CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application 60/408,107, filed Sep. 4, 2002, the entire contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference. 
    
    
     STATEMENT RE: FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH/DEVELOPMENT 
     (Not Applicable) 
     BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     The present invention relates generally to containers and more particularly to a smart and secure container. 
     Elements (e.g., containers, vessels, people) in international cargo transit (via air, sea or land) all host a potential threat. Examples of such threats include, but are not limited to: diverting a container from its planned route and exchanging cargo including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with a portion of the original content; sealing cargo containers that include WMD in the container; and the transport of one or more terrorists inside the container. It is highly desirable to minimize the risk of threat. It is also desirable to minimize potential threats by keeping elements that have a high probability of threat outside the intended target area/environment. 
     In February of 2002, Robert C. Bonner, the Commissioner of Customs stated that “[t]he Container Security Initiative consists of four core elements. These are: (1) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers; (2) pre-screening containers before they arrive at U.S. ports; (3) using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers; and (4) developing and using smart and secure containers.” 
     The development and use of smart and secure containers should employ technologies that eliminate the highest percent possible of the non-threatening cargo transit elements in order for the physical security interdiction and verification to take place on the real threat(s). The interdiction should take place at the farthest possible point from the intended target. In addition to the threats described above, additional concerns include the loading of non-smart containers onto a vehicle (e.g., ship); a non-smart container with WMD cargo being loaded onto the ship en route to the destination; and one or more smart containers being disabled or damaged en route. 
     Current containers include an electronic seal and global positioning system (GPS) location logging. The electronic seal not only provides a tamper detection function but can also be used to carry data related to the container (e.g., manifest). The GPS logging function permits detecting a deviation from the planned transit route at the destination point. Such a system utilizing only standalone electronic seals and GPS logging does not provide adequate security against a high-risk container (e.g., one in which the seal has been violated in transit or in which a suspicious route deviation has occurred). Such a system cannot identify a high-risk container while still en route (e.g., on the open ocean or in flight). In addition, such a system places an implicit trust in the individual(s) activating the electronic seal. 
     Thus, there is a need for a system that can detect and minimize the risk of high-risk containers. Such minimization of the risk includes detection of high-risk containers sufficiently early so that the container can be diverted from the intended target area. 
     BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     A smart container configured for transporting cargo on a transportation vehicle and a method for transporting the smart container on the transportation vehicle are disclosed. The smart container includes a container housing that has an opening for loading and unloading cargo. The opening can be sealed and unsealed. Disposed within the container housing is at least one detector for detecting deviations that could be indicative of possible threats (security concerns). A communications link is also disposed within the container housing. The communications link is capable of transmitting the possible threat information to a central cargo data collection location. For example, the container(s) on a transportation vehicle (e.g., a ship) transport information about the container to a central data collector onboard the ship. The central data collector may then transmit that information off of the ship, e.g., to a C4ISR grid. 
     The container may also include a logging device. The logging device stores information about the container. 
     The container may also include or be in communication with a global positioning system. The logging device may receive and store location information from the global positioning system. Such location information could be stored at periodic intervals. The periodic intervals could vary based on the location of the transportation vehicle as determined by the global positioning system. For example, such logging may occur more often in certain high-risk geographic areas. Such reporting could also occur more frequently as the transportation vehicle approached the destination. Another example of when the reporting frequency could increase is when potential threats have been identified. 
     The communications link may transmit information to the central cargo data collection location via at least one other smart container. Thus, the containers are configured in a chain-type fashion wherein information is forwarded through various containers and a final container in the chain transmits the information to the central cargo data collection location. 
     The container housing may be a conventional container housing that is retrofitted to have the at least one cargo contents detector and the communications link disposed within the conventional housing. The conventional container housing may include: a global positioning system location logging device disposed within the conventional container housing; and a commercial electronic seal configured to seal and unseal the container opening. 
     The commercial electronic seal may include a radio frequency identification tag and/or a tamper resistant member. 
