Defining Concepts of Emotion: From Philosophy to Science
  This paper is motivated by a series of (related) questions as to whether a
computer can have pleasure and pain, what pleasure (and intensity of pleasure)
is, and, ultimately, what concepts of emotion are.
  To determine what an emotion is, is a matter of conceptualization, namely,
understanding and explicitly encoding the concept of emotion as people use it
in everyday life. This is a notoriously difficult problem (Frijda, 1986, Fehr
\& Russell, 1984). This paper firstly shows why this is a difficult problem by
aligning it with the conceptualization of a few other so called semantic
primitives such as "EXIST", "FORCE", "BIG" (plus "LIMIT"). The definitions of
these thought-to-be-indefinable concepts, given in this paper, show what formal
definitions of concepts look like and how concepts are constructed. As a
by-product, owing to the explicit account of the meaning of "exist", the famous
dispute between Einstein and Bohr is naturally resolved from linguistic point
of view. Secondly, defending Frijda's view that emotion is action tendency (or
Ryle's behavioral disposition (propensity)), we give a list of emotions defined
in terms of action tendency. In particular, the definitions of pleasure and the
feeling of beauty are presented.
  Further, we give a formal definition of "action tendency", from which the
concept of "intensity" of emotions (including pleasure) is naturally derived in
a formal fashion. The meanings of "wish", "wait", "good", "hot" are analyzed.
