had to be removed from several sites and entire houses were demolished, with their contents removed, examined and eventually destroyed. According to the official account, about 112,000 people were examined for radioactive contamination, 297 were found to have significant levels of radioactive material in or on their body, and 4 people died. However, these numbers are in dispute, as a victims’ association argues these statistics do not take into consideration the subsequent injuries and deaths resulting from the Goiânia accident. In April 2000, there was a leak of 5,000 m3 (176,573 ft3) of uranium liquor at the Lagoa Real industrial mining complex, located in Caetité, Bahia. INB, the company responsible for the facility, tried to keep the accident secret, but nine employees broke their silence six months later and informed authorities. In turn, INB was fined R$119,130 (US$57,600) and had its activities suspended from November 2000 to July 2001. On 28 May 2001, another leak of radioactive water occurred at Angra 1, this time 22,000 liters and attributed to human error. Authorities considered it a minor accident and stated that the workers and the residents of the area did not face contamination risks. In October 2001, uranium hexafluoride gas leaked at the Resende fuel factory due to a failure of the facility's safety and detection system. This radioactive, lethal gas invaded a 60 m2 (646 ft2) room but was contained. According to news reports, the gas leak did not affect any of the 450 workers or the 8,000 residents of the nearest district. However, the communities in the area nearby complained about not being informed about the accident. In April 2002, two INB workers told Caetité's Radio Educadora that another leak of uranium liquor had happened at "Area 170" but was being kept as a secret by INB. In Caetité, between January and June 2004 the reservoir for radioactive water flooded seven times, which spread liquid effluents of uranium-238, thorium-232 and radium-226 to the Riacho das Vacas creek and the surrounding environment. This accident motivated in loco, or on-the-spot, inspections of CNEN's Coordination of Nuclear Facilities (Coordenação de Instalações Nucleares – CODIN). The inspectors produced a technical report which listed various irregularities, such as constant overflows of contaminated water and inadequate excavation measures, which could lead to landslides and lack of hydro-geological studies to prevent the contaminated water from reaching the groundwater. Despite the critiques of the report, Caetité's mining