The Counterfactual NESS Definition of Causation
  In previous work with Joost Vennekens I proposed a definition of actual
causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the
debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a
more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways.
First, I show that our definition is in fact a formalization of Wright's famous
NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making
condition. This means that our definition integrates two highly influential
approaches to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other.
Second, I modify our definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken
the difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids the problematic
analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition
of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and
the NESS approach.
