Using arguments for making decisions: A possibilistic logic approach
  Humans currently use arguments for explaining choices which are already made,
or for evaluating potential choices. Each potential choice has usually pros and
cons of various strengths. In spite of the usefulness of arguments in a
decision making process, there have been few formal proposals handling this
idea if we except works by Fox and Parsons and by Bonet and Geffner. In this
paper we propose a possibilistic logic framework where arguments are built from
an uncertain knowledge base and a set of prioritized goals. The proposed
approach can compute two kinds of decisions by distinguishing between
pessimistic and optimistic attitudes. When the available, maybe uncertain,
knowledge is consistent, as well as the set of prioritized goals (which have to
be fulfilled as far as possible), the method for evaluating decisions on the
basis of arguments agrees with the possibility theory-based approach to
decision-making under uncertainty. Taking advantage of its relation with formal
approaches to defeasible argumentation, the proposed framework can be
generalized in case of partially inconsistent knowledge, or goal bases.
