goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin
The goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin uses a weak password for the QR broadcast message. If the QR broadcast message is captured over RF it is possible to decrypt it and use it to decrypt all future and past messages sent via encrypted broadcast. In the goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin application, the encryption keys are stored along with a static IV on the device. This allows for complete decryption of keys stored on the device. This allows an attacker to decrypt all encrypted broadcast communications based on broadcast keys stored on the device. The goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin use AES CTR mode for short, encrypted messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to any attacker that can access the message. The goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin does not encrypt the callsigns of its users. These callsigns reveal information about the users and can also be leveraged for other vulnerabilities. The goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin does not use SecureRandom when generating its cryptographic keys. The random function in use is not suitable for cryptographic use. In the goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin there is a vulnerability that makes it possible to inject any custom message with any GID and Callsign using a software defined radio in existing gotenna mesh networks. This vulnerability can be exploited if the device is being used in a unencrypted environment or if the cryptography has already been compromised. The goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin broadcast key name is always sent unencrypted and could reveal the location of operation. The goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin has a payload length vulnerability that makes it possible to tell the length of the payload regardless of the encryption used. goTenna Pro ATAK Plugin by default enables frequent unencrypted Position, Location and Information (PLI) transmission. This transmission is done without user's knowledge, revealing the exact location transmitted in unencrypted form.