to protect British trawlers up to the 12-mile limit, provided that the total catch did not exceed . British trawler captains, eager to protect their nets, tried several tactics: Ramming of ICG vessels by trawlers. Although technically illegal under maritime law, the trawler Aldershot rammed the Ægir on 18 October 1972, north of Hraunhafnartangi. Brucella also tried ramming—on 28 December 1972—in an action against the Óǒinn to the east of Iceland. Using two trawlers to operate one trawl net. Both trawlers would sail in line astern formation; the first would fish while the second would attempt to fend off Icelandic vessels. Unfortunately, this not only cut the number of vessels engaged in fishing in half: it was also ineffective against Icelandic vessels, as the high standard of seamanship required to steer a heavy, unwieldy trawler in tight formation in rough Atlantic seas was simply too much for a civilian fisherman. The British government rented four tugs; Englishman, Irishman, Lloydsman and Statesman. These tugs were sent out with orders to protect the trawlers in the disputed area, but as the tugs were unarmed, both intentional and unintentional collisions were the only way to defend the trawlers. However, this method cost the British taxpayer a substantial amount in rent and fuel costs, and did not have the desired effect. Because of the failure of all the above tactics, British trawlers withdrew from Icelandic waters on 17 May 1973, citing fears for their own safety and livelihoods. They informed the British government that unless the Royal Navy were sent to protect them, they would not return to fishing in that area. Two days later, on 19 May, the government acquiesced, and a number of British frigates sailed north. Fishery Protection Squadron intervention After 19 May, three or four British frigates, four tugs, and as many as five Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessels were in the disputed area to protect an average of 46 trawlers from Icelandic harassment. In order to keep some on station at all times, seven frigates were taken from ordinary duties to be assigned to the squadron. In addition, several Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft were sent to the area, and the total manpower assigned was in the region of 2,000 personnel. The strategy used by the British was relatively straightforward: they marked out "fishing boxes" for use by trawlers, protected by high-speed frigates at the outer edges, and with the slower