     The detector may be a cargo contents detector, a container security detector, a route deviation detector or some combination thereof. 
     The contents cargo detector may be a container volumetric change detector, a WMD detector, a motion detector, or some combination thereof. 
     The volumetric change detector is configured to detect a deviation from a known volume of the cargo. This may be done using cargo profiling and/or reverberation measurements. The WMD detector is configured to detect materials comprising radioactive isotopes stored in the container. Such isotopes may be indicative of nuclear/radiological weapons, biological weapons and/or chemical/explosive weapons. 
     The motion detector is configured to detect cargo movement within the smart container. 
     The container security detector may be a breach detector, a door open/close detector or some combination thereof. 
     The breach detector is configured to detect unauthorized container entry, such as cutting of the container and/or container shell openings. 
     The door open/close detector is configured to detect container entry via the container opening. 
     The route deviation detector compares the current location of the transportation vehicle to the planned route to determine if there has been a significant deviation from the planned route. The current location information may be obtained from a global positioning system. 
     The method of transporting cargo in the container (such as the one described above) via a transportation vehicle to a destination point includes: (a) loading the cargo in a container that includes at least one container security detector for monitoring container security; (b) electronically sealing the container; (c) loading the container on the transportation vehicle; (d) transporting the cargo via the transportation vehicle; and (e) continuously monitoring container security during transit using the at least one container security detector. 
     The method may also include: (f) evaluating container security risk based on data collected while monitoring container security; (g) if the container security risk is high, taking corrective action; and (h) if the container security risk is not high: (i) proceeding to the destination point; and (ii) electronically unsealing the smart container. The corrective action taken when the container security risk is high may be not to proceed to the destination point. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       These as well as other features of the present invention will become more apparent upon reference to the drawings wherein: 
         FIG. 1  illustrates a hierarchical network of unmanned/unattended autonomous sensors that are in part embodied as smart and secure containers; 
         FIG. 2  illustrates exemplary subsystems of a communications and secure data infrastructure; 
         FIG. 3  illustrates a smart and secure container created by retrofitting an existing container; 
         FIG. 4  illustrates an exemplary system of operations for a smart container that is loaded on a ship. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
     Referring now to the drawings wherein the showings are for purposes of illustrating preferred embodiments of the present invention only, and not for purposes of limiting the same,  FIG. 1  illustrates a hierarchical network  10  of unmanned/unattended autonomous sensors that are in part embodied as smart and secure containers  12 . Collectively, the network  10  facilitates the risk analysis/response cycle with a timeline appropriate to interdicting the threat at a distance that protects the homeland. 
     The system  10  interrogates the vehicle&#39;s (e.g., ship&#39;s) contents and verifies shipping information. Automatic verification of shipping information against the manifest reduces the need for inspections, which reduces costs. The system includes a central station that has access to master cargo lists, ships&#39; travel history and links to Intel/law enforcement databases. This allows the system  10  to covertly collect data that may be provided to law enforcement agencies. 
     As shown in  FIG. 1 , the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) grid  16  includes one or more ships  14 . Each ship  14  includes one or more smart containers  12 . Collectively the sensor network  10  facilitates the risk analysis/decision/response cycle with a timeline appropriate to interdicting the threat at a distance that protects the homeland. 
     In exemplary embodiments, the smart container  12  is created by retrofitting an existing container  50  as shown in  FIG. 3 . Preferably, the existing container  50  that is retrofitted includes a GPS location logging device  52  and a commercial electronic seal  54 . In exemplary embodiments, the commercial electronic seal includes a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag, tamper detection of the electronic seal and a record of manifest. The record of manifest includes a description of the container contents (e.g., type of materials stowed in the container, weight of contents and/or volume of contents. The record of manifest may also include the destination and planned route for the container. 
