Reasoning about Minimal Belief and Negation as Failure
  We investigate the problem of reasoning in the propositional fragment of
MBNF, the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure introduced by
Lifschitz, which can be considered as a unifying framework for several
nonmonotonic formalisms, including default logic, autoepistemic logic,
circumscription, epistemic queries, and logic programming. We characterize the
complexity and provide algorithms for reasoning in propositional MBNF. In
particular, we show that entailment in propositional MBNF lies at the third
level of the polynomial hierarchy, hence it is harder than reasoning in all the
above mentioned propositional formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. We also
prove the exact correspondence between negation as failure in MBNF and negative
introspection in Moore's autoepistemic logic.
