unlike Judge Wolchik, held neither tribal status nor aboriginal fishing rights could exist in the absence of a federal treaty. Opinion The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded Judge Wolchik's decision. The opinion's main legal innovation was holding that "[a]n historical event, although insufficient by itself to establish an extinguishment, may contribute to a finding of extinguishment when analyzed together with other events" and that "a century-long course of conduct may demonstrate extinguishment, even though the exact date on which Indian title is extinguished is difficult to determine." The court concluded that "a series of historical events, beginning with the Wentworth Grants of 1763, and ending with Vermont's admission to the Union in 1791, extinguished the aboriginal rights claimed here." Reception Legal commentary on the Elliott decision has been generally negative. According to Joseph William Singer, a professor at Harvard Law School: [I]t defies both precedent and the longstanding policy of protecting Indian title to conclude that Congress, by the simple admission of Vermont to the Union, casually obliterated all Abenaki title in the State of Vermont, whether currently settled by non-Indians or inhabited by Abenakis. Gene Bergman wrote in the American Indian Law Review: Elliot misinterprets Abenaki/Vermont history during the period from 1763 to 1791. An honest account of history would not have found extinguishment under the traditional rules. Hence, to avoid this conclusion, the Vermont Court created a radical new test that undermines the United States Supreme Court's rules and purposes protecting aboriginal title. . . .Essentially, the court changed the test from an examination of intent/purpose to a review of cumulative effects. Under this new test, a sovereign need not have known that the consequences of an act would eliminate aboriginal title. Therefore, if the sovereign unleashed forces which eventually frustrated Indian occupancy, Elliot would find extinguishment in that act. Elliot implicitly holds that the cumulative effects need not be manifested at the time of or near in time to the sovereign action. The functional result of Elliot is that courts will weigh the cumulative effects of a sovereign's action over a long time—say, 200 years. This removes the barrier prohibiting the light imputing of extinguishment. Elliot undermines the entire framework of aboriginal title law. According to John Lowndes: This controversial decision marks a clear departure from the longstanding aboriginal title doctrine expounded in the early nineteenth century by Chief Justice John Marshall and the United States