     The off-the-shelf container  50  is a retrofitted with a self-contained package that consists of a set of sensors to detect Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats  60 , breaching  66 , gross alternation of contents  62 , deviation from planned routes  70 , as well as a means of localized communications  74 . Smart containers  12  exchange information not only each other but with the sensors on board the vehicle (e.g., ship)  14  and indirectly (via the ship  14 ) a global C4ISR grid  16 . Each of the smart containers  12  includes nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) sensors  60 . The containers  12  also include sensors for detecting volumetric changes  62 , weight changes, motion  64 , breach  66 , and route deviation  70 . The containers also include container communication links  74  for communicating with other containers  12  and with the vehicle (e.g., ship)  14  on which the container  12  is located. 
     Current containers  50  include a GPS location logging device  52  and a commercial electronic seal  54 . Current electronic seals provide the following functions: Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), tamper detection and record of manifest. Current electronic seals function like a padlock. The existing container  50  can be retrofitted to include various detectors. Motion and/or light detectors can be used to warn of any attempt to penetrate the container by bypassing the seal. The containers can also be retrofitted to include door open/close detection  68  and breaching detection  66 . Furthermore, a volumetric change detector  62  and/or weight change detector can be added to the container. A nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) detector  60  can be added to the container. In addition to various detectors, the container may include GPS based route verification  70 . The route verification compares the current location information to the planned route information. The planned route information may be stored, for example, in the record of manifest. 
     Volumetric change detectors  62  may include cargo profiling and/or reverberation measurements. Cargo profiling is similar to motion detection. A sensor is mounted in the ceiling of the container  12 . The detector map profiles the top of the cargo and can detect changes from the mapped profile of the top of the cargo. The cargo profiling can also detect changes in mass via strain sensors in the frame of the container. Multiple sensors may be used to measure profile across horizontal planes. Reverberation measurements adapt methods from architectural acoustics to characterize reverberation in container volume. Periodic measurements are taken and compared in order to detect changes in volume and/or weight. 
     Breaching detection  66  includes detection of cutting and/or openings in the container shell. Detection of cutting is accomplished via passive vibration. Accelerometers are mounted to the container shell. Data is sent to a low-power monitoring system. A vibration event triggers the system to wake up and evaluate the vibration. Strain sensors may be mounted on the container frame to detect changes in structure. Openings in the container shell are detected via active vibration, for example via ultrasound. Shakers/accelerometers are mounted to container shell test transmission paths through the shell (similar to current non-destructive test procedures) or different resonances of paths. A new opening in the container shell alters transmission paths. 
     WMD may include, but are not limited to, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, including “dirty bombs”. The detectors of WMD  60  may include nuclear/radiological detectors, biological detectors, chemical explosive detectors, or any combination thereof. The nuclear detectors will preferably detect the most common fissionable materials (Plutonium-239 and Uranium-235). Other current and future detectors of nuclear radiological materials may be used. Chemical/explosive detectors may include ion mobility and surface acoustic wave sensors. Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometers may also be used. 
     Various events may be logged. Such logging should include a date and time stamp. Examples of such loggable events include: GPS location logging, seal/unseal events, container volumetric signatures and tamper detection events. GPS location logging should occur whenever the container is sealed or unsealed and periodically during transit. The seal/unseal logging should include a biometric identification of the individual sealing or unsealing the container. Container volumetric signatures should be logged whenever the container is sealed or unsealed and periodically during transit. 
     Ships (or other vehicles)  14  are retrofitted with ship level sensors capable of detecting WMD threats contained within the structure of the ship (e.g., superstructure, hull, etc.), as well as container communications and global C 4  communications links. The shipboard systems not only facilitate transport of information from the containers to the global C 4  grid, but also manage the risk of threats that are not contained within containers. The ship (or other vehicle) includes ship level sensors for detecting nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The ship also includes communications links for communicating with the C4ISR grid and communications links for communicating with smart containers on board the ship. 
