it would boost Brazil's international credibility. Additionally, Argentina had already joined the regime in 1995 and its membership consisted of nearly every country in the world. Accordingly, Brazil did not want to remain isolated. However, the legislative decree that formalized Brazilian's adhesion to the NPT linked it to the understanding that Article VI of the Treaty – which stipulated negotiations in good faith to cease the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, and the outcome of a treaty on complete disarmament under strict and effective international controls - would be fulfilled. Even though Brazil decided to join the regime, it continued to criticize the slow pace of disarmament and demanded balance between the obligation of non-proliferation and the obligation of disarmament. Brazil has been part of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), a group comprising seven states concerned with the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, since the coalition's inception in 1998. Considering itself as "the most active country regarding the nuclear disarmament cause," Brazil affirmed in its 2008 National Defense Strategy that "[it] will not adhere to amendments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons extending the restrictions of the Treaty, until the nuclear weapon states advance in the central premise of the Treaty: their own nuclear disarmament." In this sense, Brazil refuses to sign the Additional Protocol (AP), a voluntary legal instrument that complements comprehensive safeguards agreements and provides the IAEA broader rights of access to sites. Brazilian attitude toward the nuclear order is underscored by its strong defense of the right of any NPT signatory to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as was demonstrated on the occasion of the 2010 Tehran Declaration between Brazil, Turkey and Iran. Safeguards The nuclear safeguards in place in Brazil are under the oversight of ABACC and the IAEA, per the provisions of the 1991 Quadripartite Agreement. There are 25 facilities in Brazil under the ABACC and IAEA safeguards. As a verification measure of Brazil's declared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities, ABACC and IAEA perform different types of inspections – including unannounced, short-notice, and physical inventory verification – and carry out ongoing monitoring and evaluation. There were tensions between ABACC and the IAEA in 2004, when Brazil refused to allow IAEA inspectors to see the Resende facility's equipment on the grounds that Brazil needed to protect its commercial secrets. After months of impasse, Brazilian authorities reportedly agreed to allow increased