Scalia concluded. He went through all the hypothetical questions they would have to ask under the decision, and possible remedies that might be derived from it due to the lack of guidance on the question. "Loose ends are the inevitable consequence of judicial invention", he wrote. "We will spend decades trying to improvise the limits of this new First Amendment procedure that is unmentioned in text and unformed by tradition." Dissent For private-sector employees, Stevens wrote, the exercise of their First Amendment rights to speak on matters of public concern "may entail unpleasant consequences." But public employees were entitled to greater protections. "As long as that expression is not unduly disruptive, it simply may not provide the basis for discipline or termination." Stevens believed there was no real factual dispute as to the basis of Churchill's termination—the dinner-break conversation. The Court had to assume it was protected speech, per procedure, but the plurality had concluded that what mattered was that the hospital reasonably believed it was not. "This conclusion is erroneous because it provides less protection for a fundamental constitutional right than the law ordinarily provides for less exalted rights, including contractual and statutory rights applicable in the private sector." Had Churchill been a contractual employee, fired in the mistaken belief that she had failed to perform her job adequately, she would have been entitled to relief, he noted. "Ordinarily, when someone acts to another person's detriment based upon a factual judgment, the actor assumes the risk that an impartial adjudicator may come to a different conclusion". The Court, he noted, had done just that in National Labor Relations Board v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., when it upheld the board's order to reinstate two workers fired in the mistaken belief that they had threatened violence if a union certification vote failed. Stevens criticized Scalia's approach as derived solely from the use of the word "retaliation" in the cases Scalia had cited. In all those cases, there had been no factual dispute over the content of the speech. Two, Pickering and Perry v. Sindermann suggested that a "causal connection between the employee's speech and her discharge is all the 'retaliation' that must be shown." Stevens saw the issue in very stark terms. Since disagreements were among employees inevitable, the plurality's rule "invites discipline, rather than