     As shown in  FIG. 2 , the C4ISR grid  16  fuses information from ships  14  and smart/secure containers  12 , with federal/state/local databases and implements the risk analysis decision/response cycle. The C4ISR grid includes a global C 4  communications link. It is capable of Federal/State/Local database fusion. It performs law enforcement, customs and intelligence (Intel) functions. The C4ISR also performs analysis/decision/response cycles. In order to perform these functions, the C4ISR grid implements a communications and secure data infrastructure  20 . This includes law enforcement database(s)  22 , customs database(s)  24 , Intel community database(s)  26 , and smart and biometrics data storage  28 . The communications and secure data infrastructure  20  includes smart containers  12  as well as a ship based sensor network (described above)  40  and a port based sensor network. The communications and secure data infrastructure  20  may also include an under-vehicle inspection system  44 , license plate readers  42 , ship and port smart card interrogators  34 , handheld interrogators  32 , and biometrics readers  30 . 
       FIG. 4  illustrates an exemplary system of operations for a smart container  12  that is loaded on a ship  14 . At a Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) member shipper location cargo is loaded into a smart and secure container. Subsequently an individual authorized by the shipper utilizes a handheld interrogator to electronically seal the container  80 . A biometric signature reader  30  with smart card storage medium, integral to the handheld interrogator, is utilized to verify the identity of the authorized individual. As part of the sealing action, the event is logged into container memory along with the authorizing biometric signature and manifest. 
     Subsequently a port crane lifts the container onto a container ship  82 . To ensure that containers that do not utilize smart/secure container technology are either not loaded onto the ship or that their existence is documented, the port crane utilizes an interrogator. The port crane interrogator queries the container (e.g., the RFID tag) during the lifting process. The lading is updated, the route, weight and center of gravity (CG) are loaded. In exemplary embodiments, during a transitional period of phasing out non-compliant existing containers  50  in favor of smart and secure containers  12 , the existence of non-compliant containers  12  are logged in ship memory via communication between the port crane interrogator and shipboard interrogator. When smart and secure containers  12  are universally deployed, non-compliant or non-functional containers  50  will be rejected and subsequently not loaded onto the ship  14 . 
     During blue water transit  84 , smart containers  12  communicate with each other and with the shipboard interrogator periodically generating an aggregate risk assessment. Risk assessments are generated from container and shipboard sensors, as well as potential deviations from planned routing. Given that arbitrary containers have no line-of-sight to the sky and GPS satellite resources, ship location information is related to containers via a store-and-forward ad-hoc network of intra-container communication links. 
     When the ship crosses the 200-mile homeland boundary an electronic interdiction and potential clearance to proceed to port occurs 86. Risk assessment, manifest and lading records are communicated to either a homeland based fusion center via satellite communications or to interdicting vehicles (air or sea) via the intra-container communication link. The information provided by the ship/container network is utilized to feed the analysis/decision/response cycle. Assuming that a low risk assessment is generated (e.g., ship did not divert to a high risk port, containers remained sealed, WMD sensors did not detect a threat, etc.) the ship  14  is given a clearance to proceed to port. Alternatively, if a threat has been identified, it has been identified at a range from the homeland sufficient for protection as well as within a timeline applicable for physical interdiction. 
     At the port of entry the container is unloaded  88  and via the port crane interrogator the lading record is updated, manifest read and risk assessment reconfirmed. 
     At the container&#39;s destination a handheld interrogator is utilized to electronically unseal the container  90  and, update the record of lading. Continuity in the end-to-end chain-of-custody establishes security assurance as well as underpins insurance industry indemnification. 
     The smart containers  12  described herein can be used to detect and identify WMD using NBC detectors. An example of one such detector is a cadmium zinc telluride gamma ray detector. However, it will be appreciated that other WMD detectors may be used instead of or in addition to NBC detectors. Such detectors may be presently existing detectors or may be detectors created in the future. 
     The smart containers  12  can be used to establish and verify end-to-end chain of custody. The containers  12  include integral door secured sensors and integral acoustic volumetric charge sensors. The GPS devices can be used to determine deviations from the planned route. The containers  12  are capable of stand-alone interrogation as well as interrogation when in stack (i.e., in communication with other containers and with the ship  14 ). Intra-container communications and the container/ship communications are accomplished via a wireless radio frequency (RF) link. Preferably, stored data is encrypted. 
