Using Enthymemes to Fill the Gap between Logical Argumentation and
  Revision of Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
  In this paper, we present a preliminary work on an approach to fill the gap
between logic-based argumentation and the numerous approaches to tackle the
dynamics of abstract argumentation frameworks. Our idea is that, even when
arguments and attacks are defined by means of a logical belief base, there may
be some uncertainty about how accurate is the content of an argument, and so
the presence (or absence) of attacks concerning it. We use enthymemes to
illustrate this notion of uncertainty of arguments and attacks. Indeed, as
argued in the literature, real arguments are often enthymemes instead of
completely specified deductive arguments. This means that some parts of the
pair (support, claim) may be missing because they are supposed to belong to
some "common knowledge", and then should be deduced by the agent which receives
the enthymeme. But the perception that agents have of the common knowledge may
be wrong, and then a first agent may state an enthymeme that her opponent is
not able to decode in an accurate way. It is likely that the decoding of the
enthymeme by the agent leads to mistaken attacks between this new argument and
the existing ones. In this case, the agent can receive some information about
attacks or arguments acceptance statuses which disagree with her argumentation
framework. We exemplify a way to incorporate this new piece of information by
means of existing works on the dynamics of abstract argumentation frameworks.