     The containers  12  should be constructed to withstand a worldwide environment. They should minimize damage to/from cargo. Furthermore, externals should minimize damage to/from the containers and handling equipment, for example by placing externals, such as antenna, photovoltaic, etc. within the steel corrugations of the container. 
     The containers  12  should also have a minimal impact on economic commerce. One way in which this is achieved is by retrofitting existing containers. Other factors in minimizing economic impact include design and manufacturing which reduce safety hazards associated with the container system as well as design and construction so that the mean time between failures (MTBF) is in the magnitude of years. 
     The capabilities described above are implemented in smart containers  12 , fixed interrogators  34 , handheld interrogators  32  and a multi-hop RF network. In order to maintain container integrity, smart container  12  includes various features as described next. The containers include container subsystems for tamper detection, door open/close detection, gross content tamper detection and motion detection, for example, an ultrasound motion detector. The containers also include an accelerometer for detecting cutting, welding or opening of the container. The container also includes a volumetric change detection active acoustic reverberation signature as well as cargo height profiling ultrasound. The containers  12  also include route verification, GPS with a stored planned route. 
     The containers also include a container power source such as a container battery  72 . Various batteries may be used, such as lithium batteries. The container should also have a rechargeable power source  72  such as a photovoltaic cell. 
     The smart container  12  also includes an intra-container and container/interrogator link with the multi-hop RF network  74 . In exemplary embodiments the multi-hop RF network  74  uses an ad hoc network protocol. The multi-hop RF network  74  also includes a symmetric RF link. Containers  12  may communicate directly with a central logging location on the ship  14  or a container  12  may send information to another container  12 . The containers  12  continue to forward the information until a final container  12  forwards the information to the central logging location on the ship  14 . Any type of wireless technology currently available or available in the future that has suitable range may be used for implementing the communication links. The containers  12  send messages indicating the state of the container and the cargo stored within the container. For example, periodic status messages may be sent. Such messages include a container identification and time. The message may include additional information such as any changes from the previous message. Such changes may include volumetric changes, weight changes, new location information, breaching information, material changes (e.g., change in the composition of the container contents), etc. The messages may be sent at periodic intervals, e.g., every 5 minutes. The time intervals may vary based on the location of the transportation vehicle. For example, messages may be sent more often in specific geographic locations and/or as the transportation vehicle gets closer to the destination. 
     Fixed interrogators  34  include a fixed infrastructure link Ethernet connectivity. They may also include an optional wireless infrastructure (WLAN). The fixed interrogator may also include an optional global link SATCOM. An optional overhead link radar responsive tag may also be implemented. The fixed interrogator interrogates container status for the multi-hop RF network. 
     Handheld interrogators  32  are used to obtain identification of operator smart card readers. They have local infrastructure connectivity (WLAN). They are used to seal/unseal the communication link multi-hop RF network. The handheld interrogators  32  also provide physical verification of operator biometric signature readers  30 . 
     Additional modifications and improvements of the present invention may also be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, the particular combination of parts described and illustrated herein is intended to represent only a certain embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to serve as a limitation of alternative devices within the spirit and scope of the invention.
A smart container configured for transporting cargo on a transportation vehicle and a method for transporting the smart container on the transportation vehicle are disclosed. The smart container includes a container housing that has an opening for loading and unloading cargo. The opening can be sealed and unsealed. Disposed within the container housing is at least one detector for detecting deviations that could be indicative of possible threats (security concerns). A communications link is also disposed within the container housing. The communications link is capable of transmitting the possible threat information to a central cargo data collection location. For example, the container(s) on a transportation vehicle (e.g., a ship) transport information about the container to a central data collector onboard the ship. The central data collector may then transmit that information off of the ship, e.g., to a C4ISR grid.